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Media policy debates are today marred by outdated and 
ultimately unworkable justifications for government intervention in 
media markets. Both proponents and opponents of such intervention 
have obscured the appropriate goals of media policy.  Moreover, they 
have paid insufficient attention to the impact of digital media on the 
marketplace of ideas.   This article proposes a new account of media 
policy goals and offers the first detailed analysis of how new media 
market dynamics should affect future media policies. 
Policies that promote greater diversity in video products, 
whether through regulations or subsidies, serve both reactive and 
proactive purposes.  In its reactive posture, media policy aims to 
correct what I call narrow market failures.  These are failures of 
media markets to deliver content that small audience segments desire.  
But media policy must also pursue a proactive agenda by 
supplementing even well-functioning markets.  This proactive thrust 
responds to broad failures of the market to deliver media content that 
audiences might not currently desire, but promotes democratic 
discourse and social solidarity.   
What this article shows is that digital networks substantially 
affect both reactive and proactive media policy objectives.  Existing 
media policies are premised on the mid-twentieth century reality of 
scarce content and abundant audience attention.  But in the digital 
era, it is attention that is scarce and content that is abundant.  
Drawing on empirical evidence and theory from several disciplines, I 
show how this shift changes the narrow market failures to which 
media policy must respond and undermines past responses to broad 
market failures.  This article concludes with an application of these 
theories to media subsidies, arguing that subsidies for a robust public 
service media are the proper channel for media policy in the digital 
era from both a First Amendment and practical perspective.
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I. Introduction
Federal media policy is in a state of flux.  In 2003, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) relaxed its limits on media 
concentration in a controversial ruling that both Congress and the 
courts later criticized.1  Now, the FCC will re-evaluate these rules 
*
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1988.   
1
 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, Report and 
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, 13634 (2003), 
remanded in part sub nom. Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 
(3rd Cir. 2004)  [hereinafter Media Ownership Order].  Both during and after the 
FCC deliberations, there emerged surprisingly fierce and widespread opposition to 
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amidst heated debates about broadcast “indecency,”2 public television 
funding,3 and public interest obligations for digital television.4  As 
these policy disputes unfold, the media landscape is changing 
dramatically, most notably because of digital networks.  And yet, 
analysis of how emerging patterns of media use affect policy has been 
relatively scant.5  Moreover, neither policymakers nor commentators 
have effectively articulated media policy goals beyond a narrow 
allegiance to consumer sovereignty.   
This Article offers a new analytic framework for evaluating 
media policies in the digital era.  It starts from the following premise:  
the purpose of government intervention in video markets has as much 
to do with influencing the consumption of media products as with 
responding to existing consumer demands that the market has failed 
to satisfy.  In this sense, media policy must be, and to some extent has 
long been, proactive as well as reactive.  An emphasis on the reactive 
media ownership deregulation.  See Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols, Up in 
Flames, NATION, Nov. 17, 2003, at 11; Gal Beckerman, Tripping Up Big Media, 
COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 15.  Opponents of media 
consolidation, including such disparate groups as the ACLU, the National Rifle 
Association, the AFL-CIO, the Parents Television Council, and the National 
Organization for Women, achieved what was thought to be impossible:  a 
Republican Congress’ roll-back of a Republican FCC’s rule changes within one 
month.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 
Stat. 3, 99 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 2004)).  
2
 In the aftermath of the notorious breast-baring performance of singer Janet 
Jackson at the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show, Congress loudly moved to 
introduce legislation increasing penalties for indecent broadcasts. Broadcast 
Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. 3717, 108th Cong.; Broadcast Decency 
Enforcement Act of 2004, S.2056, 108th Cong.  The FCC recently requested 
comment, in response to a Congressional directive, on whether some violent 
programming should be considered “indecent.”  Violent Television Programming 
and its Impact on Children, Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 04-261 (July 28, 
2004).
3
 The funding of public television will be at issue in the reauthorization of the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, see The Public Broadcasting Reauthorization 
Act of 2004, S. 2645, 108th Cong., and in initiatives to funnel federal support for 
public television into a permanently-funded trust fund.  See Testimony of John M. 
Lawson, President and CEO, The Association of Public Television Stations before 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (June 9, 2004), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1220&wit_id=3514.
4 See Public Interest Obligations of Television Broadcast Licensees, Notice of 
Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21633 (1999); Children’s Television Obligations of Digital 
Television Broadcasters, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 22946 
(2000).
5
 This article deals with the subset of media policy comprised of federal intervention
in the market for video distributed to the public by cable, broadcast, satellite, and 
Internet broadband networks.  
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media policy goal – the perfection of consumer sovereignty – has 
dominated the discourse since media deregulation gathered speed in 
the 1980’s.  Indeed the most powerful critique of media regulatory 
policy today is that media markets are competitive enough to ensure 
that consumers are well served.6  To date, commentators have failed 
to answer such critiques effectively in light of technological change,7
and policymakers have largely proceeded on the assumption that these 
critiques are correct. 
By articulating the proactive justification for media policy, 
this article offers a new prescription for public policy in this area.  On 
the conceptual level, media policy should support the kind of 
marketplace of ideas that democracies need, doing more than just 
promoting the satisfaction of existing tastes.  It must strive to cultivate 
those tastes in ways that build social solidarity and democratic debate.  
There was little need to distinguish the proactive from the reactive in 
media policy theory so long as conditions of mid-twentieth century 
media markets obtained.  These were conditions in which video 
content was scarce and audience attention was abundant.  A public 
hungry for content and captive to the schedules of three major 
broadcast networks was likely to be exposed in significant numbers to 
all content on offer, even programming that it did not initially 
demand.    
In the changing technological environment, with digital 
networks remaking the mediascape, the scarce resource is attention, 
not programming.  Content abundance is replacing scarcity and 
attention scarcity is replacing audience captivity to network 
schedules.  Today, consumers sit in the eye of a storm of bits surging 
through cable and satellite channels, DVDs, video games and 
websites.8  Moreover, program guides and search engines allow them 
6 See, e.g., Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform:  The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 and the FCC Media Ownership Rules, 2003 DET. C. L. REV. 671; Christopher 
S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L. J. 1579 
(2003).
7 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002); CASS 
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
8
 Digital plenty has a holographic character, allowing critics to see media products 
as either tremendously diverse or monotonously similar.  The perception of 
diversity focuses on the sheer number of outlets.  For example, most Americans 
have access to more than 100 television channels, dozens of radio stations, and 
thousands of Internet radio stations and news venues.  Media Ownership Order, 
supra note xx at 13620, 13634 (2003); Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Tenth Annual 
Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, 1608 (2004) [hereinafter Video Competition Report]; 
Testimony of Michael Powell, FCC Chairman, before the Comm. on Commerce, 
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to construct their own media environment into which the unsought 
media experience seldom strays. The supply of programming for 
which there is no ready demand, but anticipated public value, is 
unlikely to reach viewers who are otherwise committed.    
The growing abundance of media content, contrary to the 
claims of deregulators, is not a basis for the dismantling of media 
policy.  Rather, new media dynamics require new policy approaches.  
First, policymakers must resist the facile conclusion that media 
abundance guarantees consumer satisfaction.  Rather, notwithstanding 
the explosion of media distribution channels, there will remain 
demand that media producers fail to satisfy because of the economic 
and cultural characteristics of media.  Second, technological change 
requires an emphasis on media subsidies as opposed to regulations, as 
an instrument of proactive media policy.  Subsidies can achieve what 
regulations cannot:  they can influence consumer appetites 
constitutionally, without relying on the shaky First Amendment 
exceptionalism that underlies much broadcast regulation.9
In conceptualizing a new vision for media policy, this Article 
progresses as follows.  Part II distills what I have identified as 
reactive and proactive media policy goals, showing how they grow 
out of various democratic theories, how they have been implemented 
to varying degrees in policy, and how they relate to varieties of 
market failure.  
Science, and Transp., available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235127A1.pdf (June 4, 
2003) (“people today have access to more information from more diverse sources 
than at any time in our history…”).  The perception of sameness focuses on patterns 
of ownership of, and programming on, these many channels.  See, e.g., BEN 
BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 3-26 (4th ed. 1996) (showing how the largest 
media companies dominate the print, broadcast, cable, satellite, film and online 
content industries); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, CORPORATE MEDIA AND THE THREAT 
TO DEMOCRACY 17-22 (1997) (arguing that big media produce voluminous amounts 
of homogeneous content).  
9
 Regulations of broadcasting that would be unconstitutional if applied to print or 
new electronic media like cable and the Internet, have passed muster on the grounds 
that the airwaves are unusually scarce and the government’s interest in controlling 
them unusually great.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC 
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).  Multiplying channels of communication 
undermine this First Amendment exceptionalism.  See infra notes xx and 
accompanying text.  I have argued elsewhere that tightening First Amendment 
constraints on media policy necessitate the more creative use of subsidies, as 
opposed to regulations, to effectuate policy goals.  See Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains 
in the Information Marketplace:  The Use of Government Subsidies to Regulate New 
Media, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. LAW 217, 224-28, 231-38 (2002).
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Part III shows how digital media affect the pursuit of these 
media policy agendas.  By analyzing the relationship between distinct 
policy goals and consumer choice in both the ebbing analog 
mediascape and the emerging digital one, I demonstrate how digital 
media may improve the functioning of media markets, but will not 
correct all failures of the market to satisfy consumer demand.  More 
importantly, digital media will reduce the likelihood of consumer 
exposure to unsought, but ultimately valuable, media experiences.  
Given the consumer impact of new media dynamics, Part IV 
argues that simply putting content into the mass media flow is 
unlikely to attract viewers to content they did not seek, but media 
policy urges upon them.  At the same time, First Amendment 
constraints limit the creative possibilities of media regulation.  Pursuit 
of proactive media policy goals requires a new emphasis on media 
subsidies, and a new brand of public service media that engages a 
distracted and fractured audience in content that is important for 
democratic flourishing.  Media subsidies must literally emerge from 
the broadcast box to be effective in the digital mediascape, taking 
advantage of new communicative tools, techniques, and real space 
encounters to bring the public to programming.  Recent “out of the 
box” public broadcasting initiatives, although limited by existing legal 
authority and funding, illustrate the possibilities for using multiple 
distribution platforms and techniques of public engagement to 
develop demand for and exposure to under-produced content.  
II. Media Policy, Civic Life, and Consumer Sovereignty 
Media policy assumes a special bond between media outputs 
and the character and vibrancy of democracy – a connection that does 
not exist for other consumer products.10  The existence of this bond 
charges media policy discussions and fuses them to a larger discourse 
about democratic culture.  At the same time, video products are 
consumer goods, chosen or rejected through marketplace mechanics.  
Obscured in both media policy and the underlying theory is the 
appropriate relationship between policy goals and the market.    
The most vigorously defended, and widely embraced, posture 
of media policy is reactive.  In this stance, policy submits to the yoke 
of consumer sovereignty and strives to make media markets more 
10 See Cheryl Leanza and Harold Feld, More than “A Toaster with Pictures”: 
Defending Media Ownership Limits, 21 COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER 12 (2003).  
Despite its ambitions, American media policy is today a rather modest enterprise.  
Indeed, there is very little to it outside of structural regulations, consumer protection 
rules, subsidies in the broadcast area, and some limited access requirements for 
cable and satellite.  
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responsive to consumer demand.  Another posture, sometimes evident 
in policy, but required by theory, is proactive or aspirational.  The 
proactive approach to media policy accepts, as Cass Sunstein has put 
it, that there “is a large difference between the public interest and 
what interests the public.”11 Between the reactive and aspirational 
approaches is the tension between satisfying and shaping media 
experiences – a tension that digital media exacerbate.  This section 
briefly outlines today’s major media policy goals: diversity and 
localism in commercial media, and diversity, localism and the elusive 
property of excellence in noncommercial media.12  It goes on to show 
how the policies themselves and their theoretical justifications depend 
on, but sell short, aspirations to shape media experiences through 
policy.
A. Media Policy Components
The Supreme Court has identified speech diversity as a “basic 
tenet of national communications policy” because “the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”13  Diversity policy is 
11
 Cass Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 501 
(2000).  But cf. Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to 
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 202, 210-11 (1982) (“the public’s interest 
… defines the public interest.”).
12
 Philip Napoli has made particularly careful study of diversity and localism.  See 
Philip M. Napoli, Deconstructing the Diversity Principle, 49 J. COMM. 7 (1999); 
Philip M. Napoli, The Localism Principle Under Stress, 2 INFO: J. POL’Y, REG. & 
STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM. INFO. & MEDIA 573 (2000), Philip M. Napoli, The 
Localism Principle in Communications Policymaking and Policy Analysis:  
Ambiguity, Inconsistency, and Empirical Neglect, 29 POL. STUD. J. 372 (2001), 
Philip M. Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication Policy, 
2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 797.  Another important goal of media policy 
is to increase competition in media markets.  See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, 
supra note xx at 13642 (stating that increased competition in media markets 
produces “more innovation and improved service”).  To the extent that competition 
is desired for non-economic reasons, it duplicates the diversity goal.  To the extent 
that competition serves economic purposes, it is it is an objective of most regulatory 
intervention in markets and does not distinguish media policy.    
13
 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 
n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 
1, 20 (1945)).  Endorsements of speech diversity as a primary media policy goal 
abound.  See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990) 
(upholding minority ownership policies on grounds that they furthered media 
diversity); FCC v. Nat’l. Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) 
(upholding broadcast ownership regulations aimed at diversifying mass media); Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing 
diversity as a legitimate goal of media policy); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
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embedded in twentieth century First Amendment jurisprudence.14  It 
reflects the instrumentalist free speech tradition that values unfettered 
expression for society’s sake, not for the speaker’s sake.15
Expression, in antagonistic engagement, is expected to produce a 
healthy democratic culture of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open 
debate.”16  This debate, in turn is important for uncovering truths 
important for both public and private life.17  Taking its instructions 
U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (upholding policies promoting “access to a multiplicity of 
information sources”).  
14 See, e.g., Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 663 (characterizing 
speech diversity policy as “a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it 
promotes values central to the First Amendment.”). See also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens 
Comm. For Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (associating the FCC’s public interest 
mandate with First Amendment goals).
15 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the 
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is 
paramount.”).  See also Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1405, 1409-11 (1986) (defending the instrumentalist view of the First 
Amendment); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 275-77 
(1992).  The Supreme Court has drawn on this instrumentalist view a number of 
times to uphold media structural regulations.  See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding rules governing network and affiliate station 
relationships); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. For Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) 
(upholding cross-ownership restrictions between local newspapers and broadcast 
stations).  See generally, C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting:  Content-Based 
Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57.  In recent years, lower 
courts have taken a more essentialist, liberty oriented view of the First Amendment 
in communications cases, resulting in the reversal of media regulations held to 
infringe on media companies’ speech rights.  See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment 
Co., v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that cable 
ownership restrictions interfere with operators’ “speech rights by restricting the 
number of viewers to whom they can speak.”); Comcast Cablevision v. Broward 
County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that local regulation 
requiring cable operators to carry competing broadband providers violated 
operators’ speech rights).   See generally C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration:
Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 847-855 (2002) (criticizing recent 
lower court decisions on structural media regulations).
16
 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
17 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 13-48 (R. McCallum ed., 
1948) (extolling a diverse and contentious press as a defense against excessive state 
power); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), in 2 Complete Prose Works of John 
Milton 486 passim (E. Sirluck ed., 1959) (same); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the purpose of the First Amendment is to preserve “an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”).
Contemporary theorists have extended the desired field of informational combat to 
include cultural as well as narrowly political expression.  See, e.g., BAKER [MEDIA, 
MARKETS], supra note xx at 143-153 (advocating a complex democracy centered on 
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from this instrumentalist free speech tradition, the FCC, operating 
almost entirely within the broadcast arena, has tried to foster debate 
by increasing the number of viewpoints, program genres, program 
sources, and owners of distribution outlets within a market.18  After 
experimenting with approaches aimed at each kind of diversity, the 
agency has settled on increasing the number of independently owned 
broadcast distribution outlets as the principal tool of diversity 
policy.19
Ostensibly distinct from, but closely related to diversity 
policy, is broadcast localism policy.  This policy seeks to improve 
broadcaster responsiveness to the needs and interests of the local 
community, especially by strengthening the local voice in media.20
With localism as with diversity, ownership rules now bear the weight 
of policy goals once encoded in more varied regulations.21  By 
cultural diversity). Courts have taken the same expansive approach.  See, e.g.,
Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1473 (C.D. Cal. 1992), 
aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (“Artistic expression, 
no less than academic speech or journalism … is at the core of a democratic 
society’s cultural and political vitality.”).
18
 Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13627 (identifying viewpoint, outlet, 
program, source, and minority and female ownership diversity metrics).  For a 
comprehensive discussion of FCC rules emanating from its diversity policy, see 3 
HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN, ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14.4 (1999).  
19 See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13633-13634.  Policymakers 
have long linked the ownership of media outlets with the viewpoint expressed in 
programming.  Id. at 13629-30 (discussing evidence of, and continued adherence to 
policy based on, this linkage).  See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 
73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM 
and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 FCC 1476, 1477 (1964) (“[T]he greater the 
diversity of ownership in a particular area, the less chance there is that a single 
person or group can have an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or similar 
programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level.”). The Supreme Court 
has sanctioned this linkage. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 571 n. 16 
(1990) (“ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the 
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation…”).   
20
 For early endorsements of localism policy, see, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville 
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 139 (1940) (denying broadcasting application 
because “applicant did not sufficiently represent local interests in the community.”); 
FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 362 (1955) (upholding FCC’s 
authority to distribute broadcast licenses “to a community in order to secure local 
competition for originating and broadcasting programs of local interest”).   
Congress reaffirmed localism as a media policy goal in the legislative history of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act, H. Rep. No. 104-104 (1996) at 221 (localism “is a 
vitally important value, …  [and] should be preserved and enhanced as we reform 
our laws for the next century.”).  
21
 Localism is, in principle, preserved through limitations on network ownership of 
local stations and restrictions on network contractual requirements of their affiliated 
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restricting ownership of local broadcast stations, the FCC hopes to 
bolster local control over media content as measured by an ill-defined 
brew of locally-produced content, content on matters of local interest, 
and local say over content.22   Despite the ambiguity of the concept, 
the recent political and popular protest against the FCC’s relaxation of 
its broadcast ownership rules is a reminder that localism has broad 
appeal.23  The courts continue to affirm localism as a media policy 
goal and the FCC and Congress continue to assert it in regulating 
existing and new media distribution services.24
stations.  47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2003).  See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943) (upholding these rules, then referred to as 
the chain broadcasting rules, as within the FCC’s authority).  Other localism-based 
requirements are that broadcast stations maintain a local studio, 47 C.F.R. §73.1125 
(2003), maintain a public inspection file including a list of programs concerning 
community issues, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(e)(11)(i) (2003), and give local 
communities a chance to petition to deny a station’s application for renewal or 
transfer of license, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3580 (2003).
22
 Four times in the past several years, the courts have vacated or remanded 
challenged broadcast and cable ownership regulations on the grounds that they were 
not sufficiently well defended. Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 
372, 435 (3rd Cir. 2004); Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027,1053 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (vacating rules 
prohibiting broadcast station and cable system ownership in same market and 
remanding national broadcast ownership cap); Sinclair Broadcast Group Inc. v. 
FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (invaliding limits on ownership of 
multiple television broadcast stations within a market); Time Warner v. FCC, 240 
F.3d 1126, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating cable ownership caps and channel 
occupancy provisions).
23 See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13624 (describing public concerns 
over localism).  In an effort to articulate the localism interest and measure 
“localism” performance among broadcasters, the FCC established a Localism Task 
Force to hold hearings across the country on the issue, Press Release, “FCC 
Chairman Powell Launches ‘Localism in Broadcasting’ Initiative,” at 2-3 (Aug. 20, 
2003), at http://www.fcc.gov/localism, and issued a Notice of Inquiry concerning 
new localism rules.   Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 04-
233 (July 1, 2004).
24 See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13644 (“We remain firmly 
committed to the policy of promoting localism among broadcast outlets.”); Fox 
Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1042 (“[T]he public interest has historically 
embraced … localism…”).  The FCC adopted localism rules for its new low power 
radio service.  Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (1999); 47 
C.F.R. § 73.853(b) (limiting initial eligibility for licensees to local entities); 47 
C.F.R. § 73.872(b)(1), (3) (giving preference to license applicants that have had an 
established community presence for two years and those that pledge “to originate 
locally at least eight hours of programming per day” respectively).  At the direction 
of Congress, the FCC adopted more substantive localism rules when it created a 
new low power television service.  Establishment of a Class A Television Service, 
15 F.C.C.R. 6355, 6363-64 (2000) (requiring new low power television stations to 
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The pursuit of speech diversity and localism extends beyond 
the regulation of commercial media to support for noncommercial 
media, by way of federal subsidies for public broadcast programming 
and transmission facilities.25  Public broadcasting was conceived in 
large part as a means to satisfy consumer appetites for diverse and 
local content that the market overlooked.  The public broadcasting 
system was assembled in the 1960’s from scattered local stations, 
supported principally by state legislatures, universities, and 
foundation grants, which provided instructional and other educational 
programming.26 In 1965, the independent Carnegie Commission 
issued A Program for Action, in which it called for a new system of 
“public television.”27  This system would retain its local character, 
and its connections with local and regional institutions like 
universities.28  It would also be charged with an explicitly diversity-
broadcast a minimum amount of programming produced locally as required by 47 
U.S.C. § 336(f)(2)). Congress has also tried to advance localism goals in recent 
satellite policy.  47 U.S.C. § 338 (2003) (establishing a framework for the 
retransmission of local broadcast television signals on satellite).
25 See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 368-69 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2003)).  Support for noncommercial media can also 
be found in rules requiring satellite broadcasters to reserve four percent of their 
channel capacity for “noncommercial programming of an educational or 
informational nature.” 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (2003); Implementation of Section 25 
of the Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Direct Broadcast 
Satellite Public Interest Obligations, 13 FCC Rcd 23254, 23285 (1998).  In addition, 
cable operators may be required, under their local franchise agreements, to devote a 
certain amount of channel capacity and equipment to noncommercial public, 
educational, and governmental programming. 47 U.S.C. § 531; 47 C.F.R. § 76.702 
(2003).  
26 See GEORGE H. GIBSON, PUBLIC BROADCASTING:  THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, 1912-76 3 (1977).  Beginning in the late 1950’s, legislators began to 
envision a national network that would knit these stations together, although still 
mainly for local educational purposes.  In 1957, Senator Warren Magnuson 
introduced a bill “to expedite the utilization of television facilities in our schools 
and colleges, and in adult training programs.”  104 Cong. Rec. 7141 (1957), quoted 
in John E. Burke, The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967:  Part I:  Historical Origins 
and the Carnegie Commission, 6 EDUC. BROAD. REV. 105, 108 (1972).  The bill did 
not pass, but between 1958 and 1962, Congress held 18 public hearings and four 
floor debates on similar legislation.  See James Ledbetter, Funding and Economics 
of American Public Television, in PUBLIC TELEVISION IN AMERICA 73, 75 (Eli M. 
Noam and Jens Waltermann eds., 1998).
27 THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION:  PUBLIC TELEVISION, A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967) 
[hereinafter Carnegie Commission Report].
28
  The Carnegie Commission hoped for noncommercial programming that would 
“deepen a sense of community in local life… show us our community as it really is 
… bring into the home meetings … where people of the community express their 
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enhancing mission to develop and distribute distinctive national 
programming.29  Finally, as E.B. White captured in correspondence 
with the Carnegie Commission, noncommercial television would 
“address itself to the ideal of excellence” through programs that 
“arouse our dreams [and] satisfy our hunger for beauty,” delivered by 
a system capable of becoming “our Lyceum, our Chautauqua,  . . . and 
our Camelot.”30
The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 closely followed the 
Carnegie Commission’s recommendations, incorporating not only 
localism and diversity aspirations, but also its insistence on 
excellence.31
B. Reactive Policy Thrust:  Serving the Consumer
Each of the policies discussed above is implemented through 
rules and subsidies aimed at enhancing the array of consumer media 
choices. 32   These policies posit the existence of unsatisfied consumer 
demand for such media options, to which government then reacts.  
Indeed, democratic theories analogizing discourse to market 
exchanges support reactive policies that improve service to the 
sovereign consumer.  
Both diversity and localism policy, and to a lesser extent 
noncommercial media policy, are dominated by the “marketplace of 
ideas” metaphor of speech competition.33  It is from this metaphor 
hopes, their protests, their enthusiasms, and their will.”  CARNEGIE COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note xx at 92-99.
29 CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note xx at 3 (finding that “a well-financed 
and well-directed educational television system, substantially larger and far more 
pervasive and effective than that which now exists in the United States, must be 
brought into being if the full needs of the American public are to be served.”).
30
 Letter of E.B. White to Stephen White, Assistant to Chairman of the Carnegie 
Commission, Sept. 26, 1966, at
http://www.current.org/pbpb/carnegie/EBWhiteLetter.html.
31
 47 U.S.C. §396(a) (2003) (to further the general welfare, noncommercial 
television should be “responsive to the interests of people both in particular 
localities and throughout the United States, and which will constitute an expression 
of diversity and excellence…”).
32 See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, supra note _ at 13788 (“Ultimately, our goal is 
not to prescribe what content citizens access, but to ensure that a wide range of 
viewpoints have an opportunity to reach the public.”).
33
 The term “marketplace of ideas” is usually attributed to Justice Holmes.  Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J. dissenting) (“the best test of 
truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market…”).  The actual phrase was first used much later.  See Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).   
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that the FCC’s efforts to diversify speech radiate.34  Embedded in the 
marketplace metaphor is an image of speech consumers and of 
speech.  Listeners pursue truth much as they might pursue bargains, 
turning over a wide range of ideas in competition with each other.35
In this sense, the marketplace analogy is all about an open and 
competitive market that can supply consumers with the content they 
want.    
Notwithstanding the criticism the marketplace metaphor has 
endured, policymakers seem largely untroubled by its use.36  More 
troubling has been the question of what kind of competition and 
quality of antagonism media policy should promote. Attempts to 
increase one form of diversity, like independently owned distribution 
outlets, might actually decrease diversity along other lines, like 
program genre.37  This is the position the media giant Clear Channel 
34 See, e.g., Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13627 (the pursuit of a 
diverse and robust marketplace of ideas is at “the foundation of our democracy.”); 
id. at 13631 (the FCC’s “core policy objective of facilitating robust democratic 
discourse in the media” is premised on the notion that “the free flow of ideas under-
girds and sustains our system of government.”).  The FCC began to use the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor with regularity in 1967.  See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY:  PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS IN THE 
REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 109-121 (2001) (reporting results of empirical 
study).  
35 See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 50 
(1989); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 
(1984).
36
 For criticism of this metaphor, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 25- 28, 46-51 (1993) (applying traditional critiques of 
free markets to speech markets and proposing a New Deal for speech); Owen M. 
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-1413 (1986) 
(criticizing the dominant free speech tradition which equates freedom from 
government intrusion with uninhibited and robust debate); Stanley Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas:  A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1, 48-50 (arguing that 
the marketplace metaphor perpetuates a myth of personal autonomy which supports 
the status quo and a system that simply fine-tunes differences among elites).
37
 This is because efficient combinations of media outlets may create the conditions 
for genre diversity. See  Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis 
for Radio Deregulation, 12 J. MEDIA ECONS. 19, 23 (1999); BRUCE M. OWEN & 
STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 65-68 (1992) (outlining Peter Steiner’s 
model of viewer preference in which competing media outlets duplicate 
programming to capture the largest audience in contrast to a monopolist which 
would differentiate media offerings); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and 
Democracy:  A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1936-1951 (2000) 
(discussing Steiner’s and other economic modeling of the effects of concentrated 
distribution markets on program diversity); Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1449 (1996) (“In an increasingly diverse landscape of leisure 
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takes, for example, when confronting criticism that its ownership of 
some 1200 radio stations has reduced variety in radio content. The 
efficiencies of concentrated ownership, the company claims, have 
allowed it to increase programming genres that the public demands.38
While some listeners might miss the idiosyncratic voice, most 
listeners are better satisfied.39  Wal-Mart can make the same claim as 
it out-competes small businesses that are diversely owned, but 
provide a narrower range of products.  The important aspect of this 
debate for our purposes is that it turns on different dimensions of 
consumer satisfaction.
The same reactive thrust has dominated localism policy.  
Local stations are required, in an undefined and largely unenforced 
way, to satisfy consumer demand for difference.40  Indeed, in this 
respect, localism policy is really a subset of diversity policy.  Policy 
interventions to ensure that local media outlets respond to community 
interests are simply another way of increasing the number of 
competing perspectives available to viewers – particularly those 
perspectives within distinct geographic markets that may be lost in the 
options, only concentrated broadcasters can attain the scale needed to garner and 
market” diverse and desirable programming.).  
38
 For an account of this debate, see Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition:  How 
Radio Consolidation Has Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 279, 313-321 (2003).  The FCC itself 
has concluded that more concentrated outlet ownership might produce more genre 
diversity. Review of Commission Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 
10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3551 (1995) (“where there are competing parties, each of their 
strategies would be to go after the median viewer with the ‘greatest common 
denominator’ programming…[whereas] where one party owned all the stations in a 
market, its strategy would likely be to put on a sufficiently varied programming 
menu in each time slot to appeal to all substantial interests.”).  
39
 The courts have criticized the FCC for failing to make explicit tradeoffs between 
different kinds of diversity. Schurz Communications v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-
1055 (7th Cir. 1992) (remanding financial interest and syndication rules as arbitrary 
and capricious in part because the FCC did not explain how rules designed to 
increase source diversity would enhance program diversity); Sinclair Broad. Group 
v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (the FCC 
“should define its diversity goal, and in doing so explain the distinctions (and 
interaction) between programming diversity and viewpoint diversity, rather than 
simply quoting boilerplate on the ‘elusiveness’ of diversity.”).
40
 Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13644 (“The Commission decided long 
ago that local station licensees have a responsibility to air programming that is 
suited to the tastes and needs of their community”) (citing Deregulation of Radio, 
84 FCC 2d 968, 981 (1960)).  
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national din.41  Consider, for example, the early structural approach to 
localism epitomized in the requirement that the FCC distribute 
broadcast licenses to as many communities as possible.42  This 
elevation of cities and towns, at the expense of larger political or 
territorial units, reflects the early republican belief in disbursed power 
as a guarantor of liberty.43  In media as in politics, the hope was that 
devolution of control would promote responsiveness to the will of the 
people.44  After experimenting with more substantive rules, discussed 
below, the FCC has returned to this structural approach over the past 
several decades.  At the heart of this approach is the notion that some 
combination of market pressures and licensee responsibility will 
produce a satisfying local service, so long as the market is not unduly 
concentrated.45
41 See Sixth Report and Order on Television Allocations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952) 
(localism policies “protect[] the interests of the public residing in smaller cities and 
rural areas more adequately than any other system.”).
42
 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (directing the FCC to “make such distribution of licenses, 
frequencies, hours of operation, and power among the several States and 
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio 
service to each of the same.”).  See generally FCC Policy Statement on 
Comparative Hearings, 1 F.C.C. 2d 393 (1965).  
43 See Andrew Calabrese, Why Localism?  Communication Technology and the 
Shifting Scales of Political Community, in COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 251, 
253 (Gregory J. Shepherd et al., ed., 2001) (“U.S. communications policy has 
always been nominally committed to the idea of localism as a Jeffersonian-style 
means of promoting decentralized public discourse about matters of social and 
political consequence.”); ROBERT B. HOROWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY 
REFORM:  THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 174 (1989) 
(localism was a “surprisingly conscious policy” connected with the Jeffersonian 
idea of small-town America).  But see Office of Technology Assessment, Critical 
Connections:  Communication for the Future 148-9 (1992) (noting that America’s 
early legislators thought that “media subsidies” should sponsor the distribution of 
post and newspapers to foster the development of a national identity through 
communications). 
44
 For a discussion of localism as the core value of federalism, see Frank B. Cross, 
The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20-25 (2002); Coll. Sav. Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (lauding “local control over local decisions”). See also 
MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 215 
(1995) (localism policies were “designed to reinforce a vision of American life and 
imagination in which the geographical community had dignity.”).
45 See Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 04-233, ¶1 (July 1, 
2004) (in the 1980’s, the FCC “found that market forces, in an increasingly 
competitive environment, would encourage broadcasters” to serve local 
communities).  The Supreme Court has endorsed indirectly the structural approach 
to localism in upholding the statutory requirement that cable operators retransmit 
broadcast signals within their local communities.  Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 
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The dominance of the structural, reactive approach to localism 
can be seen in the recent battles over local television ownership 
restrictions.  Those opposing these restrictions attempted to show that 
the market ensured responsiveness to local consumer demand for such 
products as local news.46  This is because local news is often the most 
profitable part of a station’s operations.47  In other words, the stations 
are meaningfully local because they are responsive to consumer 
demand for the local.  Supporters of the ownership restrictions have 
fought on the same grounds, arguing that the rules are necessary to 
satisfy consumer desires.48  The FCC too has come to equate localism 
520 U.S. 180, 194 (1997) (emphasizing that cognizable governmental interest was 
in promoting local control of the broadcast transmission service, not local content 
per se).  But see 520 U.S. 180, 234-35 (O’Connor J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
asserted governmental interest was a “content-based preference for broadcast 
programming” that is local, not a content-neutral preference for local control).
46
 Comments of Fox Entertainment Group, et al. in 2002 Biennial Regulatory 
Review  Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other 
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 35-37 (F.C.C. 
filed Jan. 2, 2003); Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13838-13839;
Thomas C. Spavins, Loretta Denison, Scott Roberts, Jane Frenette, The 
Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs Programs (2002), at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A12.doc (FCC 
commissioned study finding that network-owned stations air 23% more local news 
and public affairs programming per week than independent stations); Media 
Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13678-93 (discussing results of FCC-
commissioned study).  
47 See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION
111 (1973) (showing how local news is popular and cheap to produce, making it 
highly profitable); Vernon Stone, News Operations at U.S. TV Stations, at
http://www.missouri/edu/~jourvs/tvops.html.  But see Reply Comments of The 
National Association of Broadcasters and Network Affiliated Stations Alliance in 
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review  Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket 
No. 02-277, 46-55 (F.C.C. filed Feb. 3, 2003) (identifying shortcomings of studies 
suggesting that network-owned stations outperform independent stations on local 
news).
48 See, e.g., Comments of The National Association of Broadcasters and Network 
Affiliated Stations Alliance in 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review  Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 202, MB Docket No. 02-277, 39-40 (F.C.C. filed Dec. 9, 2002).  See 
generally, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the FCC’s National Television 
Ownership Cap: What’s Bad for Broadcasting Is Good for the Country, at 18-27 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing affiliated stations’ 
arguments that media consolidation discourages them from being more responsive 
to local tastes).  
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policy with support of programming that has popular appeal within a 
local market.49
It might be supposed that the development of a 
noncommercial alternative to consumer-driven broadcast media 
would not emphasize consumer sovereignty.  But today’s system of 
public broadcasting does.  The public television system proposed by 
the Carnegie Commission was meant to identify demand that 
commercial television did not serve.  Because commercial television 
“is obliged for the most part to search for the uniformities within the 
general public, and to apply its skills to satisfy the uniformities it has 
found,” the Carnegie Commission thought it was likely to amass 
audiences by muting, rather than satisfying, differences.50  The Public 
Broadcasting Act followed up on this insight by making it a policy 
goal to serve “unserved and underserved” audiences.51  In other 
words, public television was to enhance the marketplace of ideas, 
with its emphasis on customer service, by going beyond the market to 
deliver communications that market exchanges should have, but failed 
to, produce.52
As discussed below, it is in the area of noncommercial 
television policy that the inadequacy of the consumer satisfaction 
model is most evident.  The problems are exposed whenever the 
nominally underserved audiences that non-market media target are, 
for practical purposes, non-existent audiences.  The limitations of the 
consumer sovereignty model are evident in diversity and localism 
policy as well.  Policy aspirations require, and policy has sometimes 
49 See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx at 13755-60, 13839-42 (relying 
heavily on ratings for local news in assessing the impact of television ownership 
rules on localism).   Taken to its extreme, the procedural or responsive approach to 
localism would not rule out a decision by local broadcasters to provide their 
communities with a wholly national program service if that is what the population 
desired.  It is difficult to imagine the persistence of the localism principle under 
such circumstances.  Indeed, the tendency to equate localism with local content (and 
particularly news and public affairs) has proved to be irresistible.  See e.g., Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (identifying broadcast coverage 
of matters of local concern as objective of broadcast localism policy); NBC v. U.S., 
319 U.S. 190, 192 (1943)(equating local control with a local program service that is 
a “vital part of community life.”).
50 CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note xx at 13-14.
51
 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (2003).  
52
 Upon signing the Public Broadcasting Act in 1967, President Johnson adverted to 
the democratic theory behind the marketplace of ideas, remarking that “at its best, 
public television would help make our Nation a replica of the old Greek 
marketplace, where public affairs took place in view of all the citizens.”  Gary O. 
Larson, Fulfilling the Promise:  Public Broadcasting in the Digital Age (Center for 
Media Education 1998), at http://www.cme.org/publications/fulfill.html.  
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revealed, a more proactive approach to the provision and consumption 
of media products that transcends consumer sovereignty.
C. Proactive Policy Thrust: Altering the Consumer
Most media policy criticism has focused on the technical 
implementation of diversity, localism and non-market goals.53  But 
there is a more important question.  This is to what extent media 
policy, however implemented, should be proactive as well as reactive 
with respect to media consumption.  To what extent should media 
policy take into account not just what consumers currently want, but 
what democracy needs?54  These needs include common exposure to a 
broad array of ideas, and public elevation through especially excellent 
programming.   
1. Common Exposure
As we saw above, both diversity and localism policies pursue 
greater choice.  And yet, the objectives of the “marketplace of ideas” 
are not met merely with more content.  Robust debate depends on a 
trade in ideas.  And trade requires that speech consumers be exposed 
in common to the abundance of ideas that the marketplace yields.  It 
requires water cooler conversation over diverse viewpoints, not 
atomized consumption.  To the extent that consumers do not want to 
be exposed to difference they do not seek, interventions in media 
markets to encourage exposure are proactive, not reactive.  
That communication should integrate listeners as well as 
satisfy demand for speech products is an idea with roots in both 
communication and political theory.  What James Cary has called the 
ritual view of communication relates communication with “‘sharing,’ 
‘participation,’ ‘association,’ ‘fellowship,’ and ‘the possession of a 
53
 For a critique of the government’s diffuse approach to diversity, see Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski and Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum:  Media Power, 
Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 818 (2000) 
(“The [FCC’s] inability to define coherently the concept of diversity has resulted in 
a confused mix of regulatory policies – a regulatory gumbo that lacks even the 
pretense of some overarching goal or objective.”).  See also NAPOLI, supra note xx 
[Foundations] at 135-146.  For a critique of localism policy, see HOROWITZ, supra 
note xx at 155 (calling localism is an “ambiguous policy goal” leading to “a kind of 
mushy policy foundation”); Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment:  
An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L. J. 899, 938 (1998); Tom A. Collins, Local 
Service Concept in Broadcasting: An Evaluation and Recommendation for Change, 
65 IOWA L. REV. 553, 635 (1980).  For an economic critique of particular localism 
regulations, see Christopher S. Yoo, supra note xx [Rethinking the Commitment] at  
1677-82; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 123-4.  
54
 This is essentially the question posed in C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens
Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998).
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common faith.’”55  Communication is thus embedded, lexically and 
conceptually, in community, communion, and common.  It is 
“directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward 
the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting 
information but the representation of shared beliefs.”56
One of the chief exponents of this view of communication was 
John Dewey.  For Dewey, communication was a defense against 
isolation and a force for solidarity.57  He wrote that “consensus 
demands communication” because “communication is the way in 
which [people] come to possess things in common.”58 Civic 
republican theory nests Dewey’s communitarian sentiments within the 
discourse of free speech.  To oversimplify, the hallmark of a civic 
republic, also referred to as a deliberative democracy, is rational 
deliberation among citizens emerging into a consensus that drives 
55 JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE:  ESSAYS ON MEDIA AND 
SOCIETY 18 (1988) (opposing the ritual view of communication to the transmission 
view of communication which conceives of communication like railroads and 
highways as tools to control far-flung territories).
56 Id.
57
 A number of contemporary media scholars share this perspective.  See, e.g.,
PRICE, supra note xx at 216 (“While it is popular to regard expansions of freedom 
as the consequence of increased choice, and to think of choice as the archetypal 
prerequisite for increased liberty, [the loss of a sense of place] represents 
deprivation as well as growth for our democratic processes and notions of identity, a 
geography of anomie as well as a geography of opportunity.”); Gigi B. Sohn & 
Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Broadcast Licensees and Localism:  At Home in the 
“Communications Revolution,” 47 FED. COMM. L. J. 383, 388 (1994) (arguing that 
localism and diversity policies serve “basic human needs… to care and to have 
pride in the places they have chosen to live in and become a part of… to not only 
know their neighbors, but to have some thread of commonality with them…[and] to 
insure that they do not become just another faceless name in a faceless society.”).
58 JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 5-6 (1916).  See also JOHN DEWEY, 
THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 219 (1927) (“We lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of 
an immense intelligence.  But that intelligence is dormant and its communications 
are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possess the local community as its 
medium.”).  Concern about the impact of media consolidation on the ability of 
communities to forge a shared culture was prominent in the debate over Clear 
Channel’s dominance of the local radio market.  See Broadcast Ownership En Banc, 
Richmond, Virginia, 2003 FCC LEXIS 2010 (April 15, 2003) *122 (Statement of 
David Croteau) (“in its embrace of nationally syndicated personalities to the 
exclusion of locals, Clear Channel has made it clear that it has no use for 
[Richmond’s] talents, viewpoints and flavor.”).  See also Comments of Future of 
Music Coalition, Radio Deregulation:  Has it Served Citizens and Musicians?  in 
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review  Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket 
No. 02-277, at 79-80 (F.C.C. filed Nov. 20, 2002).
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public policy.59  The idea is that a common culture can emerge within 
a free and heterogeneous population only through exposure to, and 
discussion of, difference.60  Such rational exchange requires a shared 
vocabulary and common intellectual heritage, which the media is 
influential in providing.   There must, in other words, be exposure to 
difference as well as satisfaction of appetites for difference.  
This distinction between exposure and satisfaction recognizes 
that speech markets are not like widget markets.  Unlike widgets, 
most utterances are not substitutable.61  Two expressions will not 
compete unless the listener thinks they are close enough substitutes to 
compare them, or the opportunity and other costs of listening are low.  
As content options increase, so do the opportunity costs of listening to 
speech that the listener does not think will satisfy.  The listener in 
effect has the choice between perusing the aisles of a supermarket, 
where diverse goods are all available, or making a beeline to a 
specialty shop stocked with just what she wants.  If the “more” that 
diversity policy engenders simply fractures audience attention among 
multiple specialty shops, then audience members are less likely to 
share a common media culture. The civic republican ideal rejects this 
specialty shop model of diversity.  Instead, the ideal is diverse 
expression whose “more” destroys the homogeneity of the consumed, 
not shared consumption patterns.  In other words, the object of 
diversity should be to increase exposure to non-substitutable speech 
utterances in the supermarket, thereby increasing tolerance of 
59 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (identifying the importance of free speech in the education of 
a citizenry capable of effective democratic participation); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996).  See also
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (federal 
“communications policy seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed 
deliberation which … democratic government presupposes”) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part).  But see Edward Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 711, 749-54 (arguing that deliberation is an anachronistic concept in 
our democracy and is not central to our political process).  
60 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 186-87 (1997) 
(arguing that democracy depends on the exchange of ideas among its citizens from 
which collective decisions can emerge); SUNSTEIN, supra note xx [DEMOCRACY] at 
241-252; JOHN B. THOMSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY 255-258 (1995).  For a 
general exposition of civic republican theory, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION (1993).
61 See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
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difference and creating the “solidarity goods” that bind citizens 
together.62
It is not just in communitarian or civic republican traditions 
that one can locate aspirations for media policy that transcend 
consumer satisfaction.  These aspirations exist too within the liberal 
traditions more closely associated with the marketplace metaphor.  At 
the surface, the value of speech diversity is the value of difference, 
not consensus.63  And yet, robust democratic debate depends upon 
exchanges, which in turn require a common vocabulary and shared 
content.  This centripetal thrust within diversity policy is merely 
reactive, as I have defined it, to the extent that citizens want to 
consume the diverse expression on which democracy depends.  But if 
they do not initially demand it, and they can easily avoid it, the 
marketplace of ideas will not host debate without proactive efforts to 
expose citizens to shared diversity.  
In his gloss on the traditional liberal theory underlying the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor, Ed Baker exposes the fissures 
between diversity and debate.   Like traditional liberal theorists, Baker 
embraces the competitive jousting among plural conceptions of the 
good.  But he recognizes the danger of the specialty shop of ideas to 
democratic debate: that consumers may avoid the competitive arena, 
demanding only the sort of speech that confirms their existing 
viewpoints.  To address this danger, Baker formulates a theory of 
“complex democracy” in which speech exposes citizens to difference 
at the same time that difference is exposed in speech.64  According to 
this conception, the ideal marketplace attracts a varied public with a 
wide range of wares, inviting comparisons between the known and the 
unknown. 
Bridging the liberal and civic republican conceptions of 
speech diversity is Jürgan Habermas’ depiction of the public sphere.65
62 See SUNSTEIN, supra note xx [REPUBLIC.COM] at 92-96 (discussing media 
products as solidarity goods).  For a more detailed discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein 
& Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity Goods, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 129 (2001).  Others 
have offered similar views in the context of media and online consumption.  See, 
e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1999); NEIL POSTMAN, 
AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH (1985).
63 See Robert M. Entman & Steven S. Wildman, Reconciling Economic and Non-
Economic Perspectives on Media Policy: Transcending the “Marketplace of Ideas”,
42 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1, 5-19 (1992).
64 See BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 142-147 (contending that plural 
conceptions of the good in a complex democracy are best formed through 
deliberative exchange with others holding similar and competing conceptions).
65 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE:  AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (trans. Thomas 
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Habermas’ public sphere is a space where different viewpoints jostle 
for public consumption on the basis of their public appeal.66  In this 
sense, the public sphere celebrates the difference and conflict that is.  
Yet the public sphere is also a forum for deliberation and the forging 
of consensus.67  It aspires to what might be, and can only be if citizens 
engage with each other and consume ideas they might not seek.  The 
public sphere thus becomes a forum for intellectual exchange that at 
once satisfies diverse tastes and supports common norms.68
Given the First Amendment constraints on policy, it is not 
surprising that these aspirational elements of media theory have been 
de-emphasized.69  What efforts there were to actualize the aspirational 
in media regulations are now mostly dead.  The FCC’s erstwhile 
“fairness doctrine,” for example, took seriously the importance of 
consumer exposure to difference for the satisfaction of democratic 
goals. By requiring broadcast licensees to present opposing 
Burger 1989).  For a theoretical examination of the impact of Habermas’ work on 
media policy, see generally PETER DAHLGREN, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE (1995).  
66
 Like the marketplace, the public sphere is a space that caters to public desires, 
except that it is distinct “from both the economy and the state.” Nicholas Garnham, 
The Media and the Public Sphere, in COMMUNICATING POLITICS:  MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 41 (Peter Golding, et al. eds., 
1986). See also PRICE, supra note xx at 21-40. Closely related to the public sphere is 
the concept of civil society, championed by communitarian theorists like Michael 
Walzer and Amitai Etzioni.  The civil society, like the public sphere, is a web of 
social relationships and institutions that are neither economic nor political and that 
serve to strengthen the ties that bind citizens together.  See, e.g., Michael Walzer, 
The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 106-7 
(Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992) (arguing for a “critical associationalism” that recaptures 
the “density of associational life” and supports “what is local, specific, contingent” 
in a democratic state.  See also AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE:  
COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 102 (1996) (media use 
should be integrated into, and recognize norms of, community). 
67 See R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public 
Interest, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media:  Implications of 
Habermas’ Theory of Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1957-1962 (1996) 
(showing how Habermas’ account of political deliberation includes both the drive 
for consensus in the common good and bargaining among particular, irreconcilable 
interests).  See also Baker, supra note xx at 147 (suggesting that his own construct 
of a complex democracy applies Habermas’ theory of community in conflict).
68
 Some theorists question the vitality of the public sphere concept in contemporary 
society.  See, e.g., Todd Gitlin, Public Sphere or Public Sphericules? in MEDIA, 
RITUAL AND IDENTITY 168, 172 (Tamar Liebes & James Curren ed., 1998) 
(suggesting that the concept of a unitary public sphere has little relevance for an 
information culture marked by “secession, exclusion and segmentation … targeted 
markets and consumption subcultures.”).
69 See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
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viewpoints on matters of public importance, the doctrine tried to 
increase diversity on each channel, not just across the sum of 
channels.70  In other words, it took the supermarket approach to media 
exposure.71  Policies directed at increasing independent television 
production prior to the mid-1990’s reflected a similar concern with 
exposing viewers to difference on all channels, rather than simply 
enabling difference across channels.72
Aspirations for common exposure to content are faintly 
evident in localism policy.  Arguably, the stated objective of localism 
policy itself, which is that broadcast stations should serve the “needs 
and interests” of their local communities, is aspirational in its 
reference to “needs” as well as “interests.”73  If needs and interests are 
70 See Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest 
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974).  For examples of 
fairness doctrine cases, see, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff’d on rehearing, 425 F.2d 543 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that station must air pro-integration programming if it 
aired pro-segregation programming); Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink, 59 
F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (holding that licensee must air coverage of environmental 
aspects of strip mining if it reported on pending federal legislation on issue).  
71
 Another example of this approach can be found in the rules requiring broadcasters 
to afford “equal opportunities” to political candidates entitled by statute to 
reasonable access of broadcast facilities. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(a), 315(b) 
(2003).  An equal opportunity is measured by the likelihood of, not just the 
opportunity for, audience exposure.  Thus, a candidate is entitled to obtain time 
within a program that has equivalent ratings to that of his opponent.  Law of 
Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting: A Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, ¶¶ 
54-56 (1984).
72
 For several decades, the financial interest and syndication rules limited the 
ownership interests that broadcast networks could have in studios that produced 
broadcast content in order to create greater diversity in the source of broadcast 
programming.  The rules were codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1970) and 
eliminated by Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 
12165 (1995).  See also Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations with Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television 
Broadcasting, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 400 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Mt. 
Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) (justifying financial 
interest and syndication rules on grounds that “[d]iversity of programs and 
development of diverse and antagonistic sources of program service are essential to 
[each] broadcast licensee's discharge of his duty as trustee for the public in the 
operation of his channel.”) (emphasis added).   
73 See Media Ownership Order, supra note xx (referring to the “needs and interests” 
of local communities 16 times without clear explication of how those needs and 
interests should be defined).  This phrasing seems to descend from language first 
used by the Federal Radio Commission, the predecessor to the FCC.  Great Lakes 
Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 34 (1929) (ordering radio stations to satisfy “the 
tastes, needs, and desires of all substantial groups among the listening public…”).
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distinct, and they do not have to be, then the difference may be that 
interests are self-defining while needs are not.  The use of the word 
“needs” evokes democratic theories about the kind of 
communications environment that is necessary for robust democratic 
debate and reasoned decisionmaking.74 Consonant with this 
interpretation, localism policies adopted between 1960 and the early 
1980’s required broadcasters actively to seek out what their 
communities needed,75 and established “guidelines” for supplying the 
“major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest.”76
Having made the determination that local content, and not just local 
control, was important for satisfying community needs, the FCC used 
the broadcast license renewal process to privilege those stations that 
aired designated amounts of specific types of local programming.77
Other policy interventions supported the production of local content 
for which there was negligible or at least insufficient demand.78
74 See, e.g., Broadcasting in America and the FCC’s License Renewal Process:  An 
Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1968)(“the greatest challenge before the 
American people today is the challenge of restoring and reinvigorating local 
democracy…[which can only be met by] a working system of local broadcast media 
actively serving the needs of the community for information about its affairs, . . . 
and allowing all to confront the listening public with their problems and their 
proposals.”).
75
 Primer of Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants, 27 F.C.C. 2d 
650, 651 (1971) (requiring broadcasters to follow procedures in ascertaining from 
community leaders and other members of the public what kind of programming 
would best serve).  The ascertainment requirement was later eliminated.  Revision 
of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and 
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1075 
(1984).
76
 Report & Statement of Policy Res: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960) (listing 14 elements including the “opportunity for 
local self-expression, …the development and use of local talent, …[and] public 
affairs programs…”).
77
 Amendment of Section 0.281 of the Commission’s Rules:  Delegations of 
Authority to the Chief, Broadcast Bureau, 59 F.C.C. 2d 491, 493 (1976) (calling on 
local stations to air at least “five percent total local programming, five percent 
informational (news plus public affairs programming), [and] ten percent total non-
entertainment programming.”).  See also Formulation of Policies and Rules Relating 
to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Third Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R. 6363, n.11 (1989) (identifying service of local 
needs and local production as factors contributing to the prospects for license 
renewals).  
78
 This approach is evident in rules that protect local broadcasters’ contractual rights 
to exclusive transmission of syndicated programming within their local markets.  
Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1023 
(1979) (“[O]ur concern with localism… may be characterized as a concern with 
externalities – that is, the true value of local news and public affairs programming 
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Although policy has clearly moved away from the aspirational 
elements of diversity and localism, the tension between reactive and 
proactive policy approaches is evident in today’s debates.  In localism 
policy, recent FCC actions suggest that substantive policy in keeping 
with proactive approaches may be heading for a revival.79  The same 
can be said for diversity policy.  Take, for example, the measurement 
of diversity.  In conformance with a procedural, reactive approach, the 
FCC has in the past simply counted the stalls in the market, looking at 
how many independent television stations and other outlets are 
available to the public, without inquiring into actual media usage and 
exposure patterns.80  An alternative would be to assess diversity by 
what media people actually consume.81  The FCC struggled recently 
to combine the two approaches in constructing a quasi-scientific 
“Diversity Index” to guide broadcast ownership deregulation.82  It 
measured actual consumption patterns, as opposed to mere 
availability, for some purposes,83 but not for other purposes.84  This 
may not be reflected in the number of individuals who view it or the value they 
place on it but in the value it has to our society as a whole and especially in the 
functioning of our democratic institutions.”); 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.122-124 (2003).
79
 Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, FCC No. 04-129 (July 1, 2004) at ¶¶ 11-
14 (asking whether the FCC should impose more substantive localism requirements 
on broadcasters rather than relying on structural controls and market pressure).
80 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §73.3555 (2003) (restricting ownership of multiple broadcast 
stations based on the number of independently owned outlets in the market).   Such 
usage patterns might be measured by an outlet’s market share within a medium or 
by a more sophisticated market analysis by particular program type, such as news 
and information, prime time, etc…. 
81
 For scholarship endorsing this direction, see Philip Napoli, Deconstructing the 
Diversity Principle, 48 J. OF COMMUN. 7 (1999).
82
 The FCC developed a “Diversity Index” to measure “the availability of outlets 
that contribute to viewpoint diversity in local media markets.”  Media Ownership 
Order, supra note xx at 13775.  The Diversity Index, which is loosely based on the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission use to analyze mergers by summing the square of market shares to 
yield a total level of market concentration, calculates each media owner’s share of 
media outlets within a market, adjusted to reflect each medium’s share of the total 
media market.   Id. at 13789-90.  See also Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 
373 F.3d 372, 404 (3rd Cir. 2004).  
83
 The Diversity Index considered actual consumption patterns in creating the 
universe of media outlets that would be included in the Index, for example 
discounting cable as a source of local news and information because consumer 
surveys suggested scant reliance on cable, while counting the Internet because 
consumer surveys suggested the opposite.  See Media Ownership Order, supra note 
xx at 13778 (“[O]ur method for measuring viewpoint diversity weights outlets 
based on the way people actually use them rather than what is actually available as a 
local news source.”).  See also Prometheus Radio Project, et al v. FCC, 373 F.3d 
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inconsistency in the treatment of audience exposure was partially 
responsible for the Third Circuit’s remand of the Diversity Index and 
associated rules.85  As the FCC comes to rework these rules and the 
underlying Diversity Index, it will have to take a more coherent 
approach to the consumption, as well as the availability of, diverse 
expression. 
2. Public Elevation
The proactive component of media policy is, unsurprisingly, 
most evident in support for noncommercial media.  Here, the 
aspiration is not only for media consumers to be exposed to content in 
common, but for them to be exposed to content that elevates or 
educates.   It is this goal that has tagged public television with the 
“elitist” label for much of its existence, even though most American 
households watch at least some public television.86  Although too 
politically incendiary to state baldly, the goal of elevation figured 
prominently in both the precursors to the Carnegie Commission 
Report and subsequent policy enactments.87
372, 405-06 (2004) (criticizing the FCC for failing to explain why Internet news 
consumption should count when the news consumed is typically sourced by 
television and newspaper news operations).
84
 The FCC abandoned its focus on consumption when it came time to analyze the 
diversity of outlets within a medium.  It considered all television stations, for 
example, equally significant sources of local news even if they broadcast very little 
news or garnered very small market shares.  Media Ownership Order, supra note xx 
at 13786 (“We have chosen the availability measure, which is implemented by 
counting the number of independent outlets available for a particular medium and 
assuming that all outlets within a medium have equal shares. In the context of 
evaluating viewpoint diversity, this approach reflects a measure of the likelihood 
that some particular viewpoint might be censored or foreclosed, i.e., blocked from 
transmission to the public.”).
85
 Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 404-410 (3rd Cir. 2004).  
See also Cheryl A. Leanza, Monolith or Mosaic:  Can the Federal Communications 
Commission Legitimately Pursue a Repetition of Local Content at the Expense of 
Local Diversity, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 597, 607-611 (2004); Mark Cooper, 
Abracadabra! Hocus-Pocus! Making Media Market Power Disappear with the 
FCC’s Diversity Index, at 5 (July 2003), at
http://www.consumersunion.org/abrafinal721.pdf (criticizing the Diversity Index 
for equalizing market shares among media outlets within each class of media).
86
 According to Nielsen ratings, more than 70% of all U.S. television households 
and about 144 million people tune into public television during the average month.  
See PBS Audience, http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/aboutpbs_corp_audience.html.  
87 See supra notes xx.  The same could not be said in Britain, at least until relatively 
recently.  The BBC started as an unabashedly elite institution intent on providing 
the public what the elite thought it needed.  See MICHAEL TRACEY, THE DECLINE 
AND FALL OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 21-25 (1998) (citing an influential 
1962 report ascribing to public television the “power to influence values and moral 
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The most important such precursor was the influential report 
of the post-war Commission on Freedom of the Press.  This 
Commission, chaired by former University of Chicago Chancellor 
Robert M. Hutchins, was established to explore dissatisfaction with 
the commercial press.88  Drawing on the liberal theory underlying 
speech diversity goals, the Commission argued that democratic life 
requires a “public mentality … accustomed to the noise and confusion 
of clashing opinions”.89  Drawing on civic republican theory, the 
Commission also located democratic strength in mutual 
understanding.90  The media, it concluded, have an obligation to foster
such understanding and “to elevate rather than to degrade” the 
public.91
These same ideas formed the intellectual backbone of the 
Carnegie Commission Report, which envisioned a public service 
media that would support high quality communication.92 This 
emphasis on quality and excellence connects public service media to 
the notion of “merit goods.”  Often used in connection with the 
performing and fine arts, merit goods refer to products that the market 
would not produce but should be made available because they do 
people good.93
standards”); IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 101-103, 108-112  
(1991).   In the 1970’s, the BBC evolved into a media institution that tried to reflect 
society rather than to mold it.  See ANG at 115 (observing that in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, the metaphor for public service broadcasting changed from that of a ship 
forging a cultural course to that of a mirror reflecting honestly a cultural truth).
88 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS
(1947).  Other members of the Commission included First Amendment scholar 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., philosopher Reinhold Nieburh, and historian Arthur M. 
Schlesinger.  
89 Id. at 91-92.
90 See id. at 68 (finding democratic infirmities in “the perpetuation of 
misunderstanding among widely scattered groups whose only contact is through 
these media.”).   
91 Id. at 92.
92 See supra note xx.  See also Testimony of Ken Burns, Florentine Films, before 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (July 13, 2004), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1265&wit_id=3648 (in 
defending the mission of public service media, contending that the “pursuit of 
happiness” requires “an active involvement of the mind in the higher aspects of 
human endeavor – namely education, music, the arts and history – a marketplace of 
ideas.”)  
93 See Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods in RATIONALITY, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 207-210 (Geoffrey Brennan & Cliff Walsh eds., 1990); DICK 
NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE, 16-24 (1978) (arguing for art subsidies because 
society benefits from artistic production even if there are small audiences).  See also
GILLIAN DOYLE, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA ECONOMICS 66, 162 (2002).  For 
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What the Public Television Act did not address, nor has any 
subsequent policy, are the irreconcilability between the provision of 
merit goods and the satisfaction of public desires, between 
“popularity and publicness” in public service media.94  Public 
broadcasting is expected to provide alternatives to the market to 
satisfy the aspirations of a democracy.95  And yet it is also expected to 
mirror the existing orientation of audiences towards particular kinds 
of media products.  The Carnegie Commission’s attempt to meld 
audience satisfaction with audience elevation has never worked very 
well for public television’s critics.96
The need to better theorize the relationship between 
consumers and media policy is nowhere more important than in the 
area of media subsidies where the entire enterprise rises or falls on 
this relationship.  Government intervention in media markets depends 
on a conception of why the market might fail to deliver what people 
want or what democracy needs.  
criticism of the notion of public service media as a merit good, see JOHN KEANE, 
THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY 117-126 (1991) (arguing that the terms “quality” and 
“excellence” cannot be defined and “allow the market liberals to elope with the old 
vocabulary of ‘liberty of the press.’”); MICHAEL TRACEY, THE DECLINE AND FALL 
OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 278 (1998) (arguing that public media’s pursuit 
of quality presupposes understanding and empathy, but society has now been so 
“coarsened… by sheer mediocrity, the flight from excellence, and the enthronement 
of the trivial, the superficial, the ghoulish in much market-driven television” that 
this level of understanding and empathy no longer exists.).
94
 Willard D. Rowland, Jr., The Institution of U.S. Public Broadcasting, in PUBLIC 
TELEVISION IN AMERICA 34 (Eli M. Noam & Jens Waltermann ed., 1993).  See also
BARRY DORNFELD, PRODUCING PUBLIC TELEVISION, PRODUCING PUBLIC CULTURE
41 (1998) (noting “[t]he tension between the market and the ‘nonmarket,’ the hybrid 
space that public television occupies in the United States…”). 
95
 Rowland, supra note xx at 14.
96 See Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Government's Role in Public 
Broadcasting, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 501-503, 513 (1994) (discussing 
Congressional attempts to eliminate funding for public television and criticizing 
public broadcastings’ over reliance on its most popular programming); Chris 
Johnson, Federal Support of Public Broadcasting: Not Quite What LBJ Had in 
Mind, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 138-140 (2000) (criticizing public television 
for political bias and a failure to garner a larger audience).  The development of 
alternative non-commercial ratings standards to credential lightly-viewed 
programming might have resolved some of the tensions for a service that is 
supposed to satisfy demand too insignificant for commercial services.  But this 
alternative did not materialize, and presents its own problems for a publicly-
subsidized media service.  E.B. White’s vision of a public service medium that 
could broadcast to the few (in many instances) in the hopes of influencing the many 
is simply not politically viable.
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D. Narrow and Broad Market Failures
Building on the distinction between reactive and proactive 
policy goals, this last subsection provides a vocabulary for addressing 
the impact of market developments on policy goals in the digital 
mediascape.  
Since the operative principle of the marketplace is to satisfy 
public demand, reactive media policy that seeks to better serve the 
sovereign consumer is justified only in cases where business 
arrangements have blunted the force of consumer preferences.  I am 
calling these failures of the market to serve consumer welfare, 
identified in Section III, “narrow market failures.”  Media policy 
interventions to address these kinds of failures are designed merely to 
correct the market, thereby enhancing consumer sovereignty.    
Even a perfectly functioning market will not meet the 
aspirational goals of media policy.  It will not serve the public welfare 
that is external to markets by accounting for the value programming 
can add to civic life through increased education, political 
engagement, or social solidarity.  These are what I am calling “broad 
market failures.”  To the extent that media policy steps in to address 
broad market failures by facilitating or compelling the production of 
this kind of programming, it is not a market corrective but a market 
supplement.97
The notion of broad market failure requires more discussion. 
The argument for market supplementation is premised on the ability 
of certain media products to generate positive externalities.98  Positive 
externalities exist whenever A’s consumption produces value created 
by B for which B is not compensated.99  For example, let us assume 
97
 This argument might also be characterized, not as one concerning market failure, 
but as one concerning “market reach” as Owen Fiss has termed it: “The market 
might be splendid for some purposes but not for others.  It might be an effective 
institution for producing cheap and varied consumer goods and for providing 
essential services (including entertainment) but not for producing the kind of debate 
that constantly renews the capacity of a people for self determination.”  Owen Fiss, 
Why the State? 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987).
98 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 41-62 (considering positive 
externalities generated by media including the quality of public opinion and 
political participation, public interactions, exposing and deterring abuses of power, 
and audience impact on cultural products available to non-audience members).  For 
a good general discussion of the externalities of information, see Daniel Farber, 
Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-62 (1991).  
99
 James T. Hamilton, Private Interests in ‘Public Interest’ Programming:  An 
Economic Assessment of Broadcaster Incentives, 45 DUKE L. J. 1177, 1179-80 
(1996) (presenting a more complex formula).
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that exposing children to educational television programming 
produces a range of benefits.100  Some of these benefits will be purely 
private, like the personal enjoyment of learning.  Some will accrue 
more broadly in society, like the likelihood that an educated child will 
become a more productive adult.  In deciding how much to invest in 
educational programming (in terms of the costs of the programming
and the aggravation of getting their child to consume it), the child’s 
parent will internalize the private benefits, but not all of the public 
benefits.  As a result, there will be fewer children in the audience, 
resulting in reduced compensation for the content producers, than 
would be optimal.  
It is generally accepted that information of many kinds can 
produce positive externalities, such as by contributing to civic 
discourse or by checking official power, to a degree that is not 
reflected in the market for information.101  The prevalence of positive 
externalities in media markets is related to the hybrid nature of media 
outputs and actors.  A video experience is a consumer product that 
may also become a basis for political decision or social behavior.  A
cable operator or broadcaster is simultaneously a commercial 
operation and a political institution.102  If these positive externalities 
100 See generally, Policies and rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming 
and Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 11 
F.C.C.R. 10660, 10664 (1996) (reviewing positive effects of educational 
programming on social skills and school preparedness).
101
 By the same token, media products can fail to produce these desired effects or 
even reduce social welfare to a degree that is not internalized in the consumption of 
programming.  These harmful effects, the costs of which are external to the 
economic decisionmaking of media enterprises and individual consumers, are 
negative externalities.  See, e.g., GEORGE COMSTOCK & ERICA SCHARRER, 
TELEVISION: WHAT’S ON, WHO’S WATCHING AND WHAT IT MEANS 274-298 (1999) 
(reviewing studies on the causal relationship between viewing of television violence 
and violent or other anti-social behavior); JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING 
VIOLENCE 20-30 (1998) (same).  But cf. MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE 
CHILDREN:  “INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 243-253 
(2001) (criticizing the media effects literature); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n 
v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2003) (questioning linkage 
between exposure to violent video games and harm to minors).
102
 See, e.g., Garnham, supra note xx at 47 (the incompatibility between the 
commercial and political functions of the media turns on “the value system and set 
of social relations within which commercial media must operate and which they 
serve to reinforce….[P]olitical communication [on a commercial platform] … 
becomes the politics of consumerism.  Politicians relate to potential voters not as 
rational beings concerned for the public good, but in the mode of advertising, as 
creatures of passing and largely irrational appetite, to whose self-interest they must 
appeal.”).
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are not internalized into the production of media products, the 
collective consequences of consumer choices will “turn out to be very 
different from what … [the consumer] anticipate[s].”103
What complicates the positive externalities defense of market 
supplementation is that the external benefits of media products, unlike 
typical externalities, may not be concentrated in third-party effects.104
Instead, these benefits may accrue to the individual consumer who is 
making the media choice as well as to society at large.  The viewer 
exposed to an incisive report on local politics, for example, may 
herself benefit, as may others influenced by her.  And yet, she will 
eschew the programming if she does not value the private benefits it 
would confer.  Particularly where this is the case, the idea that 
government should foster the delivery of such programming runs head 
long into charges of paternalism, making such policies suspect 
especially for those whose democratic and economic theories are 
premised on individual autonomy.
Advocates of market supplementation may avoid the taint of 
paternalism even with respect to the generation of these effects by 
refuting the notion that individual demand is exogenous to the 
market.105  Work in behavioral economics, drawing on cultural studies 
and psychological theories, emphasizes the contingency of personal 
preference.106  In the media context, commercial media enterprises, 
103
 Sunstein, supra note xx [Television] at 517.
104 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40-42 (3d ed. 
2000) (defining externalities as third-party effects). 
105 See BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 97-98, 121 (suggesting that it 
would be paternalistic to deprive consumers of the choices that media policy 
promotes); SUNSTEIN, supra note xx [Democracy] at 115 (“the deprivation of 
opportunities is a deprivation of freedom – even if people have adapted to it and do 
not want anything more.”).  For an attempt to square paternalism with liberal ideals, 
see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162-66 (2003) (defending attempts by public 
and private institutions to influence behavior even when the objective is purely to 
improve the individual’s own behavior and not to change third party effects so long 
as such attempts are non-coercive).  
106 See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1700, 1758 (2003) (characterizing the consumer, from the perspective of cultural 
studies theory, as “neither purely sovereign nor purely susceptible, but rather 
permanently engaged in a dialectical conversation with product manufacturers, 
marketers, regulators, and others regarding the social significance of consuming 
activities.”); Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences 
of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 75 (1998) 
(“Markets and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and 
services: they also influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities.”); 
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through marketing and the exploitation of informational cascades, are 
able to develop tastes in the kinds of fare that they intend to 
produce.107  So developed, consumer desires naturally agitate for 
more of the same.  Understanding this, it becomes possible to square 
market supplementation with liberalism, going beyond positive 
externalities to embrace a conception of personal choice as a product 
of media offerings themselves and thus endogenous to market 
dynamics.108 As one commentator has put it, a purely market-based 
approach to video products creates “a danger that consumers will 
under-invest in their own tastes, experience and capacity to 
comprehend because it is only in retrospect that the benefits of such 
investment become apparent.”109
The debate over consumer preference formation and its 
relationship to media policy is not just a matter of academic theory, 
but has become a point of contention in policy discussions.  At an 
FCC field hearing held prior to its sweeping relaxation of broadcast 
ownership limits, FCC Chairman Michael Powell challenged the 
Chairman of the Parents Television Council, who had described 
television offerings as “raw sewage.”110  Powell observed that, “[w]e 
can call it sludge, but it’s the sludge people are watching.”111  The 
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129, 1145-66 (1986) (reviewing literature on consumer preferences).
107 See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note xx at 68 (claiming that 
the media train the public to accept and even embrace sub-optimal content by 
“building and transforming the interests of the public.”).  See also, Guy Pessach, 
Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials:  Unveiling 
the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1074 
(2003) (arguing that broad copyright protection leverages the ability of “corporate 
media” to “dominate the market and shape the audience’s tastes and preferences 
according to their common types and genres of creative materials, as well as their 
specific media products.”).
108 See BAKER, supra note xx [Media, Markets] at 87-95; SUNSTEIN, supra note xx 
[Democracy] at 73-74.
109 DOYLE, supra note xx at 66 (quoting G. Davies).  The notion that consumer 
preferences are as much the result as the source of media products is rooted in the 
critical media studies of the middle and late twentieth century.   The argument of the 
post-War critical theorists, led by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, is that 
mass commercial culture perpetuates the values of, and supports the winners in, a 
capitalist system by removing from the consciousness of consumers any alternative 
to capitalism.  See, e.g., NICK STEVENSON, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA CULTURES:  
SOCIAL THEORY AND MASS COMMUNICATION 53-54 (1995) (analyzing the 
relationship among various Frankfurt School theorists).  
110
 Broadcast Ownership En Banc, Richmond Virginia, 2003 FCC LEXIS 2010 * 47 
(April 15, 2003) (statement of Brent Bozell criticizing “ultra violence, … graphic 
sex, … [and] raunchy language” in media).
111 Id. at *83 (Statement of Chairman Powell).
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consumer advocate responded that “when you’ve got a handful of 
corporations controlling … [programming], then what they determine 
is going to go on television is what can by itself determine what the 
market wants…when the public is getting a certain message, a certain 
kind of program, a certain value system, … ultimately, there is going 
to be a significant part of that market that is going to accept that 
message and want more of it”.112
Given the existence of broad market failures, an aspirational 
media policy must do more than correct a poorly functioning market.  
It must provide diversions around existing media markets and taste 
constellations.  It can do this by changing consumer wants and then 
reintroducing a richer consumer palette to the market. So 
reintroduced, the consumer might then force the market to provide 
media products with greater positive externalities, including common 
exposure to difference and public elevation.
III.Media Policy, Markets, and New Technologies
We have seen that a competitive marketplace of mediated 
expression, if it is to serve democratic purposes, must at once serve 
and influence the sovereign consumer.  Digital technology creates 
new dynamics in media production and consumption that ought to 
change the way media policy approaches both reactive and proactive 
goals.  The following subsections unpack the relationship between 
media policy and the market, showing how new media innovations at 
once challenge and support policy interventions in the media 
marketplace.  Subsection A identifies the major changes that digital 
technologies effect in the production and consumption of video 
media.  Subsection B then shows how these changes reduce, but do 
not eradicate, narrow market failures.  Broad market failures, 
subsection C argues, are aggravated in a digitally networked 
environment.  
A. New Media Dynamics
Digital media involve the following phenomena often, but not 
always, in concert:  the digital encoding of media content by 
producers, the distribution of such content through digital networks, 
and the storage and playback of such content on digital devices.  The 
spread of these phenomena has two major consequences for media 
policy.  The first is simply the increased amount of content that 
becomes available through broadcast, cable, satellite, and broadband 
networks as a result of increased carrying capacity.  The second is the 
112 Id. at *84 (Statement of Brent Bozell).  See also id. at *91-92 (Statement of 
Andrew Schwartzman) (media conglomerates use cross-marketing and vertical 
power to develop appetites for products).
2004] Media Policy Out of the Box 33
increased degree of consumer control over the consumption and even 
the production of video content.  
Digital media increase the amount of content available to
consumers in a number of interrelated ways.  First, digital 
compression technologies allow traditional subscription television 
services like cable and satellite to offer hundreds of content channels 
at various price points.113  Second, interactive technologies then allow 
these distributors to fully exploit increased channel capacity by 
providing programming to consumers on an on-demand basis.  The 
interactive components of digital television distribution systems 
enable consumers to draw on video libraries on a per-program basis, 
disaggregating networks from bundled service tiers,114 and programs 
from networks.115  Third, digital broadband networks create new 
distribution channels for traditional video content like movies and 
television programs, as well as other forms of video entertainment 
like games and video chatting.116  These digital channels may be used 
113
 Broadcast stations that could transmit only one channel of programming by 
analog means can now transmit five by digital means.  See Ellen P. Goodman, 
Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions:  The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV 
Legislation, 49 Fed. Com. L. J. 517, 523 (1997) (describing the capabilities of 
digital broadcast technology).  Cable systems that were once limited to 35 channels 
have now joined satellite services in offering several hundred, see Video 
Competition Report, supra note xx at 1624, although the average cable subscriber 
only receives 62 channels.  See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report on Average 
Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, 18 FCC Rcd 
13284 (2003).  Although this paper does not address the distributional effects of 
changes in video distribution technologies, they are manifold.  The channel 
explosion is concentrated in pay television services like cable, DVDs or 
subscription-based broadband services, as opposed to free-to-the viewer broadcast 
services. 
114
 A “service tier” is a cable service for which the operator charges a separate rate.  
47 U.S.C. § 522 (17) (2003).
115
 Today, most of the major cable operators are deploying video on demand 
services.  It has been estimated that about seven million homes had access to video 
on demand at the end of 2002.  Unlike pay-per-view services, which provide a 
relatively limited menu of programming on the operator’s schedule, video on 
demand allows consumers to order a wide array of programming from a central 
server at any time of the day and to pause the programming.  Because technologies 
like video on demand use distribution capacity on an opportunistic basis, rather than 
“occupying” real estate on the distribution pipe, the distributor can carry many more 
programs on an on-demand basis than it could accommodate ordinary program 
networks.  Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1638-39.  
116 See, e.g., Sarah McBride, Studios to Set Deals in Bid to Get PCs to Show Movies, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 14, 2004, at D4 (reporting on new partnerships 
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themselves to stream content or may be used to facilitate the 
distribution of DVDs directly to the consumer.117
As content options increase, the ability of the audience to 
navigate media offerings becomes more critical.  Digital technologies 
respond to this need by providing tools for audience control over the 
selection and timing of media experiences.  It is this control, in 
tandem with the spread of viewer attention over more video options, 
which makes attention an increasingly scarce resource.  By using 
digital electronic program guides and search engines, the viewer can 
filter out content of little interest and program her digital delivery 
systems to provide more of what she wants.118 These search 
techniques, in combination with personal video recorders or other 
digital storage devices, enable the viewer to create her own viewing 
schedule and skip freestanding commercials.119
Another kind of audience control facilitated by digital 
technologies is consumer contribution to the production of video 
content.  Most minimally, real time interactive features of television 
programming can funnel viewer reactions into programming that is 
professionally produced.  More substantially, digital production 
techniques and Internet distribution make it possible for amateur 
involvement in the production and distribution of video content either 
individually or as part of collaborative peer networks.120  These 
between content companies and hardware and software companies to facilitate 
delivery of video programming over PCs).
117
 Video “rental” enterprises like Netflix and direct sales from producers exemplify 
how the cheap production and shipment of DVDs can create new markets for video 
content.  See, e.g., Peter Wayner, In the Era of Cheap DVD’s, Anyone Can Be a 
Producer, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at G1 (reporting on distribution of 
independent films and other video productions in DVD format through the mail). 
118 See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
119 See Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1715 (“A [personal video 
recorder] is a device connected to a television set, either embedded in a set-top box 
or as a stand-alone device, which uses a hard disk drive, software, and other 
technology to digitally process and record programming.”).  Approximately 3.7 
million homes had PVRs at the end of 2003.  Id.  This number will rise 
precipitously as cable and satellite operators roll out PVRs in their digital set-top 
boxes.  See Stuart Elliott & Ken Belson, Stop Me if You’ve Seen This One Before, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at C1. 
120 See infra notes xx and accompanying text.  See also F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan 
Hunter, The Laws of Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-21 (2004) (illustrating 
how digital video game participants create virtual worlds online).
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contributions can take the form of original productions or of 
modifications to professionally produced content.121
Taking media abundance and audience control to be the most 
significant innovations of digital media, the question is how these 
innovations impact government intervention in media markets in 
furtherance of media policy goals.   The subsections below approach 
this question with respect to both narrow and broad market failures.
B. Narrow Market Failures and Market Corrections
Many have a complaint about television – what it does not 
offer, what it offers too much of.   Yet it is difficult to determine with 
confidence whether video markets really fail to deliver on consumer 
preferences, suggesting market failures, or whether demand for 
certain products is simply insufficient, suggesting market lacunae.  
Arguments that media markets fail the public are vulnerable to the 
claim that most markets fail to deliver what some segment of the 
market might desire.  One cannot necessarily find the exact 
automobile configuration one wants either.  The difference is that 
“[t]ruth and understanding are not wares like peanuts and potatoes,” 
as Justice Frankfurter put it.122   It is because media products have an 
unusually potent social and political valence, making the 
abandonment of even small audience communities particularly 
important from a policy perspective, that media markets deserve 
special consideration.  Given the stakes, intervention may be 
warranted in the market for information where it would not be in the 
markets for legumes and root vegetables.
Even if the failure of video markets to give many people what 
they want were not worth more consideration than equally plausible 
claims about other markets, media markets have challenged consumer 
sovereignty to an atypical degree.123 At least under conditions of 
121 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 397, 418-19 (2003) (providing examples of consumer contributions to video 
content).
122
 Associated Press v. United States 326 U.S. 1, 17 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).
123
 There is a substantial literature on the relationship between media market 
structure and economic welfare.  Using game theory and theories of monopolistic 
competition, this literature has focused largely on the normative question of how 
much media concentration should be allowed.  See Peter O. Steiner, Program 
Patterns and Preference, and the Workability of Competition in Radio 
Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. ECON. 194 (1952) (concentrated media outlet ownership can 
result in greater diversity of program genre given stringently limited channel 
capacity); Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television 
Markets, 91 Q.J. ECON. 15 (1977) (the ideal degree of competition in media markets 
depends on viewer tolerance of second-choice programming and channel capacity); 
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channel scarcity, three market features tend to reduce market 
responsiveness to smaller audience groups below optimal levels.  First 
is the absence of strong price signaling by consumers in video 
markets that remain heavily reliant on advertising revenue.  Second, 
further diluting the force of smaller audience preferences, are the 
unusually risky gambles entailed by expensive and mostly 
unsuccessful video programming.  These gambles create pressures on 
program producers, aggregators and distributors to favor proven 
program formulae and talent, and to spread the costs and risks of 
media products over large audiences.  These same pressures lead to 
the third feature:  the concentration of media enterprises in large, 
integrated corporations with interests that may not be in perfect 
alignment with consumer choice. 
This subsection takes each of these features in turn, predicting 
the ability of digital innovations to cure narrow market failures by 
improving responsiveness to consumer demand.
1. Audience Voice
The translation of audience desires into television 
programming, whether it is distributed by means of broadcast, cable, 
or broadband, is distorted by the way in which programming is sold.  
Specifically, the historic domination of advertiser interests combined 
with the lack of precision in the expression of audience preferences 
serve to mute the audience voice.  Technologies that foster audience 
control and content abundance threaten the dominance of traditional 
advertising in video media markets, changing the role of advertisers in 
mediating the audience voice.  These changes cut both in favor and 
against consumer sovereignty.  
a) Analog Mediascape
That advertising so dominates today’s video marketplace is 
the result of market responses to the public good characteristics of 
video programming.124  Like other information products, video 
Spence & Owen, supra note xx (a market with a higher degree of price 
discrimination (i.e., pay television) and competition is more likely to produce 
diversity in programming).  See generally OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 64-
92, 141-42 (summarizing the literature on program distribution and market 
structure).  
124 See John R. Woodbury, Welfare Analysis and the Video Marketplace in VIDEO 
COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 274 (Eli M. Noam 
ed., 1985) (distinguishing media products from sweaters and cars because of 
programming’s “heavy dose of public-good characteristics.”); C. Edwin Baker, 
Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 311, 316 (1997) 
(distinguishing media products from “typical” products like cars and can openers); 
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programming is non-rivalrous, meaning that a video product 
consumed by some is still equally available to others.  Moreover, a 
video product is to varying degrees, non-excludable, meaning that the 
owners of a video product can only imperfectly control its 
dissemination to the public.125  Because of these public good features, 
advertising was the sole means of support for television programming 
before the advent of cable.  Although consumer payments in the form 
of cable and satellite subscription fees now contribute substantially to 
video production and distribution, advertising remains the 
preponderant source of revenue across distribution platforms.126
Advertisers then are the real consumers of video programming 
in the case of broadcast and other freely available content and are at 
least co-equal with viewers in the case of subscription television.127
The advertiser’s desire for a large audience means that advertiser and 
Sunstein, supra note xx at 514 [Television] (noting that television programming “is 
not an ordinary product…”).
125
 Some have suggested that the ability of subscription services to exclude non-
payers eliminates the non-excludability aspect of television.  See, e.g., Yoo, supra
note xx at 1584. However, with the exception of pay-per-view or on demand 
programming, viewers are excluded from programming only on a network-by-
network basis and, far more commonly, only on a tier-by-tier basis.  With respect to 
any particular program and any given network, the excludability tools of producers 
remain very crude.  Powers of excludability would be increase should the cable and 
satellite industries shift from tiered services to what are known as á la carte services, 
allowing consumers to purchase only those networks that they wanted.  Such a 
conversion would impose its own costs on consumer satisfaction.  See infra note xx.
126
 This is true, of course, in the case of broadcast television services, which are free 
to the viewer, but it is also true of subscription cable or satellite television services, 
which rely heavily on advertising revenue as well.  Total cable network advertising 
revenue for 2002 was reported to be $10.828 billion out of the total revenue for the 
same networks of $20.146 billion.  Thus, advertising revenue constituted 
approximately 54% of the cable networks' revenue in 2002. Kagan, BROADBAND 
ADVERTISING No. 331 at 2-3 (March 31, 2003) (cable network advertising revenue); 
Kagan, CABLE PROGRAM INVESTOR No. 65 at 3-4 (April 16, 2003) (total cable 
network revenue). Cable operators take in significantly less advertising revenue 
than do cable networks.  When combined, the cable industry relies on advertising 
for about 30% of its revenue.  HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 
ECONOMICS 274 (6th ed. 2004).
127 See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR:  A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF 
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 276 (1996) (“One of the 
central incongruities of American broadcasting is that the audience is construed 
simultaneously as both subject and object of the system, both the buyer and the 
thing sold.”); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 311, 319 (1997) (“The media enterprise commonly sells media products to 
audiences and sells audiences to advertisers.”); Sunstein, supra note xx [Television] 
at 514 (“. . . it is more accurate to say that viewers are a commodity, or a product, 
that broadcasters deliver to the people who actually pay them: advertisers.”).
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consumer interests will substantially overlap.  However, advertisers 
are not perfect surrogates for consumers and the interjection of 
advertiser interests can distort the conversion of consumer preferences 
into media products.128
There are several reasons for the misalignment between 
advertiser purchases and consumer preferences.  To begin with, 
advertisers have an inexact understanding of audience desires.129
More profoundly, advertisers and consumers are buying different 
products. Consumers, of course, are buying programming.  
Advertisers are purchasing viewer attention (especially the attention 
of younger viewers) adjusted for the likelihood that the viewer will 
actually buy the goods and services being advertised, not the program 
being supplied.  As a result, advertisers place a higher value on those 
demographic groups associated with the ability and inclination to 
spend on consumer goods.130  Advertisers may be willing to sacrifice 
128
 Economic models of television programming have long noted the biases 
introduced into programming selection by advertiser support.  See generally OWEN 
& WILDMAN, supra note xx at 91-92.  For a governmental perspective, see Jonathan 
Levy et al., FCC OPP Working Paper No. 37:  Broadcast Television: Survivor in a 
Sea of Competition, at 7 (2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A22.doc (observing 
that because “[t]he value of the programming to viewers will differ from the value 
of the audience to the advertisers,” not all audiences will get what they want).
129
 The Nielsen ratings, which monopolize the measurement of television audiences, 
depend on the self-reporting of a small sample of households. Even when the 
sample size is large, the ratings data may be highly inaccurate due to poor reporting.  
See, e.g., Bill Carter, Young Men are Back Watching TV.  But Did They Ever 
Leave?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at C1 (reporting on erroneous Nielsen ratings 
purporting to show 10% drop in young men aged 18-34 watching television in 
2003). Because the samples are more accurate the larger they are, ratings accuracy 
decreases with the size of the audience, resulting in the chronic mismeasurement of 
niche audiences.  See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS 139-145, 176 
(2003) (showing how ratings data becomes less accurate with audience 
fragmentation); COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 20, 2004, at 9 (citing report 
showing that Nielsen Media Research ratings may underestimate Latino viewing of 
particular programs by 30%).  So poor are ratings data for smaller audiences that 
Nielsen will not even rate programming on cable networks that are not available in 
at least 20 million households.  Michael G. Baumann & Kent W. Mikkelsen, 
Economists Incorporated, Benefits of Bundling and Costs of Unbundling Cable 
Networks in Comments of the Walt Disney Company in A La Carte and Themed 
Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable 
Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-207, at 9 
(F.C.C. filed July 15, 2004).
130
 The most desirable such group consists of 18-34 year olds, followed by 19-49 
year olds.  Wayne Friedman, Cable Jumps Upfront Gun, TELEVISION WEEK, May 
17, 2004, at 1.
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a larger audience for a more desirable demographic, resulting in a 
preference for programming skewed to attract these cohorts.131
The disconnect between advertiser and consumer interests 
extends beyond advertising sales.  Consistent with their desire to sell 
goods or services, advertisers favor relatively sanguine programming 
that enhances the “buying mood” of the public.132  They can exercise 
this preference not only after production, through advertising 
purchases, but before the fact in intimate consultation with the 
networks developing program schedules.133
Perhaps the greatest source of divergence between consumer 
desires and advertiser support is the crude communication of audience 
demand.  Apart from their inaccuracies, ratings measure interest in a 
binary fashion -- thumbs up or thumbs down.   Because ratings do not 
capture the intensity of viewer preferences, an advertiser’s valuation 
of a consumer may have very little correlation with the consumer’s 
valuation of a program.134 The inability of viewers to signal the 
intensity of their desires often results in commercial television 
programming that reflects the middling interest of the many instead of 
the strong interest of the fewer.135  So, for example, a program that 
receives six points out of ten from ten viewers in a focus group might 
131 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2097, 2165 (1992) (“Advertisers ‘pay’ the media to obtain the audience they 
desire, providing a strong incentive for the media to shape content to appeal to this 
‘desired’ audience.”); Sunstein, supra note xx at 514-15 (“Advertisers like certain 
demographic groups and dislike others, even when the numbers are equal; they pay 
extra amounts in order to attract groups that are likely to purchase the relevant 
products, and this affects programming content.”); Yoo, supra note xx at 1635.   
132 See, e.g., Baker, [advertising] supra note xx at 2153-64 (discussing advertisers’ 
interests in programming that creates a “buying mood” and avoids controversy); 
Sunstein, supra note xx [Television] at 515 (“[A]dvertisers want programming that 
will put viewers in a receptive purchasing mood, and hence not be too ‘depressing’ . 
. . and also tend to dislike programming that is highly controversial . . .”); Inger L. 
Stole, Advertising in CULTURE WORKS:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURE 100 
(Richard Maxwell ed., 2001) (advertisers “want the overall media content to 
complement their commercial messages…”).
133
 Early in the production schedule, advertisers preview programs under 
consideration for placement in the network schedule.  According to a study prepared 
for the FCC, “[f]or all shows, programmers consider the demographics of the 
audience the show is likely to attract”.  Mara Einstein, Program Diversity and the 
Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network Television, FCC Media 
Ownership Working Group Study No. 5, at 7-8 (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A10.pdf (arguing 
that media consolidation has not diminished media diversity).
134 See Yoo, supra note xx at 1630-31 (noting that reliance on advertising support 
undermines any price signaling of intensity).  
135
 Einstein, supra note xx at 33 (quoting producer Rob Burnett).   
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be favored over one that received three tens and seven zeros, 
depending on the demographic characteristics of the individuals.136  It 
is also plausible that a program receiving a three from ten viewers 
would be preferred to one receiving a ten from three viewers. This 
makes video programming very different from consumer goods 
whose prices fluctuate depending on the intensity of demand for 
them.137
Cable and satellite operators increase price discrimination 
through differential subscriber fees for different program packages. 
However, because most cable programming is bundled into tiers of a 
dozen or more channels, consumers are unable to signal the intensity 
of their preferences for a particular network carried on the tier, or for 
programs aggregated by that network.138  Moreover, cable audiences 
are sold to advertisers by program tier, not by program or network.139
As a result, the advertising rates for particular networks depend upon 
the popularity of other networks with which they are grouped.  Such 
bundling further obscures the true audience interest in any particular 
channel on the tier. 
b) Digital Mediascape
Innovations in audience measurement, digital recording, and 
program sales raise questions about the future of advertising and 
whether advertising will continue to distort the responsiveness of 
media markets to consumer choice.  These distortions will likely 
decrease as tailored fee-for-service video packages reduce reliance on 
advertising.  The result will be an increased quantity of niche 
programming disadvantaged by the dominance of advertisers. At the 
136 Id.
137
 In the first example above, substitute diamonds for network programs.  A 
merchant might earn as much from selling three madly desired diamonds as from 
selling six moderately desired diamonds.  The result is that people can get the 
diamonds they want depending on the amount they’re willing to pay.
138 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 111-117 (flat fees for a bundle of video 
services deprive the programmer of any way to realize the value of intensely held 
preferences, leading to non-production of a program whose value to viewers, when 
measured by their willingness to pay, is greater than the cost of producing it).  
Premium networks, like HBO and Showtime, which are sold on an unbundled per-
network basis are able to capture the intensity of audience interest through more 
perfect price discrimination.  The price, however, is higher marketing costs.  See 
note xx. 
139
 Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1706 (cable advertising revenues are 
based on the number of potential viewers, i.e., the number of subscribers to the 
service tier on which the network is carried); National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association, supra note xx at 6 (explaining relationship 
between service tiers and advertising rates).
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same time, we can expect advertisers to find new ways of reaching 
audiences through video products.  Advertiser responses to digital 
abundance and consumer control may well introduce new distortions 
that contribute to narrow market failures.
At the very least, digital technology might be expected to 
eradicate the problems advertisers have had with audience 
measurement. Interactive tools lodged within digital television or 
Internet receiving devices can provide more fine-grained information 
on the preferences of participating audience members.140   However, 
early digital audience measurement techniques show that technology 
alone cannot remedy inaccuracies that result from sampling.  New 
digital Nielsen “people meters,” for example, may substantially 
mismeasure actual audiences due to small audience samples.141
Whether or not technology that improves audience 
measurement can keep pace with audience fragmentation, the value of 
the audience to advertisers, and thus the impact of advertising on 
content, may decline in the digital mediascape.  There are two 
developments to note in this respect.  The first is audience 
fragmentation across more channels of video entertainment and 
information.  Not all advertisers require a mass audience. 142  But the 
largest funders of media products, such as Procter and Gamble and 
General Motors,143 value mass audiences much more highly than 
niche audiences.144 Audience fragmentation makes it more difficult to 
140 See, e.g., Kevin J. Delaney and Robert A. Guth, Beep. Foosh. Buy Me. Pow: 
Nielsen Plans a New Service To Assess Audiences for Ads in Hot Videogame 
Medium, WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 8, 2004 at B1 (reporting new measurement 
techniques to assess video gamers’ exposure to and recall of advertising placed “in 
game” in console-based videogames).  
141 See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Critics of Nielsen’s Changes in its Television Ratings 
Methods Take Their Battle to the Small Screen, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004 at C2 
(reporting on industry protests against Nielsen’s implementation of new technology 
to measure audience sizes which allegedly undercounts minority viewers).  
Embedding this technology into all devices would correct for sample distortions, but 
would raise a host of privacy and performance problems.
142
 Some niche audiences, such as upscale golf viewers, can be of more value on a 
cost per thousand basis to particular advertisers than a mass audience.  See PICARD, 
supra note xx at 135 (“For media with specialized audiences, advertisers are willing 
to pay a higher cost per thousand than is available in mass media because the media 
are able to deliver audiences with specific characteristics that the advertising may be 
targeting.”)
143 BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?:  
COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 219 (3d ed. 
2000) (listing the top advertisers on cable).  
144 See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 156 (1991) 
(presenting the “Nielsen slope” as a graphic depiction of the increase in the cost per 
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find such mass audiences, explaining why advertising revenue on the 
most watched broadcast channels has increased even as the total 
viewership on these channels has declined.145  Digital consumer 
technology which enable convenient ad skipping, today most often 
found in personal video recorders, also devalue audiences to 
advertisers.  Consumers enabled with this technology are more likely 
than not to fast forward through conventional 15 or 30 second spot 
advertisements, thereby reducing the advertiser’s reach even where a 
mass audience has been assembled.146
The advertising industry may respond in three possible ways 
to audience devaluation.  It could abandon television and other 
broadly distributed video media – a course so improbable, we can 
disregard it.  Alternatively, it could increase the frequency of 
commercials to counterbalance the reduction in audience attention.  
Given the commercial saturation of video programming that already 
exists, populating content with even more ads would seem to be 
counterproductive, particularly given the spread of ad-skipping 
technologies.  The most likely advertiser response to fragmentation 
and viewer flight from advertising is to develop new communication 
tools that penetrate the audience more effectively so as to recapture 
some of the attention television once delivered.  These tools will have 
both salutary and harmful impacts on audience service.
Assuming that audience measurement techniques are able to 
provide advertisers with more accurate information about who is 
watching what, with what constancy of attention, and even what 
thousand audience members to advertisers as the ratings for a program increase).  
One advertisement that reaches 1 million viewers is more valuable that two that 
reach 500,000 viewers each because the 1 million constitutes “unduplicated reach.”  
Baumann & Mikkelsen, supra note xx at 10. The value of mass audiences to 
advertisers is further increased if they can purchase exposure to such audiences on a 
bundled basis within or across networks.  These economies favor concentrated 
distribution for media products.
145 TODREAS, supra note xx at 188 (showing how broadcast networks, in part 
because of the transactional efficiencies they offer, have maintained a 
disproportionate share of advertising revenue even as their share of viewers has 
decreased).  Broadcast television advertising increased from $26.6 billion in 1990 to 
$41.8 billion in 2002; cable advertising increased from $2.6 billion to $15.8 billion 
in the same period.  U.S. Bureau of Census, Annual Survey of Communications 
Services, at 794 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-
abstract-03.html.
146 See Georg Szalai, Sales Boom Replays PVR Debate, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER at 
1 (Dec. 29, 2003)(personal video recorder users skip 70% of televised 
advertisements).  There are estimates that the personal video recorder will cost the 
television industry $12 billion in advertising revenue by 2006.  NAPOLI, supra note 
xx [audience economics] at 151.
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amount of pleasure, advertisers could take advantage of interactive 
capabilities to better tailor promotions for particular audiences.  They 
could, for example, provide more detailed information to interested 
viewers, supporting a stronger and more lasting impression.  Better 
information about the target audience might, thus, improve the 
effectiveness of the advertisement and reduce the minimum audience 
size necessary for programming to attract advertiser support.147  These 
innovations would allow program producers, aggregators, and 
distributors to be more attentive to smaller audiences that advertisers 
now ignore, perhaps improving the optimal mix of programming.148
Other possibilities for advertising’s evolution may decrease 
the responsiveness of programming to consumer desires.  Faced with 
a fractured and inattentive audience, advertisers are finding new ways 
to make their messages unavoidable.  For example, they are inserting 
product placements into the program narrative and “wrapping” 
program content with product logos.149  Taking this approach one step 
further, advertisers are working with programmers to develop 
programming around products, rather than simply working to place 
products into programming developed independently.150 Federal 
Express, for example, worked closely with the producers of the 
popular film Castaway to control the portrayal of the company’s 
products and services in a movie about a Federal Express airplane 
147 See Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder:  Unbundling Advertising and 
Content, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 197 (Sept. 2003) at 
12, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.  Alternatively, it could 
lead to increased stratification in programming support as advertisers refined their 
ability to target high-value, high-income consumers.   See Comments of Consumers 
Union et al. in Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspaper, MM Docket 
No. 01-235, at 60 (F.C.C. filed Dec. 3, 2001).
148
 It should be noted that no amount of measuring or appealing to niche audiences 
solves the problem of general interest advertisers aiming at a mass audience.  These 
advertisers will continue to look for programming with mass appeal.
149 See, e.g., Daisy Whitney, A ‘Tivo-Proof’ Ad Model; Ripe TV Will Weave 
Messages Into Its On-Demand Service, TELEVISION WEEK, Mar. 29, 2004 at 25.
150
 For example, Disney’s ESPN2 presented a documentary about boxing champion 
Roy Jones Jr., which was created by an advertising agency on behalf of its client, 
Nike.  The boxer, who is also a pitchman for Nike, wore the company’s apparel 
throughout the program.   The program cost twice as much as a commercial would 
have ($650,000), but ran during prime time free of charge.   Other examples of this 
new trend whereby advertising agencies produce video featuring their clients 
include Interpublic Group’s co-production of the reality program The Restaurant, 
which aired on NBC and featured clients such as Coors and Mitsubishi.  See 
Suzanne Vranica, Hollywood Goes Madison Avenue, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 
15, 2003, at B5.   
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crash survivor.151  While this trend is probably neutral with respect to 
the audience size necessary to support a program, it intensifies 
advertisers’ interest in the kind of programming with which they are 
associated.  When spots are discrete breaks in a program, the tenor of 
the program is at some remove from the product.  This distance closes 
markedly when the product is in the hand of an actor or, indeed, when 
the actor is in the hands of the advertiser.  Thus, a shift from spot 
advertising to in-program advertising could well increase advertiser 
influence over content, opening the gap between viewer preferences 
and programmers’ responsiveness.152
Recall that, in addition to advertiser interests, the inability of 
audience members to register preference intensities has disadvantaged 
minority tastes.153  By increasing transmission capacity and 
interactivity, digital technology enables distributors to sell 
programming directly to consumers through such services as video on 
demand, broadband streaming, or even simply mail-order DVDs.154
To the extent that consumers are willing to pay for programming 
delivered in this way, programmers of at least some kinds of video 
products will rely less on advertising, reducing advertisers’ impact on 
programming whatever strategies they may develop to address 
audience fragmentation and control.  More importantly, greater price 
discrimination in the sale of video programming could increase the 
availability of programming that is in high demand by relatively small 
audience segments.155  These developments, discussed below, will 
151 See NAPOLI, supra note xx [Audience Economics] at 153.
152
 There is a long policy tradition of requiring broadcasters to make it clear to the 
public who has paid for programming. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (2003); 47 
C.F.R. § 73.1212(a) (2003) (requiring identification of sponsor of any material “for 
which money, service or other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly 
paid or promised to, or charged or accepted by such station…”). The FCC has found 
that the use of subliminal advertising, defined as an attempt “to convey information 
to the viewer by transmitting messages below the threshold level of normal 
awareness,” is “contrary to the public interest” because such advertisements are 
“intended to be deceptive.” Public Notice Concerning the Broadcast of Information 
by Means of “Subliminal Perception” Techniques, 44 FCC 2d 1016, 1017 (1974).
153 See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
154
 As of July 2003, an average of 12% of all Americans had watched some form of 
Internet video in the past month, up from an average 8% as of July 2002.   There is 
a significant amount of streaming video available for viewing in real-time as well as 
other video, like movies made available through Movielink, a joint venture of five 
major movie studios, available for storage and playback.  Notably, however, most of 
this video is not original and is otherwise available through other media organs.  
Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1674-75.
155 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 83 (discussing price discrimination as a 
way out of the public good problem of television programming).
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likely amplify the audience voice and result in more programming for 
niche audiences, although the impact on choice will be complex and 
variable across programming types.
2. Programming Gambles
The economics of video production are as responsible as 
advertisers for the underproduction of certain kinds of programming.  
Upfront investments in professional video production tend to be 
relatively high, while the likelihood that any particular product will 
achieve market success is relatively low.  This combination creates a 
programming sweet spot favoring the safe over the risky, imitation 
over experimentation, and experienced insiders over newcomers.156
At least where distribution channels are scarce, as the first subpart 
below shows, it is a spot contoured for the satisfaction of expressed 
majority tastes over expressed minority, or unexpressed, tastes.  The 
second subpart examines the degree to which these patterns will 
persist in a digitally networked environment. 
a) Analog Mediascape
What economist Harold Hotelling in 1929 labeled the 
“excessive sameness” of media products is rooted in basic 
characteristics of video supply and demand.157  Expensive production 
and volatile consumption patterns, combined with low variable 
distribution costs and imperfect price discrimination, motivate media 
producers to aggregate large audiences for any given video product.  
On the supply side, video products are characterized by high 
first copy costs.158  The yearly operating expense of a cable network is 
156 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY:  
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 29-48 (2000) (discussing incentives 
to produce homogenous content); BAKER, supra note xx [media markets] at 37-40 
(relating tendency towards homogenization of media products to public-goods 
characteristics); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 99-100 (showing how 
satisfaction of majority tastes tends to be excessive because it is more profitable to 
carve up large audiences than to risk smaller ones); Einstein, supra note xx at 45-49 
(citing advertiser pressures and efforts to repackage successful formulas as factors 
leading to bland, homogeneous programming.); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and 
Amish Children:  Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 92-98 
(2001) (arguing that mass media markets shortchange diverse content);  See
Sunstein, supra note xx [television] at 515-17 (discussing incentives for 
homogeneity in programming).
157
 Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, ECONOMIC JOURNAL 34, 41-57 
(1929), cited in W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 129 
(1991).
158
 Some video, like reality and local news programming, is relatively cheap to 
produce, while dramatic series, professional documentaries, global news, and 
professional sports are relatively expensive.  See DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM 
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more than $125 million, of which 65% consists of programming 
costs.159 Much recent scholarship has focused on the mutability of 
these first copy costs, suggesting that they are heavily influenced by 
policy choices.  Extended copyright terms, for example, drive up 
video costs by reducing the availability of public domain works for 
inclusion in media products and distribution over media networks.160
The cult of celebrity, supported by rights of publicity, increases the 
cost of talent.161  Even the legal rights enjoyed by the major 
professional sports leagues, affording them control over competition 
to and exhibition of their games, contribute to the expense of video 
products.162
While it is true that policy choices can impact the cost of 
content production, the expense of producing professional video 
products is largely independent of policy discretion.  Good and wide-
ranging journalistic capabilities, as well as scripted programs with 
HOYNES, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA:  CORPORATE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
157 (2001).  
159 KAGAN WORLD MEDIA, ECONOMICS OF BASIC CABLE NETWORKS 25 (2003), 
cited in Comments of The Progress and Freedom Foundation in A La Carte and 
Themed Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable 
Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-207, at 6 
(F.C.C. filed July 15, 2004).  Independent start-up cable network have average costs 
of $10-30 million annually.  Id. For the cable operator, as opposed to the network, 
programming costs account for about one third of operating expenses.  U.S. Bureau 
of Census, supra note xx at 730. And these costs are rising.  The General 
Accounting Office recently found that programming costs have risen on average by 
as much as 34% in the last three years, with sports programming costs increasing on 
average by 59%.  See U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues Related to 
Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry, GAO-04-8, 4, 
21-22 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04262t.pdf 
[hereinafter 2003 GAO Report].  
160 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001) (arguing that strong copyright protection 
raises costs for new entrants in the content business and advantages media 
enterprises with large copyright portfolios); Benkler, supra note xx [Free as Air] at 
401-08 (same); RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE:  THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996) (arguing that copyright ownership 
enables media companies to exploit economies of scale and scope through phased 
release and product expansion).
161
 In the late 1990’s, the average film cost approached $60 million, plus an 
additional $20 million for marketing.  Substantially contributing to these costs were 
the salaries of movie stars like Gwyneth Paltrow and Tom Cruise who could 
command $20 million a film.  COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 361.  
162 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of 
Professional Sports, 79 B.U.L. REV. 889, 895-905, 917-921 (1999) (detailing how 
permissive antitrust regulation of sports leagues has increased media costs for sports 
exhibition).
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high production values, for example, entail invariably high labor 
costs.163  Video product prices depend too on promotion and brand-
development costs, which constitute a large part of programming 
budgets.164 Promotion for media brands and programming is 
particularly important because media products are experience goods 
whose value cannot be determined prior to purchase.165  Consumers 
must therefore rely on brand reputation and third party reviews to an 
unusually high degree.166 While word of mouth, weblogs, and other 
forms of distributed promotion can help to reduce promotion costs 
after a video product is first released, extensive marketing may be 
necessary to bring consumers to the product in advance of its release, 
particularly for video products with short shelf lives.   
The second notable characteristic of video economics on the 
supply side is that distribution costs do not vary appreciably with 
audience size.  It costs scarcely more to distribute a video product by 
means of broadcast, cable or broadband networks to one hundred 
million than to one million people.  Because of these low variable 
costs, at least in markets with poor price discrimination, “video 
program packagers will always prefer to transmit to larger 
audiences.”167 By appealing to larger audiences, media producers and 
163
 Such products, like other labor-intensive creative products, are excluded from the 
most significant technology-related efficiency gains that accrue to the production of 
other goods because of what has been called “Baumol’s disease” after the economist 
William J. Baumol.  Baumol showed that, because labor costs tend to rise more 
quickly than other costs, the costs of cultural production tend to increase faster than 
the costs of other products.  DOYLE, supra note xx at 80.  Video production has a 
weaker case of Baumol’s disease than live artistic endeavors if audience numbers 
increase.  See William J. Baumol & Hilda Baumol, On Finances of the Performing 
Arts During Stagflation:  Some Recent Data, 169, 191 (1980) in BAUMOL’S COST 
DISEASE:  THE ARTS AND OTHER VICTIMS (Ruth Towse ed., 1997) (noting that the 
cost per person served by mass media may remain relatively stable if the audience 
per broadcast or movie rises at a rate faster than the cost of performance increases).
164 See, e.g., PICARD, supra note xx 67 (estimating that the costs of marketing as a 
percentage of costs of media operations range from 20% for television to 70% for 
motion pictures); MCCHESNEY, supra note xx [Rich Media] at 24-25 (discussing 
importance of branding to the sale of video products).   
165
 The term “experience goods” was coined by Phillip Nelson, Information and 
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970).  See also JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 106-44 (1998).  
166 Cf. Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality:  Vertical 
Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 817, 825 (1992) (describing the 
different information requirements for experience goods as contrasted with search 
goods).  
167
 Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 
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aggregators can expect larger licensing, subscription, and advertising 
revenue, without appreciably larger costs.168  The pursuit of these 
mass audiences, of course, tends to advantage what are perceived to 
be widely shared tastes. 
If video product were merely expensive to produce, but fairly 
certain to sell, the impact on market outputs might not be so profound.  
Demand side characteristics are important too.  The most significant 
of these is that video products are not substitutable whenever 
consumer preferences are strong.  Such preferences are often strong, 
either for predictable reasons (e.g., a preference for sports or 
tendentious political commentary) or for unpredictable reasons (e.g., a 
preference for one new actor over another). The unpredictability of 
preferences makes video production highly risky as well as costly.  
Only one out of every ten feature films, for example, makes a 
profit.169  Only 5% of television program pilots result in a profitable 
program series.170 The unpredictability of programming success, 
combined with high production and low distribution costs, further 
strengthens the quest for blockbuster hits.171
17312, 17323 (2001) (discussing cable programming).  See also Amendment of 
Section 73.368(g) of the Commission’s Rules – The Dual Network Rules, Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making, 15 F.C.C.R. 11253, 11257-61 (2000) (discussing broadcast 
programming); Douglas Gomery, Who Owns the Media? in MEDIA ECONOMICS:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (A. Alexander et al. ed., 1993) (“the optimal market for 
selling a television programme, a feature film, music…or a printed publication is 
the entire planet.”).
168 See ROBERT G. PICARD, THE ECONOMICS AND FINANCING OF MEDIA COMPANIES
134-5 (2002) (discussing incentives to attract the largest possible preference 
groups); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx, at 23-25 (same).
169 DOYLE, supra note xx at 108.  Mining for hit movies is much like exploring for 
oil.  And like the oil business, the media industry tends to privilege companies that 
involve themselves in the whole cycle of production and distribution from 
development (exploration) to production and distribution (refining and retail).
170
 Cynthia Meyers, Media Consolidation and Product Diversity: A 
Recontextualization, delivered to Conference on Media Diversity and Localism:  
Meaning, Metrics, and the Public Interest, Fordham University (December 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). The practice in U.S. media 
markets of deficit financing exacerbates these risks of failure. Cable and broadcast 
networks typically underfund the production of programming, requiring producers 
to share in the financial risk.  If they cannot find other financing, producers then 
have to bear this risk, sharpening the bite of programming failure.  DOYLE, supra
note xx at 82-3.
171
 It is fairly well documented that this strategy results in the loss of “consumer 
surplus” because the competitive success of some products will cause the failure of 
other products that would produce more value to consumers than they cost to 
produce.  Thus, hits that spin off ancillary musical or durable goods produce gross 
consumer welfare, but may damage net consumer welfare by eliminating more 
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This pursuit of the widely popular creates biases in favor of 
programming that mimics existing programming successes and/or that 
holds out the promise of a long and extended life in various media and 
ancillary markets.  In either case, the programming produced may 
systematically shortchange minority tastes.  The first proposition –
that producers and aggregators will pursue programming that 
duplicates existing media options – conflicts with expectations of 
market differentiation.  Economists have explained this conflict, 
showing how poaching a fraction of an existing audience may be 
preferable to developing a new audience where media outlets are 
scarce.172  Even where scarcity is reduced, the unpredictability of 
public appeal and the investments required to produce high-cost 
programming tends to support a culture of conformity.173 The 
frequency of program failures, and the pressures of cost recovery on 
programs that succeed, lead naturally to a reliance on heuristics of 
success.  These will include proven program formats, formulae, and 
stars.  
It might be supposed that a producer that foregoes large 
audiences for initial release, hoping instead for market longevity, 
market breadth outside of the U.S., or market synergies in non-video 
product markets would be more innovative.174  But the creation of 
diverse alternatives – alternatives that will be valued more highly by some segment 
of the viewership than either the hit or what is left in its wake. BAKER, supra note 
xx at 20-24; DOYLE, supra note xx at 77.
172 See BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA 
STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18-20 (1975) (explaining why, in the 
absence of perfect price discrimination, the market will under-produce welfare-
enhancing programs, particularly those that are intensely desired by smaller 
populations); Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, Television Programming, 
Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q. J. ECON. 103, 103-6, 122-25 (1977) 
(same).  See also BAKER, supra note xx at 24 (“[T]he competitively successful but 
economically unjustified material will have relatively uniform but broad appeal – a 
comparatively flat demand curve.  In contrast, the economically justified, audience-
satisfying material that a free market fails to produce often is material with 
relatively strong, unique appeal-creating a more steeply declining demand curve.”).  
173
 A cultural explanation for conformity is that audience tastes are in fact largely 
the same.  See NEUMAN, supra note xx at 146 (“On the whole most people within a 
given cultural setting display remarkably homogeneous tastes . . .. [favoring s]tories 
of romance and adventure and news of war and peace…”).
174
 The goal at least for high-cost productions is sale over temporal windows, for 
example first in theatrical release, then on a premium cable channel, then video on 
demand, then on basic cable or broadcast.  For television series, the syndication or 
re-run market is also critical.  OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 26-38; DOYLE, 
supra note xx at 84 (“Windowing is a form of price discrimination in that it 
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programming that can sell well in many geographic and product 
markets, over an extended period of time is captive to its own 
dogmas.175 For example, high action content easily translatable for 
foreign audiences and content that is not particularly time-sensitive is 
best suited for extended and broad exploitation.176  Moreover, content 
populated by animated (or merely cartoonish) characters, music, and 
highly visible consumer items make product tie-ins especially 
attractive.177 The result is that audience preferences for a video 
product without ancillary marketing opportunities and with limited 
geographic appeal must compete against audience preferences that are 
aggregated over multiple direct and ancillary markets.  Programming 
resources can be expected to flow in disproportionate amounts into 
video products with broad and extended appeal.178
involves the same product being sold at different prices to different groups of 
consumers for reasons not associated with differences in costs.”).  
175
 Companies with cable as well as cinematic and broadcast properties are better 
able to wring value out of their investments in programming over temporal and 
product windows.  Thus, for example, Viacom’s Paramount film division was able 
to reap a substantial profit on its Beavis and Butt-Head Do America film based on 
Viacom’s MTV cartoon series.  Disney is perhaps most renowned for this kind of 
cross-selling, exploiting the popularity of its 1994 hit film The Lion King on 
television, Broadway, and through all sorts of merchandise.  MCCHESNEY, supra 
note xx [Rich Media] at 22-27, 38-48 (providing examples of media conglomerate 
cross-selling and intensive commercial exploitation).
176 See David Kipen, Offshoring the Audience:  If France Makes Movies for the 
French, and America Makes Movies for the World, Who’s Left to Make Movies for 
America?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1, 2004 at [pincite] (arguing that the 
prevailing view in Hollywood of domestic movie sales as loss leaders for 
international box-office revenues results in a loss of films that are highly verbal and 
focus on distinctly American themes like politics); C. Edwin Baker, International 
Trade in Media Products in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 280-281 
(Niva Elkin Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2002) (arguing that foreign sales 
supply a prime motive to fill video products with violence and sex); C. Edwin 
Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N. CAROLINA L. 
REV. 1358, 1384 (2000) (same).
177
 The integrated marketing strategy typical of media products that are exploited 
most broadly and successfully can be seen in such films as Warner Brothers’ 
Batman & Robin.  The studio’s promotional campaign included partnerships with 
Taco Bell, Kellogg’s, Amoco, and Apple Computer as well as more than 250 
licenses and tie-in with outlets like Toys ‘R’ Us, Wal-Mart and Target as well as, of 
course, Warner Bros. Studio Stores around the world.  JOHN RYAN & WILLIAM M. 
WENTWORTH, MEDIA AND SOCIETY:  THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE MASS 
MEDIA 165-7 (1999).
178
 Whether it is because successful windowing provides the support necessary for 
big-budget investments or because big-budget investments are necessary to produce 
this kind of programming, there is a clear correlation between windowing and 
programming budgets.  See, e.g., OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 47-49 
2004] Media Policy Out of the Box 51
The relaxation of channel constraints facilitates a strategy for 
coping with the high costs and high risks of video production that is 
altogether different from the pursuit of mass market, multiple market 
hits.  Such a strategy involves production for minority tastes, with the 
hopes of a more secure, albeit smaller, audience base.  Cable and 
satellite networks have pursued this strategy, but, on the basic service 
tiers, only for relatively low cost programming.  Even when supported 
by the dual revenue stream of advertising and subscriptions, high-cost 
programming requires a large audience in the absence of either more 
perfect price discrimination or premium subscription rates.  The 
question for the digital era is whether new modes of price 
discrimination, combined with new production and distribution 
models, will substantially augment the production of programming for 
taste minorities.
b) Digital Mediascape
Digital technologies have the potential to remake the 
programming sweet spot by vastly increasing video distribution 
channels.179  It is tempting to settle on the incontestable claim that 
more distribution results in greater consumer satisfaction, without 
probing what constitutes the additional flow of bits.  A more rigorous 
analysis asks whether digital abundance and consumer control change 
the formula for commercially successful programming.  The answer, 
discussed below, is “maybe, in some cases.”
Technological optimists herald the end of an age in which the 
mass audience is an economic necessity.  Relying on the ability of 
digital technologies to shift power to consumers from producers, 
program aggregators, and distributors, they envision a collection of 
media products that satisfy even the smallest taste constellations.  In 
the words of one commentator, these optimists see “a world in which 
technology, consumer demand, corporate strategy, and industrial 
policy are pushing companies away from standardized production for 
national mass markets and toward flexible production of customized 
products that better serve individual needs on a global scale.”180
(showing the correlation between motion picture budgets and the sequential release 
over multiple video platforms).  
179 See supra notes xx and accompanying text (identifying digital compression 
technologies, interactive capabilities, and new distribution channels as the most 
important contributors to video quantity).
180
 Chad Raphael, The Web in CULTURE WORKS:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CULTURE, supra note xx at 204.  See also TRACEY, supra note xx at 264-5 (1998) 
(“The rhetoric of broadband culture is that...it offers…authentic virtual communities 
and relationships formed along paths of new ways of speaking to each other; access 
to unbounded sources of information; new forms of political praxis; unlimited 
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To test this vision, I first assume that digital technologies do 
nothing but increase channel abundance.  Under these circumstances, 
unless consumers are willing to invest more in video consumption or 
media industry profit margins fall substantially, increased abundance 
will tend to drive down investment at the front end in units of video 
programming.181  The predictable result is an abundance of relatively 
low-budget programming.182 Decreased investment in any given 
channel, as the number of channels grows, can be seen in the near 
abandonment by many niche cable channels of original dramatic 
programming in favor of reruns, syndicated programming, and 
cheaper reality programming.183 The correlation between channel 
abundance and responsiveness to minority audience preferences, 
therefore, may be only as strong as is the substitutability of low and 
high budget programming.  To the extent that program investment is 
either unimportant in satisfying the particular audience or can be 
sources of entertainment.”)  The shine of technological optimism on new 
communications technologies is familiar.  In a 1970 article heralding the 
introduction of cable technology, a commentator gushed that “the stage is being set 
for a communications revolution … there can come into homes and business places 
… forms of information too numerous to specify … [making] every home and 
office … a communications center of a breadth and flexibility to influence every 
aspect of private and community life”.  STREETER, supra note xx at 309 (quoting 
Ralph Lee Smith).  
181
 Production quality is likely to decrease as programming volume increases for the 
simple reason that it is becomes more difficult for any single channel to grow its 
audience by showing higher quality programs.  As a result, programmers will 
simply produce or buy less expensive programs.  See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra 
note xx at 145-147 (showing how the marginal return on a dollar invested in 
programs falls as channel volume increases); DOYLE, supra note xx at 62 (When 
viewership falls short of a given level, program budgets will fall, creating a vicious 
circle of declining product quality and declining audience share).  
182 See Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates Limited, UK Television Content in the Digital 
Age, at 12 (2004), at www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/ukcontent_digital_age.pdf 
[hereafter Television Content in the Digital Age]. Taking a documentary as an 
example of a high-budget genre of appeal to a niche audience, the authors write that 
even if a network “targets a lower audience of two or three million… the cost of the 
documentary can probably not be financed by the advertisers’ value of [such an 
audience]. Instead the niche network searches for lower-cost, low-audience 
programming.”  Id. at 14.  It is unclear for how long reality programming will 
remain low-cost.  See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, Reality Checks:  Unscripted Shows 
Become a Money Pit, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 24, 2004, at A1 (describing 
increasing salary demands by reality show “actors.”).
183 See NAPOLI, supra [Audience Economics] note xx at 177 (citing Court TV, the 
History Channel, and Oxygen as examples); NEUMAN, supra note xx at 162 (“[A]n 
increased diversity of channels … will [produce] an increase in the number of 
channels providing mass-appeal content – as before, primarily action and comedy 
entertainment, sports, and brief news headlines.”). 
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recouped over extensive product, temporal, or geographic markets, 
then channel abundance will indeed lead to greater consumer 
satisfaction.  But to the extent that what is desired is high-cost 
programming for smaller audiences, channel abundance will have the 
opposite effect.  
Let us now assume that digital technologies not only increase 
channel abundance, but fundamentally change the economics of video 
production.  In the analog world, large audiences are required because 
of the high risks and high costs associated with video products, 
combined with imperfect price discrimination.184  If video markets are 
to satisfy a greater range of tastes, then audience aggregation 
requirements must relax.  For this to happen, the costs of production 
must plummet or the per-viewer revenue captured by producers must 
increase, thereby relieving them from amassing audiences over large 
geographic, temporal, and product markets.  
Digital technology can lower the costs of content creation in 
two different ways.  First, digital production equipment like cameras 
and recording media, and post-production equipment like editing 
software, democratize the technical process of video production.185
As broadband networks speed up and proliferate, digital technology 
will also reduce the cost of distribution.  Second, digital networks and 
technologies enable new ways to exploit creative talent that may 
reduce creative costs.  Peer production techniques, like those used in 
open-source software, allow multiple creators to collaborate on media 
product development.186  These techniques hold out the promise that 
talented individuals, working for little or no compensation, can come 
together to produce high quality content fairly cheaply, and then 
distribute that content without the intermediation of media 
conglomerates.   Of course this scenario assumes that talent is 
plentiful and responsive to non-pecuniary rewards, and that 
184 See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
185
 Low budget films like the 1999 Blair Witch Project demonstrate this.  DOYLE, 
supra note xx at 116-117.  It should be noted that digital distribution and 
reproduction techniques also threaten investments in content by increasing the risks 
of unauthorized and uncompensated consumption.  
186 See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons:  Towards a Political Economy of 
Information, 52 DUKE L. J. 1245, 1254 (2003) (arguing that the digitally networked 
environment increases the impact of nonmarket enterprises in cultural production 
and, pointing to open software, a Mars mapping project, and online encyclopedia 
project, the opportunities for “radically decentralized collaborative production”); 
Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 401-405 (1999) 
(describing five different organizational forms for the production of media products 
ranging from corporate media to non market actors).
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disaggregated groups rival individuals or organized groups in the 
quality of content they can produce.  I will question these assumptions 
below.  
Independent of production models and associated costs, digital 
distribution models can alleviate the pressure on producers to 
aggregate large audiences, thus increasing service of taste minorities.  
The most promising such distribution model involves more precise 
price discrimination.187  A simple example shows how the number of 
viewers that must be aggregated in order to support the production 
and distribution of a program should fall with the introduction of 
better price discrimination, assuming that marketing and distribution 
costs remain constant.188  A cable channel typically requires a 
subscriber base of at least 50 million households before most national 
advertisers will purchase time on it.189  If that channel is 
disaggregated and the programming sold directly to consumers, an 
audience of 500,000 willing to pay $2 each to access a particular 
program should suffice to support a program that cost $1,000,000 
(including distribution and marketing costs).190  Reducing the 
187
 The likely economic effects of price discrimination on the video market are 
contested. For a debate on the utility of price discrimination in television 
programming, see Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local:  
A Response to Christopher Yoo’s Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J. 
233, 234-5 (2004) (perfect price discrimination results in no consumer surplus 
because no buyer pays less than the maximum price he is willing to pay) and 
Christopher S. Yoo, The Role of Politics and Policy in Television Regulation, 53 
EMORY L.J. 255, 267 (2004) (perfect price discrimination will result in consumer 
surplus as measured by product characteristics in addition to price).
188
 This assumption is probably unsound.  See infra notes xx and accompanying 
text.
189
 Michael G. Baumann & Kent W. Mikkelsen, Benefits of Bundling and Costs of 
Unbundling Cable Networks in Comments of the Walt Disney Company in A La 
Carte and Themed Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution 
on Cable Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-
207, at 9 (F.C.C. filed July 15, 2004).  General entertainment and sports cable 
channels reach an average of 86.5 million subscribers and emerging niche channels 
reach an average of 34.2 million subscribers.  The average audience delivered is 
842,000 for general entertainment and sports and 311,000 for emerging niche 
channels.  Booz Allen Hamilton, The a la Carte Paradox:  Higher Consumer Costs 
and Reduced Programming Diversity in Comments of the National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association, in A La Carte and Themed Programming and 
Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable Television and Direct 
Broadcast Satellite Systems, MB Docket No. 04-207, at 41 (F.C.C. filed July 15, 
2004).
190
 This would be a relatively meager sum for a video program.  By the mid-1990’s 
the average price for a half-hour comedy was $750,000 to $1 million and the price 
for an hour-long drama was $1.5 to $2 million.  TODREAS, supra note xx at 23.
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minimum audience size even more, a program might be marketed to 
100,000 eager viewers for $4 the first day of release and then to 
another 300,000 viewers for $2 a week later.191  Thus, a video product 
distributed on-demand might well require a smaller audience than 
would a product distributed on a cable network.  
These two developments – lower production costs and greater 
per-program revenue – may indeed change the economics of 
programming gambles and lead to greater consumer satisfaction, but 
only for some kinds of product categories.   These are the very same 
low-cost or mass audience productions that are already plentiful.  As 
even the greatest enthusiasts of peer production point out, 
decentralized production works best for modular content.192
Examples would be games, reality programming, and current events 
reporting that can reasonably be assembled from individual segments.  
Scripted dramatic series, branded sports events, video involving 
professional talent compensated at market rates, and well-researched, 
comprehensive and accredited news compilations, are quite different. 
These products require sizeable upfront investments and are not 
modular in form. They are likely to remain the province of 
hierarchical, not peer, production. 193  As such, they will benefit little 
from the cost savings associated with distributed creation. 
Whether working through peer networks or not, the ability of 
video producers to make content cheaply depends heavily on labor 
costs.194 Production cost savings will be concentrated within 
programming genres that can economize on labor.  Products like 
reality or animated programming, in addition to amateur works, will 
benefit most from digital advances in video production to the extent 
191
 For such a model to work, the first release would have to include copy protection 
technology to limit the ability of the first group to share the programming with the 
second group.
192 See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L. J. 369, 391 (2002) (arguing that peer production works so long as the 
projects are modular, granular and easily integrated).
193 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, The Commercial Mass Media’s Continuing Fourth 
Estate Role, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION supra note xx at 320-23, 
330-38 (2002) (identifying the positive contributions to democracy of corporate 
media and the limitations of peer-produced media in making the same 
contributions); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our 
System of Free Expression, 53 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1879, 1917-1926 (2000).  See 
also Baker, supra note xx [media concentration] at 244 (“digital technology 
significantly reduces the cost or difficulty of making some media content… [but in 
the main,] the Internet is a distribution system…[that] does not itself create 
content.”).      
194 See supra note xx.
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that labor is not the largest cost component.  Products like 
professional sports, professional journalism, and certain kinds of 
scripted dramas that have high labor costs are less likely to benefit 
from these advances. 195
Like digital production techniques, digital distribution models 
will not necessarily result in the production of programming that was 
under-produced in the analog world.  The effects of per-program, 
direct-to-consumer sales will vary depending on program type and 
audience size.196  High-cost programming that can command a 
premium price either at one time, like sports events, or in the 
aggregate over multiple temporal, product, or geographic windows, 
like feature films or series with a well-developed market, may be 
produced even for small audiences.   But high-cost minority taste 
programming that has no proven market, a limited market life, or 
limited geographic appeal, will be much less likely to attract 
investment even in an on-demand world.  An example of this type of 
programming would be a documentary an audience would pay to see 
once, but that would have difficulty aggregating an audience over 
time, space, or product categories.  Such programming, if sold 
directly to consumers, will still have to attract relatively large 
audiences if it is to be produced.197  Low cost programming for a 
195 See Television Content in the Digital Age, supra note xx at 28 (“digitisation … 
is unlikely to change fundamentally the cost structure of the major forms of creative 
endeavor – the action adventure film, the narrative TV drama, the original situation 
comedy or the in-depth documentary [because] … [s]uch activities are fixed-cost, 
labour-intensive endeavors.”).
196
 The impact of on-demand programming will depend, in the first instance, on 
public tolerance for paying for programming on a per-program basis.  Experiments 
with Internet pricing models of the early 1990’s showed that consumers prefer to 
pay a flat fee than for metered usage.  See, e.g., Bruce Abramson, From Investor 
Fantasy to Regulatory Nightmare: Bad Network Economics and the Internet's 
Inevitable Monopolists, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 159, 168 n.15 (2002).  See also 
Loretta Anania & Richard Jay Solomon, Flat-The Minimalist Price, in INTERNET 
ECONOMICS, 91, 114-16 (Lee W. McKnight & Joseph P. Bailey eds., 1997) 
(suggesting that a flat fee is the most economically efficient option for  the Internet 
and similar networks). While the on-demand supplier of DVD’s, Netflix, provides 
subscription rates to its customers, subscribers are only allowed to rent three DVDs 
at a time and cannot obtain the next three until the first three have been returned.  
http://www.netflix.com.  A subscription to this trickle of content is entirely unlike a 
cable subscription.  Services like Netflix, although significant improvements over 
the real space video rental market in terms of consumer convenience, are unlikely to 
supplant the market for cable and broadcast programming which is either free to the 
viewer or part of a flat fee subscription.
197
 The impact of on-demand sales on the programming market is in effect being 
debated in the context of á la carte pricing for cable services.  Cable programming is 
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small audience or high-cost programming for large audiences will 
benefit from on-demand sales.
Thus far, we have viewed the cost of programming as 
independent of the distribution model.  In fact, setting aside 
production savings associated with digital technologies, the cost of 
programming may increase with channel abundance and on-demand 
sales.  This is because program promotion becomes even more critical 
and more expensive in a channel-rich environment.198 For a program 
to attract even the smaller audience that might suffice in a world of 
perfect price discrimination, it will need to be easily found.  This may 
entail obtaining a preferential place on an electronic program guide or 
search portal.199  It will also require advertising, previews, or product 
tie-ins in high volumes to reach a sustaining audience.200  Such 
typically sold to the consumer on the basis of program tiers, each tier containing 
multiple cable and broadcast networks.  Prompted by a Congressional request, the 
FCC has opened an inquiry into whether it should require cable and satellite 
operators to unbundle their programming either by network or by theme to give 
consumers better prices and more control over programming.  Comment Requested 
on A La Carte and Themed Tier Programming and Pricing Options for 
Programming and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable 
Television and Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems, 19 F.C.C.R. 9291 (2004).  Cable 
operators, and many networks argue that mandatory á la carte pricing would 
decrease cable programming choice, and increase programming costs, because 
network bundling subsidizes less popular cable channels with more popular ones.  
See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Association, The Pitfalls of A La 
Carte:  Fewer Choices, Less Diversity, Higher Prices (May 2004), available at
http://ncta.com/pdf_files/NCTA_White_Paper_-_Pitfalls_of_A_La_Carte.pdf 
(arguing that bundled programming greatly increases diversity and that unbundled 
networks would require substantial consumer investment in addressable digital 
devices that make selective delivery possible); Video Competition Report, supra 
note xx at 1705-06.  See also OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note xx at 134 (program 
bundling, by aggregating the demands of viewers who differ in their willingness to 
pay for different services, supports some services that would not survive on a stand 
alone basis).  
198
 Promotion has a special importance for unbundled programming sold directly to 
consumers.  So long as consumers have already paid for the programming as part of 
a subscription service, or the programming is included in a free broadcast service, 
the stakes in selecting programming are relatively low.  These stakes rise 
considerably if the consumer must pay before viewing.  
199 See Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services 
Over Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, 1325 (2001) (discussing importance of electronic 
program guides to the future of video programming).
200
 Industry experts have predicted that unbundling cable networks for individual 
sale would result in advertising losses of 20% to 60% as cable becomes a less 
efficient advertising medium, and a substantial increase in network marketing 
expenses.  Today, networks bundled on cable tiers expend about 6% of revenues on 
marketing, while stand-alone networks like HBO expend as much as 25% of 
58 Media Policy Out of the Box                     [Vol.__:__]
marketing efforts increase the costs of programming and thus the 
audience size (or premium price) necessary to support it.201  Increased 
promotional costs put more pressure on audience aggregation, 
especially for high-cost productions, and undermine some of the 
benefits of price discrimination for smaller audiences.
 In sum, the channel abundance and price discrimination that 
digital technologies make possible are likely to make some kinds of 
video production more responsive to smaller audience groups.  New 
efficiencies in video production could also help to correct narrow 
market failures by increasing consumer satisfaction.  But the impact 
of these innovations on the overall makeup of video content must not 
be over-stated.   Because much video content will remain expensive, 
and on-demand programming will not support all programming types, 
some content will not be produced at optimal levels even as 
distribution constraints relax.  Expensive content that is demanded by 
smaller audiences and that is either high-risk, or difficult to market, 
will probably continue to be under-produced.  
3. Industry Structure
The economics of video production have produced an industry 
structure that, together with advertising and audience aggregation 
pressures, can disrupt consumer sovereignty.  The companies best 
positioned to aggregate audiences and spread the risks of video 
products are those that can exploit economies of scale at all stages of 
the media production, distribution and promotion process.202 As a 
result, the media industry is organized into “oligopoly market 
revenues on marketing.  See Booz Allen Hamilton, supra note xx at 27-28, 35. See 
also of George Bodenheimer, President, ESPN Inc. & ABC Sports, before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (March 25, 2004), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1127&wit_id=2836 (“A la 
carte will force all channels to expend millions of dollars in marketing…”).
201
 In the context of unbundled cable networks, one study predicts that cable 
operators would price average cable channels at $4 -$5 each per month.  Booz Allen 
Hamilton, supra note xx at 34. 
202 See NEUMAN, supra note xx at 147 (“The returns to scale are dramatically higher 
in information and communications than in most industries.”).  The economies that 
media industries pursue are more accurately described as economies of scale and 
“economies of multiformity” which are realized from corporate operations in two or 
more industries.  Alan B. Albarran & John Dimmick, Concentration and Economies 
of Multiformity in the Communication Industries, 9(4) J. OF MEDIA ECON. 41, 43 
(1996) (identifying diversification, repurposing of content, and repurposing of talent 
as three examples of economies of multiformity).
2004] Media Policy Out of the Box 59
structures and large scale multiproduct firms” with multiple 
distribution and product assets.203
The impact of this market structure on competition is subject 
to a lively economic debate.204  The economic inquiry focuses on 
whether vertical efficiencies outweigh any potential anticompetitive 
effects, taking into account any market dominance of the vertically 
integrated firm, such that integration should be permitted.  We need 
not enter into that debate to understand how the organization of media 
enterprises into large publicly traded, vertically and horizontally 
integrated corporations might skew the production of video products, 
contributing to narrow market failure.205  This section undertakes that 
examination first in the analog sphere and then in the digital.  
a) Analog Mediascape
Today, both the cable and broadcast industries are far more 
concentrated than they were just a decade ago.  The cable industry is 
203 DOYLE, supra note xx at 29. This consolidation has been international in scope.  
See, e.g., GILLIAN DOYLE, MEDIA OWNERSHIP:  THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
CONVERGENCE AND CONCENTRATION IN THE UK AND EUROPEAN MEDIA 4-5 (2002) 
(“the trend that exists in the media – of increased concentration of ownership and 
power into the hands of a few very large transnational corporations – clearly reflects 
the overwhelming advantages that accrue to large scale firms.”).
204
 According to today’s reigning economic theory, vertical integration should not 
result in anticompetitive leveraging between downstream and upstream markets, or 
in foreclosure in either market.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and 
Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 187-205 (2002).  
The D.C. Circuit has evinced just this skepticism over the dangers of vertical 
concentration in relation to cable programming.  See Time Warner Entertainment
Co., v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  See generally HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 377 (2d ed. 1999) (citing Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook as 
authorities for the position that vertical integration is not generally anti-
competitive). This is as conventional a view today as it once was heretical.  The 
older orthodoxy was highly suspicious of vertical integration.  See, e.g., Louis 
Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
516-17 (1985).  Some recent economic scholarship takes on the new orthodoxy and 
supports this older suspicion.  See, e.g., Tanseem Chipty, Vertical Integration, 
Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry, 91 
AM. ECON. REV. 428 (2001) (arguing that vertically integrated cable operators are 
more likely to carry affiliated networks); Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Hal J. Singer, 
Open Access to Broadband Networks:  A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner 
Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 631 (2001) (arguing that the merger between 
AOL and Time Warner created the incentive and ability to engage in discrimination 
in favor of affiliated content).  
205
 To be clear, the question pursued here is not whether integration is 
anticompetitive such that regulatory intervention is warranted – the principal inquiry 
of the economic literature -- but only whether integration influences video content 
in ways that may not be responsive to consumer demand.    
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dominated by Comcast and Time Warner Cable.206  The carriage 
decisions of either of these companies, given their dominance overall 
and in major markets, will often be sufficient to make or break a 
programming network.207 A cable network granted carriage on 
Comcast, which is dominant in 12 of the top 20 markets, has “the 
equivalent of a full scholarship to Harvard,” as one journalist has put 
it.208 The horizontal concentration of the cable industry is 
complemented by a fairly high degree of vertical concentration.  The 
largest cable operators have significant holdings in much of the 
content that they distribute.209  In 2003, 80% of the networks with 
significant national penetration were owned or co-owned by only six 
companies, of which five also dominate the broadcast network 
program marketplace.210  The acquisition of a controlling interest in 
206
 Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1687, n. 561 (together, these 
companies serve more than 34% of all those subscribing to a video service).  
207
 Video Competition Report, supra note xx at 1687; In re Implementation of 
Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992: Horizontal Ownership Limits, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19098, 
19104 (1999) (“In most markets, a single incumbent cable operator is likely to have 
more than 80% of the multichannel video distribution market.”).  
208
 George Anders, Want to Start a TV Channel?  See Amy Banse, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 2004, at B6 (commenting on Comcast investments in new 
channels). The importance of the top cable operators lies in the fact that most 
programming channels require distribution to thirty to fifty million households in 
order to earn sufficient advertising revenue.  See In re Time Warner, Inc., 123 
F.T.C. 171, 207 (1997) (statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners 
Janet D. Steiger and Christine A. Varney) (estimating that any new cable channel 
must reach at least 40-60% of all subscribers in order to have a chance of 
surviving).  The range in numbers depends on whether the denominator can consist 
of cable-only subscribers, numbering about 65 million households, or must include 
all multichannel video subscribers, numbering about 94 million households.  Video 
Competition Report, supra note xx at 1609, 1622.
209
 Until recently, the FCC had channel occupancy rules that limited cable operators 
from owning more than 40% of the national video programming services that they 
carry on the first 75 channels of their systems.  47 C.F.R.  § 76.504.  This rule was 
reversed and remanded as arbitrary and capricious.  Time Warner Entm’t Co., v. 
FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 2001).   
210
 Comments of The Writers Guild of America, et al. in 2002 Biennial Regulatory 
Review  Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other 
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 2 (F.C.C. filed 
Jan. 2, 2003) (identifying 73 of 91 most popular cable networks).  About 33% of all 
national cable networks are vertically integrated. Video Competition Report, supra
note xx  at 1690 (110 of 339 networks).  Another statistic suggests slightly less 
concentration.  Eighteen of the top twenty programming networks in terms of 
subscribership (excluding C-Span and the Weather Channel) are owned by one or 
more of thirteen media companies.  These are:  Time Warner, Cablevision, 
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DirecTV by News Corp., owner of the Fox Entertainment Group, 
increases vertical integration within the programming distribution 
sector.211
As with the cable industry, the broadcast industry has 
consolidated in both the distribution and programming markets.  In 
the distribution market, the largest four national networks own almost 
all of the major local stations in the top four media markets (New 
York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia).212  These top four 
markets cover about 17% of all television households and are 
essential to any national advertising campaign.213  All of the major 
networks have also engaged in upstream integration, combining with 
or creating in-house production studios.214  Walt Disney Company, 
Viacom, Fox Entertainment Group, and General Electric have come 
to control the production and distribution of most content broadcast in 
prime time. As of 2002, producers unaffiliated with the networks 
accounted for only 8.7% of prime time content.215
There are two reasons why the concentration of economic 
control over the production and distribution of video products, even if 
not anticompetitive, might frustrate consumer choice.  The first 
concerns the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to engage in 
strategic behavior to disadvantage competitors and to exploit 
Comcast, Cox, Disney, E. W. Scripps Co., General Electric, Hearst, Liberty Media, 
Advance Newhouse, News Corp., Viacom, and Vivendi. Id. at 1693.
211 See Subject to Conditions, Commission Approves Transaction Between General 
Motors Corporation, Hughes Electronics Corporation and The News Corporation 
Limited, Public Notice, FCC 03-328 (rel. Dec. 19, 2003). DirecTV currently has 
12.32 million subscribers.  Video Competition Report, supra note xx at App. B, 
Table B-3.  
212
 NAB Comments at 32.  Network ownership of stations in the top 24 television 
markets is heavy as well.
213 COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 222.
214 See Einstein, supra note xx at 15. This consolidation succeeded repeal of the 
financial interest and syndication rules, which had prohibited broadcast networks 
from holding financials interests in the television programs they aired beyond first-
run exhibition and restricted the creation of in-house syndication units.  See supra
note xx.  Between 1990, when these rules were in full force, and 2002, seven years 
after they had been repealed, the percentage of prime time programming supplied 
by the networks themselves increased by more than 450% to nearly 75% of all 
prime time programming.  Einstein, supra note xx at 30-32.  
215
 Einstein, supra note xx at 26. See also Comments of Coalition for Program 
Diversity in 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202, MB 
Docket No. 02-277, at 4-5 (F.C.C. filed Jan. 2, 2003) (contending that 68% of prime 
time programming on the three largest broadcast networks used to be independently 
produced versus 24% today.).
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efficiency gains to increase consumption of affiliated product.216  The 
second relates to the culture of risk aversion and revenue-
maximization that tends to permeate large and diversified 
corporations.  
In both cable and broadcast industries, programming 
distributors and aggregators stand to benefit from strategic carriage 
choices that favor affiliated content.217  The principal check on such 
favoritism is that the vertically integrated firm that discriminates in 
the upstream content market will experience downstream revenue 
losses, assuming a competitive downstream market.218 Notably, in the 
market for television programming, these losses will be blunted by the 
way in which programming is bundled.  The vertically integrated 
distributor, such as Time Warner Cable, that forecloses a channel like 
ESPN or ABC will indeed stand to experience downstream revenue 
losses as subscribers switch to satellite.219  But most programming 
216 See generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 4, 386 
(1934).  An example of strategic behavior would if Time Warner Cable used an 
upstream asset, like its owned service, HBO, to raise the costs of distribution for a 
downstream competitor like Echostar.  Alternatively Time Warner could use its 
downstream cable distribution asset to disadvantage upstream competitors, like 
Showtime, by depriving Showtime of carriage or favorable carriage terms.   
Efficiency gains might include “transaction efficiencies,” such as the costs Time 
Warner saves in contracting for HBO, and economies of scale that the distributor 
and programmer can realize by sharing creative or financial resources that are 
difficult to contract for on an arms length basis.
217 See, e.g., DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN 
CABLE TELEVISION 88 (1997) (“[C]able television systems do tend to favor their 
affiliated cable networks . . .  [sometimes] at the expense of rival, unaffiliated 
networks.”).  Fear of this kind of discrimination motivated Congress in the 1992 
Cable Act to limit vertical integration.  H.R. Rep. No. 862, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
56 at 42 (1992) (“vertically integrated companies reduce diversity in programming 
by threatening the viability of rival cable programming services” and “have 
impeded the creation of new programming services by refusing or threatening to 
refuse carriage to such services that would compete with their existing 
programming services.”).  See also 138 Cong. Rec. S400, S418 (Jan. 27, 1992) 
(“The danger of this kind of vertical integration is that a big cable company has a 
financial incentive to carry the channels it owns on its many systems while denying 
exposure to channels that might compete against it.”); 137 Cong. Rec. S2011, 
S2012 (1991) (“[V]ertical integration has led some operators to discriminate in 
favor of programming in which they have equity interests.”).
218 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 172-
73, 197-98 (1976) (arguing that the vertically integrated firm cannot leverage power 
from one market into another or deter entry into either market unless it has market 
power in both and there are barriers to entry by new competitors).   
219 See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note xx at 130 (“the lack of more than one or 
two of the most well-known networks would seriously handicap a multichannel 
competitor to an established cable system.”). 
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channels are not “must have” networks that, if dropped or made 
inconvenient to access, would alienate downstream subscribers.220
Whether a cable operator carries BBC America or Oxygen, or carries 
them in a favorable position on the cable system, is unlikely to be 
decisive in a consumer’s decision to subscribe.221 This is particularly 
true where competition in the downstream distribution market is 
marred by the failure of satellite to effectively substitute for cable for 
many subscribers and by the barriers to new entrants in the 
distribution market.222  Thus, a cable operator may well be able to 
reap benefits from privileging affiliated programming without 
suffering the downstream market costs that would ordinarily be 
predicted.  
Efficiency gains augment the incentives for vertically 
integrated distributors to favor affiliated programming.  Much of the 
money to be made on affiliated programming comes from markets 
that are ancillary to the downstream market.223 A vertically integrated 
220 See TIMOTHY M. TODREAS, VALUE CREATION AND BRANDING IN TELEVISION’S 
DIGITAL AGE 53 (1999).
221
 A favorable position may be characterized by the service tier (e.g., the analog 
service tier which is available to all subscribers or the digital service tier available 
only to some), the channel number (e.g., in a channel neighborhood with other 
popular programming), or the program guide (favorable display on the guide).  See
e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-628, Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992 at 41 (identifying “discriminating against rival 
programming services with regard to price, channel positioning, and promotion” as 
examples of prohibited acts by vertically integrated cable operators).
222
 Although the two direct broadcast satellite companies, Echostar and DirecTV, 
control 20% of the subscription television market, satellite service is not yet 
substitutable for cable for the growing number of broadband cable subscribers 
because it does not offer integrated broadband service.  Broadband subscribers and 
would-be subscribers have strong disincentives to switch to satellite even if they are 
dissatisfied with cable programming, allowing cable operators a great deal of 
competitive freedom to make programming decisions.  See Written Ex Parte Filing 
of the Walt Disney Company in CS Docket No. 00-30, at 34-35 (F.C.C. filed July 
27, 2000) (“Cable . . . networks are the only distribution platforms capable of 
delivering the full Interactive Television experience, and this is not likely to change 
for the foreseeable future.”).
223 See supra notes xx and accompanying text.  The empirical evidence supports the 
contention that networks, whether in order to exploit the syndication market or to 
recover costs of affiliated studios, do favor affiliated programming.  See Einstein, 
supra note xx at 30.  Cf. id. at Appendix 3 at 24 (“It is generally believed that some 
shows are being maintained on the network schedule for longer than they might be 
if the network did not have an interest in the show.”).  These same incentives lead to 
the acquisition of network equity interests in unaffiliated programming that gains a 
slot in the network schedule as a condition of airing.  See NAB Comments, supra 
note xx at 35.  See also Einstein, supra note xx at 23 (“The television executives 
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cable operator, for example, that carries, or merely promotes, its own 
content at the expense of competitors’ content may be able to shore 
up the market for tie-in merchandise, music, or DVDs.  One need only 
look at the pattern of media mergers and proposed mergers to see that 
vertical integration is highly valued by distributors seeking synergies 
through backward integration to defray the costs of content 
acquisition over a greater audience base.224  If they own content, they 
can more easily and cheaply repurpose that content over video-on-
demand, multiple cable channels, and online channels.225  This is 
especially true if vertically integrated distributors prominently feature 
and heavily promote their affiliated content. 
   The absorption of the most prolific media companies into 
large public corporations has an impact on video products that goes 
beyond content decisions related to affiliation. The particular 
corporate culture characteristic of large media conglomerates tends to 
reinforce risk aversion and homogeneity in media products.  
Journalism research suggests that the demands of the parent 
corporation and its shareholders to meet quarterly earnings targets 
affect the production and selection of media content.226   Emblematic 
interviewed for this report agreed that networks would continue to increase their 
level of program ownership in the coming years.”).   
224 See generally, RYAN & WENTWORTH, supra note xx at 164-67.  The desire to 
exploit synergies in ancillary markets was an explicit motive in Comcast’s bid for 
Disney in February 2004.  See, e.g., Brigeitte Greenberg, Roberts Says Comcast will 
Stay Committed to its Core Business, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY 9 (March 9, 2004) 
(quoting Comcast CEO Brian Roberts as saying that Comcast “can help take 
[Disney’s] content and the libraries and the portfolio of the … company and help 
them to accelerate its growth rate” by combining distribution with content); Joe 
Flint, Why Comcast Covets ESPN, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2004, at B1; 
Martin Peers, Merger Could Alter Hollywood Balance of Power, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2004, at B1.  See also Merissa Marr & Martin Peers, MGM’s 
Library of Old Movies Puts It in Spotlight, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 7, 2004, at 
A1 (illustrating the economic value of film archives for repackaging on cable, 
DVD’s, the stage, and other venues).
225
 For example, one of the benefits Time Warner saw in merging with Turner was 
better coordination of program distribution and retailing strategies to boost retail 
revenues from Time Warner’s cartoon characters.  TODREAS, supra note xx at 151.  
See also Larry Collette & Barry R. Litman, The Peculiar Economics of New 
Broadcast Network Entry:  The Case of United Paramount and Warner Bros., 10(4) 
J. OF MEDIA ECON. 3, 10 n.5 (1997) (noting that Warner Bros. had been frustrated in 
its attempts to cross promote its cartoon characters over multiple platforms so long 
as the Fox television network distributed its cartoons because, for example, Fox 
proposed eliminated the Batman series just when Warner Bros. was preparing to 
release its Batman Forever movie and related product tie-ins).
226 See, e.g., PICARD, supra note xx at 182 (“New pressures for increased company 
performance have been placed upon managers because of the obligations to 
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of this Wall Street-driven approach to media production is the view of 
General Electric’s Chairman, shortly after his company’s acquisition 
of NBC.  News, he said, would be treated as “a commodity or service 
no different from ‘toasters, light bulbs or jet engines’ [and NBC News 
would be expected] to make the same profit margins as every other 
GE division” even at the expense of journalistic standards.227  These 
financial pressures to satisfy Wall Street are made more acute by the 
debt that many large diversified public corporations carry after a 
major merger.228
Although aggressive earnings targets have led to explicit 
corporate influence over journalistic output, such influence tends to 
be more subtle and less easily policed.229  Among the most important 
effects is an unduly heavy reliance on official sources and canned 
reporting to produce content quickly, with minimal detectible error.230
shareholders … These market pressures have led to short-term thinking in some 
media companies…”).  This observation is not new.  More than fifty years ago, the 
Hutchins Commission bemoaned the commercial pressures on the media, resulting 
in speech that “emphasizes the exceptional rather than the representative, the 
sensational rather than the significant.”  COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
supra note xx  at 55.  See generally, LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS
29-34 (1991).  
227 DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA:  HOW GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS 
MEDIA, DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY 169 (1998) (quoting 
former NBC News President Lawrence Grossman quoting GE Chairman John F. 
Welch).
228 See ALGER, supra note xx at 156.
229
 Parent firms of newspapers have told editors and publishers that the news must 
bend to advertiser interests.  See, e.g., Comments of Consumer Federation of 
America, et al. in 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 41-48 
(F.C.C. filed Jan. 2, 2003). Electronic media journalists have experienced the same 
kinds of interference.  See id. at 41-48 (citing call from GE CEO to NBC news 
division, asking that there be nothing in the nightly news broadcast that might 
depress GE stock prices); Jim Rutenberg, Disney Is Blocking Distribution of Film 
That Criticizes Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2004 at 1 (reporting on Disney’s blocking 
of Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11allegedly out of concern that the negative 
portrayal of President Bush could jeopardize Disney tax breaks).  See generally, 
MCCHESNEY, supra note xx [Rich Media] at 53-63 (providing examples of editorial 
choices influenced by corporate commercial interests and the enlisting of journalists 
in support of the parent corporation’s business).
230 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note xx at 292 (identifying the nonstop news cycle, 
and the reliance on public officials, public relations entities, and other research 
short- cuts as causes of soft reporting).  For an excellent discussion of the pitfalls of 
journalism’s top-down reporting based on official statements, see Herbert J. Gans, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 45-68 (2003).  See also DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM 
HOYNES, BY INVITATION ONLY 105-137 (1994) (showing the effects of the limited 
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These tendencies have contributed to influential media mistakes like 
the early mis-reporting of the 2000 presidential election results and 
the uncritical acceptance of government rationales for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.231  Journalistic shortcuts that save time and money, 
taken to their extreme, result in the passing off of third party advocacy 
pieces or press releases as reporting, leaving the public in the dark as 
to the actual source of seemingly objective news.232
What the foregoing suggests is that media market structure, 
itself a reaction to the costs and risks of cultural production, tends to 
favor certain kinds of content.  This is content in which the distributor 
or aggregator has an interest and content that maximizes short-term 
economic returns.  It requires a leap from this observation to the claim 
that, therefore, the media industry is not optimally responsive to 
public demand.  Empirical evidence that there is indeed public 
demand for media products free from the influences and pressures 
discussed above is lacking.  Yet, the vocal grassroots objections to 
media consolidation suggest that at least a portion of the public is 
dissatisfied with the current media environment.233  Research 
pool of experts consulted on television public affairs programs like Nightline and 
what was then the McNeil/Lehrer News Hour). 
231
 The media relied on efficient, but monolithic, polling data for the 2000 election 
making it difficult for any media outlet to independently predict election outcomes.  
For a catalog of media shortfalls with respect to the 2000 presidential election, see, 
e.g., Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of 
Self-Restraint, 55 ALLR 1, 6-12 (2004).  For a critique of the media’s war coverage, 
see, e.g., SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, WEAPONS OF MASS DECEPTION:  
THE USES OF PROPAGANDA IN BUSH’S WAR ON IRAQ 161-188 (2003) (criticizing the 
news media for lack of critical coverage of the events leading up to, and the onset 
of, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq); Brent Cunningham, Re-thinking Objectivity, in 
OUR UNFREE PRESS:  100 YEARS OF RADICAL MEDIA CRITICISM 287, 294-295 
(Robert W. McChesney & Ben Scott ed., 2004) (cataloging media failures to 
challenge official statements on purpose and expected aftermath of preemptive 
strike in Iraq).  The relationship between public misperceptions about the war in 
Iraq and media exposure is explored in Steven Kull, Misperceptions, The Media and 
the Iraq War 12-19 (2003), at http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp (finding 
that the majority of survey respondents reported misperceptions concerning the 
discovery of weapons of mass destruction, world public opinion about the war 
and/or links between Iraq and al-Qaeda; viewers of Fox, CBS, ABC, CNN, and 
NBC evinced the highest concentration of misperceptions in that order; and higher 
exposure to television news compounded the effect of political positions on the 
frequency of misperceptions).  
232
 This happened, for example, when more than 40 television news stations aired 
videos produced by the Department of Health and Human Services lauding recent 
changes to Medicare.  Amy Goldstein, GAO Says HHS Broke Laws With Medicare 
Videos, WASHINGTON POST at A1 (May 20, 2004).
233 See supra note xx. 
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revealing public loss of faith in media as a truth-teller suggests the 
same thing.234
b) Digital Mediascape
How might digital innovations affect media industry structure 
in order to improve responsiveness to public demand?  Digital 
technologies certainly facilitate the emergence of new challengers in 
the competition for the viewer’s attention.235  Because distributed 
digital networks allow an ordinary webcaster to attain the reach of an 
NBC or Comcast, the Internet can loosen the bottleneck that has 
existed in the upstream production and packaging of programming.  
There will be less flex in the downstream market. Distribution choke 
points will remain in the hands of broadband facilities owners like 
cable.  But even here, principles of nondiscrimination fashioned on a 
common carrier model might well prevent such owners from favoring 
their own content. 236
Notwithstanding these changes, digital technology is as 
unlikely to remake media industry structure as it is to remake the 
economics of media production and promotion.  Indeed, because 
production and promotion costs will remain high, the benefits of scale 
and incumbency will remain in the digital world.  It will remain 
attractive for media companies to spread the risks of program 
production over bigger taste and geographic markets.237  Moreover, 
the composition of companies best able to exploit economies of scale 
and scope will not change much.  Open network architecture does not 
234 See, e.g., DAVIS MERRITT, PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE:  WHY 
TELLING THE NEWS IS NOT ENOUGH xv (1995) (citing study that shows that citizens 
with “great confidence” in television news and newspaper news fell from 55% to 
25% and from 50% to 20% respectively between 1998 and 1993).   
235 See, e.g., COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 135, 159 (the Internet has 
reduced the power of concentrated media by creating the possibility for “diversity, 
accessibility and affordability.”).
236
 It is to achieve this free flow of data over broadband pipes that a number of 
commentators have argued for media policy reforms that prevent broadband 
distribution facilities from discriminating against content they do not own.  See 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 34-48 (2001); Mark A. Lemley and 
Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architecture of the 
Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 925 (2001); Mark Cooper, 
Open Access to the Broadband Internet:  Technical and Economic Discrimination 
in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2000).  These issues 
are joined in the pending FCC Notice of Inquiry, Nondiscrimination in the 
Distribution of Interactive Television Services Over Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321 
(2001). 
237
 The continuing value of distribution capacity to content companies is clear from 
the News Corp.-DirecTV merger, while the continuing value of content to 
companies with distribution capacity can be seen in the NBC-Universal merger.  
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disempower the giants of content production, aggregation, and 
distribution to the same degree that it empowers new content 
producers.  As new opportunities in media have arisen over the past 
century, such as broadcasting and DVD’s, those at the top of the 
media hierarchy have appropriated them.238 Given the logic of 
capitalism, which restlessly pursues new markets, the very same 
companies that control cable, satellite, broadcasting, and broadband 
delivery will come to acquire significant holdings in the digital 
mediascape.239  This is not to minimize the importance of new 
entrants, but simply to suggest that big media is here to stay.  
Audience behavior may be as important as internal industrial 
logic in limiting the movement of media audiences to vanguard 
providers.  The most popular websites are provided by the big media 
of cable and broadcast television.240  Even if the barriers to entry in 
video markets fell, the willingness of consumers to spread their 
attention over multiple outlets is relatively limited.  Data show that 
consumers with 100 or more channels typically watch only about 
238 See COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note xx at 378-80.
239
 The 2000 AOL-Time Warner merger was an example of this, although there the 
new media company acquired the old media company.  Smaller, but perhaps 
ultimately more transformative, acquisitions going the other way seem to be the 
trend today.  See, e.g., Shelley Solheim, Comcast Buys Tech TV, PC MAGAZINE, 
Mar. 26, 2004 at 1 (reporting on Comcast’s acquisition of Tech TV, which it has 
merged with G4, both gaming channels aimed at male 12-34 year olds). 
240 See, e.g., James G. Webster, et al, The Internet Audience: Web Use as Mass 
Behavior, 46  J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA, 1-12 (2002); Federal Communications 
Commission, Study 8, Consumer Survey on Media Usage, prepared by Nielsen 
Media Research, September 2002, Question 9, at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A17.pdf (reporting 
that 60% of survey respondents reported using web-based news sources affiliated 
with major television and newspaper outlets); TVKey Facts About Media Markets 
in America, Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union at 
http://www.democraticmedia.org/resources/filings/senatecom.pdf (May 2003) 
(reporting survey results showing that those who rely on online sources for news 
tend to use the web sites of major television or newspaper outlets); Mathew 
Hindman and Kenneth Neil Cukier, Measuring Media Concentration Online and 
Offline, at http://www.cukier.com/writings/webmedia-jan04.htm (reporting on 
large-scale study of online political information, showing that high-traffic sites 
benefit from a “winners-take-all” pattern absorbing the vast majority of hits).  For a 
similar point concerning weblogs, see Clay Shirky, Power Laws, Weblogs, and 
Inequality (2003), at http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html 
(reporting research results showing that 50% of weblog traffic is directed to the top 
12% of the blogs).   See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, It’s All About Control:  
Rethinking Copyright in the New Information Landscape, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 79 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock 
Netanel ed., 2002) (describing big media dominance in cyberspace).
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18.241  To the extent that promotion and branding are important in 
retaining this audience loyalty, it is the large integrated media 
company that has the resources to invest in and fully exploit strong 
brands, allowing it to stabilize audience habits.242  In addition, well-
branded networks are able to extend their brands through the launch 
of additional affiliated networks, like ESPN2 and ESPNews.  By 
increasing their dominance within a niche through channel 
proliferation and cross-selling, incumbent providers can reduce 
channel space or interest in rival networks.243
The impact of digital technologies on media industry structure, 
as on other market features, will be mixed.  Digital networks create 
opportunities for new players to reach audiences, but the costs of 
content development and promotion will remain barriers to entry.  
Moreover, big media will be attentive to these opportunities, 
exploiting them to retain consumer attention in the new media 
environment.     
4. Conclusion
This Section identified three related aspects of the production 
and sale of video products that disturb the satisfaction of consumer 
desires, resulting in narrow market failures.  First, the very nature of 
advertiser-supported media muffles the audience voice.  Second, 
programming costs and risks create pressures to aggregate large 
audiences and to develop programming with proven broad appeal, 
thus blunting the impact of distinct taste communities.  Third, these 
same pressures promote a market structure in which barriers to entry 
are fairly high, vertical and horizontal scale is rewarded, and 
programming choices are made with a view to satisfying short-term 
corporate goals.   
While new media dynamics in the form of digital abundance 
and audience control may ameliorate some of the narrow market 
failures, they will not correct them and may create new friction for the 
241
 Peter Grant, Manage TV-Channel Clutter, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 17, 
2003, at R6 (citing Nielsen Media Research estimates that the average viewer 
watches 15 out of 41-50 channels and 18 out of 121 or more channels).  See also
GANS, supra note xx at 30 (predicting that the same viewer concentration patterns 
will hold for Internet media sources).
242 See DOYLE, supra note xx at 145 (“the additional scale economies made possible 
by digitization” may increase big media’s advantage in branding).  See also 
TODREAS, supra note xx 182-187 (discussing power of incumbent brands in digital 
environment).
243 See, e.g., Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
16 FCCR 17312, 17323-25 (2001).
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sovereign consumer.  Audience control over advertising exposure 
may reduce advertisers’ power over program content, thereby 
amplifying the consumer’s voice in content choices.  More perfect 
price discrimination, especially when combined with new production 
efficiencies, may make media more responsive to the tastes of small 
audiences. As for industry structure, big media will probably have to 
share the audience with new content originators and distribution 
channels. 
This said, innovations resulting from new revenue and 
distribution models and new entry will be limited, benefiting some 
audience constituencies, but not others.  In particular, product gaps 
will remain in entertainment and news programming that is expensive 
to produce and unlikely to aggregate large audiences across product, 
temporal, and geographic markets.  Examples include documentary 
films and investigative journalism requiring significant research and 
upfront investment, news commentary and reporting not unduly 
reliant on government or commercial official statements, and certain 
kinds of scripted dramatic series or films.   Given these continuing 
gaps, market correction will continue to be a valid objective of media 
policy where narrow market failures persist.  
C. Broad Market Failures and Market Supplementation
The market correction justification for media policy, as Part II 
showed, conceives of the consumer as sovereign and is largely
reactive.  Media policy fashioned along these lines is, like the 
imperfect market, at the service of existing consumer wants.  As Part 
II also suggested, the achievement of media policy goals depends on 
aspirations that extend beyond consumer satisfaction.  Even if the 
market could give consumers exactly what they wanted, our media 
would not necessarily deliver what a strong democracy and civil 
society needs in terms of exposure to diversity, the forging of 
solidarity, and elevation outside of market exchanges.  That is 
because there are broad failures of the market to internalize the value 
of these goods. These aspirations thus call for supplementation of 
even well-functioning markets.  Yet digital networks challenge the 
efficacy of supplementation efforts. The following subsections 
identify past responses to broad market failures and show how digital 
technologies undermine these responses.      
1. Availability Mechanism in the Analog Mediascape
Market supplementation assumes that: (1) policy interventions 
can increase the production and distribution of media products that 
further media policy goals; (2) if such increases take place, 
individuals will consume and be affected by these products; and (3) 
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this consumption has social and political salience that transcends the 
value of consumer sovereignty.  As an instrumental matter, the second 
link in this chain is the most critical, and it is the weakest.  It is 
weakest because it assumes that consumption flows naturally from the 
availability of content – a process that I call the “availability 
mechanism.”  Policy interventions into the market, whether to correct 
narrow market failures or provide a diversion around broad ones, have 
encouraged or sponsored media products that are simply made 
available.  If the products are meant simply to satisfy consumer 
demand, availability is perhaps all that is required.244  But the 
availability mechanism is far less reliable in addressing broad market 
failures by bringing audiences to content that they have not 
demanded.
To be sure, it is possible for some kinds of media products to 
produce classic third-party positive externalities even if the 
availability mechanism fails and there is very little audience 
exposure.245  Prime examples of this kind of product are investigative 
reporting and even the passive filming of public bodies.  The press 
may serve a “watchdog” function of exposing and deterring abuses 
simply by documenting proceedings, even if no one is watching.246
Weblogs behave this way by circulating reports read by relatively 
few, but then picked up by other media organs for more general 
consumption.247
However, most media products will not produce benefits 
without being consumed.  Even if reporting has some impact without 
an audience, an audience will be necessary to maximize the rhetorical 
power of a report.  An audience will also be required whenever the 
positive value inheres in the experience of the media product itself 
244
 It should be noted that even if a consumer would choose a product if he knew 
about it, the consumer might remain ignorant of such products in a cluttered digital 
mediascape dominated by proprietary digital portals and search engines and heavily 
dependent on promotion.
245
 Civic republican theory, for example, holds that even those not directly exposed 
will benefit from those who are because well-informed people are likely to improve 
social, cultural, and political interactions. See Cass Sunstein, A New Deal for Free 
Speech, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 137, 155-56 (1994).  
246
 For arguments about the importance of the press as a surrogate for the public in 
the policing of the powerful, see David L. Protess et al, THE JOURNALISM OF 
OUTRAGE:  INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA (1991); 
Justice Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975).
247 See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION, 133-141 (1999) 
(discussing the catalytic effect of the Drudge Report’s website report on the sex 
scandal involving President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, leading to an explosion 
of mainstream media coverage).
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and in the content conveyed, rather than in the raw information or the 
mere fact of production.  This will be true, for example, for films, 
commentary, cultural events, dramas, satire, and sporting events, as 
well as news productions that seek to inform the public as well as 
affect the newsmakers. Content has no power to increase social 
solidarity or to expose citizens to diverse viewpoints without 
amassing an audience. 
In the analog world of channel scarcity and audience passivity, 
the problems with the availability mechanism were muted.  
Consumers could be expected to stumble across and consume content 
they did not initially demand because they were hungry for video 
content.  Channel abundance and audience control make these 
expectations unreasonable and, as discussed below, require new 
approaches to market supplementation. 
2. Availability Mechanism in the Digital Mediascape 
Digital abundance and consumer control undermine the 
availability mechanism in two ways.  They create an attention deficit 
by taking eyes away from content responsive to proactive media 
policy goals and they dilute the quality of attention even when the 
audience is “tuned in.”    
The claim that video consumption might yield solidarity or 
exposure to difference has always been fragile.  Theorists like Robert 
Putnam are suspicious of the media’s role in strengthening civic life 
and even blame television for destroying the social ties that existed 
when people spent leisure time on community pursuits.248  Whatever 
its drain on real-space activities, however, there is evidence that 
television had the power to expose the public to difference and forge 
consensus simply by being available.249 This power was created by, 
and largely dependent on, under conditions of channel scarcity and 
248
 Robert Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out:  The Strange Disappearance of Social 
Capital in America, 28 POL. SCI. AND POLITICS, [cite] (1995) (defining social 
capital as “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.”).  Similar 
views are common in relation to the destruction of Habermas’ public sphere.   See, 
e.g., PRICE, supra note xx at 28  (“broadcasting has become, at best, irrelevant to the 
operation of a democratic society and, at worst, so implicated in the harmful 
transformation of culture that the possibility of recuperation for an effectively 
institutionalized public sphere is dim indeed.”).  See also ROBERT M. ENTMAN, 
DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS:  MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN POLITICS
17-30 (1989).
249 See, e.g., Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us From Segmentation, in Roger G. Noll & 
Monroe E. Price, A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 99, 106 (1998) (“the shared 
experience of viewing [a single channel in Israel] often made for conversation 
across ideological divides.”). 
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attention abundance. The increase in content options over digital 
media, by fragmenting the audience and fraying attention, reduces 
audience exposure to products responsive to broad market failures.250
Thus, while market segmentation may mean more satisfaction of 
existing tastes, it likely means less common exposure to different 
tastes, less communion over shared tastes, and less provocation to 
change tastes.
Today, as the late media scholar Elihu Katz lamented, 
television “no longer serves as the central civic space; one can no 
longer be certain that one is viewing together with everybody else or 
even anybody else”.251 Taking advantage of interactive tools or 
distracted by a multitude of video options, consumers can easily 
choose not to be exposed to content that furthers media policy goals.  
Cass Sunstein’s book, Republic.com, expresses concern that Internet 
services reduce exposure to solidarity goods.252  Others have observed 
that personal video recorders and digital program guides operating in 
traditional television media reduce the likelihood that consumers will 
be exposed to media content they did not seek or will converge on the 
same programming in a democratically significant way.253 Given 
250 See supra notes xx and accompanying text.  See also ANG, supra note xx at 154-
5.  (“[W]hen ‘anarchic’ viewer practices such as zapping and zipping became 
visible, when viewing contexts and preferences began to multiply, …  the industry 
… had to come to terms with the irrevocably changeable and capricious nature of 
‘watching television’ as an activity.”); DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS 
COMMUNICATION THEORY, 407-410 (4th ed. 2003).  
251
 Katz, supra note xx at 101.
252
 Sunstein’s stalking horse, drawn from the online context, is the Daily Me news 
service that speaks to the user’s existing tastes and filters out information with 
which he does not agree or does not care about.  SUNSTEIN, supra note xx[republic] 
at 206 (“To the extent that numerous people are ‘personalizing’ … their experience 
through the creation of specifically tailored communications packages, there may 
well be a problem from the democratic point of view.”).  See also James W. Carey, 
Community, Public, and Journalism in MIXED NEWS, 1, 14 (in Jay Black ed., 
1997)(earlier raising the dangers of tailored news in cyberspace in the form of a 
“Daily Me” news service).  But cf. Hunter, supra note xx at 627-637 (arguing that 
there is no such thing as perfect filtering and fears on this score are greatly 
exaggerated).
253 NAPOLI, supra note xx at 150 (“[I]ncreases in the diversity of content can lead to 
decreases in the diversity of exposure … [such that] the objectives inherent in the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor may actually be undermined, rather than fulfilled, by 
policies designed to increase the diversity of content options available.”)  See also
J.G. Webster & P. F. Phalen, Victim, Consumer, or Commodity?  Audience Models 
in Communications Policy in AUDIENCEMAKING:  HOW THE MEDIA CREATE THE 
AUDIENCE 35 (J.S. Ettema & D.C. Whitney ed., 1994) (“If increasing diversity of 
content means that each individual is actually exposed to less diversity of 
expression, it’s hard to see how such a result facilitates the marketplace of ideas.”).
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quantity and control, viewers may deprive themselves of the shared 
experiences that are important to careful deliberation in a democracy.  
Digital technologies weaken the availability mechanism even 
when content penetrates information blizzards and information shields 
to reach the public.  The potency of any particular program to fulfill 
media policy goals will diminish with over-exposure and a reduction 
of quality attention.254 One the most striking statistics about media 
usage is that the increased use of one media tool does not result in a 
corresponding decrease in others.  For example, average television 
viewing increased between 1998 and 2001 from 1,551 to 1,661 hours 
per year.  Over the same period, average annual consumer Internet 
usage increased from 54 to 134 hours and average annual video game 
usage increased from 43 to 78 hours.255  Some of the gain in screen 
time came at the expense of books and other leisure activities, but 
much of the increase was due to simultaneous usage of video media 
and a net increase in screen time.256  This amount of total and 
simultaneous screen time tends to result in an information flow that 
“exceeds the interpretative capacity of the subject.”257 The 
overexposed and restless audience, even when reached by the 
availability mechanism, may not be reached in a meaningful way.  
It is not just the amount of information that is taxing, but also 
the degree to which viewers are responsible for the critical functions 
once exercised by content providers.258   Knowing the fragility of 
their audience’s attention, entertainment producers emphasize the 
sexy, violent, profane, graphic, and fast, sometimes at the expense of 
the more enduringly provocative.259  News and information producers 
254
 The use of “blizzard” in connection with information overload comes from the 
postmodernist theorist Jean Braudrillard.  See, e.g. JEAN BRUADRILLARD, Mass 
Media Culture, in REVENGE OF THE CRYSTAL:  SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE 
MODERN OBJECT AND ITS DESTINY, 1968-1983 (Paul Foss & Julian Pefanis, eds. 
and trans. 1990).  See generally STEVENSON, supra note xx at 157-161.  
255
 U.S. Bureau of Census, supra note xx at 720.
256 Id.  Video game usage and Internet usage are projected to increase by about 40% 
and 60% respectively by 2006.  Even television viewing is expected to increase 
along with the total number of hours per person per year devoted to media 
consumption.  Id.
257 STEVENSON, supra note xx at 157.
258 See KEANE, supra note xx at 182-3 (discussing Jean Baudrillard’s theory “that 
citizens will become trapped in a never-ending blizzard of information, without 
adequate free time to digest or make sense of the information flows which envelop 
them.”).
259 See, e.g., CROTEAU & HOYNES, supra note xx at 157-62 (citing proliferation of 
programming with shock value, including wild animal attacks, tabloid gossip, 
dysfunctional families, reality programming, sex, violence, and spectacle); Nancy 
2004] Media Policy Out of the Box 75
too tend to privilege the sensational and fast-moving over nuanced 
analysis.260  One of the consequences of channel proliferation is that 
news services are under growing pressure to reach an audience first, 
and to reach it audaciously.261  Viewers click remote control devices 
between 36 and 107 times an hour and three-quarters of Americans 
under thirty watch the news with a remote in hand.262  Producers 
cannot afford to tarry over content, whether by delaying release 
pending additional fact-gathering or by composing a slower story with 
greater critical nuance.263 More and more information reaches the 
viewer in a fairly undigested form.  This sort of stream-of-
consciousness reportage has the benefit of reducing the editor’s 
control over public opinion.264  At the same time, it burdens the 
audience’s already strained attention to make sense of information.
Although digital technology undermines the availability 
mechanism as a means for pursuing the proactive agenda of media 
policy, it opens up new possibilities for such pursuits as well.  It is 
with these that I conclude in the next section.   
IV.  Out of the Box Public Service Media
The vulnerability of the availability mechanism in the digital 
era impacts all facets of media policy, including both regulations and
subsidies.  But it is in the realm of media subsidies that media policy 
can make the most substantial strides in addressing broad market 
failures in the digital environment.  The current system of federal 
deWolf Smith, Slices of Life, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 25, 2004, at W2 (noting 
the popularity of plastic surgery programs like The Swan and Nip/Tuck, the latter of 
which was the top rated new series on basic cable in 2003).  See also TODD GITLIN, 
MEDIA UNLIMITED:  HOW THE TORRENT OF IMAGES AND SOUNDS OVERWHELMS 
OUR LIVES 87-95 (2003) (discussing the increase in frames per second and cutaway 
shots in film and video products).
260 LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 6 (1991) (arguing that ratings pressures lead 
to press obsession with “gossip rather than governance” and “titillation rather than 
scrutiny”).
261
 New research on the implications of the rush to “firstness” identifies a “spin 
bias” in the news that emerges from news outlets that ride on, and magnify, the spin 
created by other news outlets without independent deliberation or perspective.  
Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer, Media Bias (MIT Department of 
Economics Working Paper No. 02-33), at http://ssrn.com/abstratct_id=335800).
262 GITLIN, supra note xx at 72.
263 See HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 49-54 (2003) (describing the 
various tactics news organizations employ to mass produce news); GITLIN, supra
note xx at 96-97 (describing the affects of the sound bite on news production).
264 See, e.g., Ithiel de Sola Pool, Direct-Broadcast Satellites and Cultural Integrity
in TELEVISION IN SOCIETY 231 (Arthur Asa Berger ed., 1987) (“Simultaneous radio 
coverage of war, a moon walk or whatever absorbs and fascinates the mass audience 
directly, cuts out traditional local purveyors of information and interpretation.”).   
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media subsidies centers upon fairly meager support for public 
broadcasting265 and even more limited support for media production 
outside of the broadcasting system.266  These subsidy programs are 
flawed in manifold ways.267  The object here is not to propose specific 
institutional reforms, although institutional and legal reforms are 
necessary, but to show how media subsidies can further the proactive 
media policy agenda amid content abundance and attention scarcity.  
The first step is a commitment to subsidies as a major, not marginal, 
instrument of media policy.
A. Subsidy Policy and The First Amendment
Subsidies for the creation and dissemination of content that 
supplements the market are the most effective and constitutionally 
sound way to further proactive media policy goals.  
Consider the following regulation. To enhance speech 
diversity, the FCC orders television broadcasters to devote some of 
their digital transmission capacity to entertainment or informational 
programming “concerning issues related to minority audiences within 
the broadcaster’s community.”  At the outset, we can observe that 
even if such a rule were constitutional, it would not necessarily have 
the effect of enhancing robust and antagonistic exchange in a 
marketplace of ideas.  It might satisfy under-served audience 
segments, although even the achievement of this reactive goal is 
questionable given the resources it would take to develop compelling 
265
 Federal appropriations for public broadcasting activities were about $378 million 
in 2003, constituting approximately 15% of public broadcasting revenues.  CPB 
Appropriation History, at http://www.cpb.org/about/funding/appropriation.html. 
266
 These funds are made available primarily through the National Endowment for 
the Humanities.  NEH funding for all projects, including video media, has fallen 
precipitously over the last decade from $140.6 million and 2195 grants awarded in 
1990 to $106.8 million and 1290 grants awarded in 2001.  U.S. Bureau of Census, 
supra note xx at 772.  Funds made available through the National Endowment for 
the Arts, typically for non-video media, have fallen even more dramatically from 
$170.8 million and 4475 grants awarded in 1990 to $94 million and 2093 grants 
awarded in 2001.  Id.
267
 The public broadcasting system is famously troubled and beset by controversy as 
to its organization and output.  See, e.g., QUALITY TIME?  THE REPORT OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC TELEVISION (1993) (reviewing 
the problems, and recommending reform, of the public broadcasting system).  
Critiques of public broadcasting have come from both the left, see, e.g., JAMES 
LEDBETTER, MADE POSSIBLE BY…:  THE DEATH OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing that public television has adopted commercially-
driven strategies), and the right, see, e.g., PUBLIC BROADCASTING & THE PUBLIC 
TRUST (David Horowitz & Laurence Jarvik ed., 1995) (including essays arguing 
that public television has been captured by the left).
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programming.  But it would not involve audiences without preexisting 
interest in such minority issues.  
Even if the regulation were effective, it would encounter 
serious constitutional problems.  Policies that seek to promote 
particular types of media content, like the “minority programming 
regulation,” will in many cases be content-based.268  Content-based 
regulations will generally only pass muster under the First 
Amendment if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.269  Although the Supreme Court has applied a 
less stringent standard to content-based regulations of broadcasting on 
the grounds that broadcast frequencies are scarce,270 this relaxed 
scrutiny has not been extended to other electronic media.271
Moreover, its continued vitality with respect even to broadcast media 
is in considerable doubt.272  The consensus opinion is that it is just a 
268
 Speech regulations that the government has adopted “because of [agreement or] 
disagreement with the message it conveys” are content-based.  Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1980).  By contrast, speech regulations that 
favor or disfavor speech without reference to the ideas or views such speech 
expresses are content-neutral.  City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
269 See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).  See generally, KATHLEEN 
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 212-217 (2nd ed. 
2003).  Content-neutral regulations are subjected to an intermediate level of 
scrutiny, and are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to further an important or 
substantial governmental interest.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 
(1994); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
270
 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969) (upholding Fairness 
Doctrine  requirement that broadcasters provide opposing viewpoints on matters of 
controversy on grounds that broadcasting required access to physically scarce 
airwaves licensed by government); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) 
(upholding broadcast ownership regulations on grounds of the scarcity of broadcast 
airwaves). 
271 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 51 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (rejecting Red Lion’s First 
Amendment approach for Internet regulations); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 637-41 (1994) (rejecting Red Lion’s First Amendment approach for 
cable television regulations).  Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding 
Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 146 (Red Lion has 
had “rather little gravitational force”).
272
 The First Amendment exceptionalism for broadcasting has been criticized in the 
academic literature, see, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the 
Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003); 
Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1993); 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today:  A 
Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L. J. 151, 151-52; 
Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast 
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982), and in the courts, see, e.g., FCC v. 
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (acknowledging criticism of 
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matter of time before the Supreme Court buries the scarcity rationale, 
subjecting broadcast regulation to the same scrutiny as other types of 
speech regulation.273  The result will be an even heavier reliance on 
content-neutral structural regulations (e.g., ownership restrictions), 
which themselves are being subjected to more rigorous constitutional 
scrutiny as courts grow more solicitous of corporate speech.274 The 
bottom line is that the “minority programming regulation” will be 
constitutional, if at all, only for broadcasting – a diminishing 
component of the digital mediascape – and only for the near term.  
The use of subsidies, in the form of cash or non-cash 
incentives, permits government to pursue media policy goals across 
all media and with far less formidable First Amendment constraints.  
Moreover, subsidies are most effective in advancing a proactive 
media policy agenda.  Let us replace our minority programming 
regulation with a subsidy in the form of a grant for multi-media 
content concerning minority populations. Suppose that grant criteria 
include indicia of content quality and a compelling outreach program 
using such techniques as search engines, community screenings and 
events, school curricula, blogs, and marketing to increase exposure.     
Government grants are subject to far less exacting First 
Amendment review than are government regulations.275  The 
“minority programming subsidy” would almost certainly be 
constitutional, even though it discriminates on the basis of content, so 
long as a preference for “minority programming” was not a cover for 
invidious viewpoint discrimination.276  This is not to say that the 
the scarcity doctrine in light of new communications technologies, but asserting 
Court’s unwillingness “to reconsider [its] longstanding approach without some 
signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so 
far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.”); 
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, 
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing scarcity as basis of 
special First Amendment treatment for broadcasting).
273 See, e.g., Phil Weiser, Promoting Informed Deliberation and A First Amendment 
Doctrine for a digital Age:  Toward a New Regulatory Regime for Broadcast 
Regulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE MEDIA 11 (Simone 
Chambers 7 Anne Costain eds., 2000).  The FCC itself repudiated the scarcity 
rationale when it abrogated large parts of the Fairness Doctrine.  Syracuse Peace 
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5843 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).    
274 See Baker, supra note xx [Media Concentration].
275 See Goodman, supra note xx at 231-38.
276
 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding 
against facial challenge federal art subsidies conditioned on artistic merit and 
general standards of decency).   Some public broadcasting entities today are not 
only subsidized by the federal government, but are themselves government entities.  
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value judgments involved in selecting media projects to subsidize will 
never call for constitutional scrutiny.  The tensions between policy 
goals and the free speech interests of grantees are evident in the 
implementation of tax policy,277 copyright policy,278 and of course 
broadcast policy.279  In the context of public service media, these 
tensions have been addressed to some extent by interposing 
institutional buffers like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
between producers and government.280  Given the inherently political 
process of subsidizing media, these buffers will always be under 
pressure.281  Steps that make media subsidies more effective will 
intensify constitutional scrutiny, but they need not increase 
constitutional infirmity.  It is to these steps that we now turn.
In such cases, the media content choices they make may constitute government 
speech, which is subject to even more permissive First Amendment standards.  See
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding federal subsidies that discriminate 
on the basis of viewpoint on the grounds that the government is not penalizing 
speech, but ensuring that public funds be spent for authorized purposes.); 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995) (in striking down public university’s policy forbidding the use of subsidies 
for student publications by those that promote or manifest religious belief, clarifying 
that viewpoint discrimination is only permissible when government itself is the 
speaker).  But cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-4 
(1998) (in upholding right of state-owned public television station to exclude 
qualified candidate from station-sponsored political debate, relying on the fact that 
the station’s selection criteria were viewpoint neutral).  See generally, Randall P. 
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1377, 1437-45 (2001).
277 See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking 
down state sales tax that exempted particular kinds of magazines for 
unconstitutional content-based discrimination within a class of media).
278 See Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th
Cir. 2001) (upholding copyright subsidies, in the form of a compulsory copyright 
license, for satellite broadcasters that carry local broadcast stations against a claim 
that such subsidies unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of local content).
279 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating federal 
statutory prohibition on editorializing by noncommercial broadcast stations 
receiving public funds as unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech).
280
 47 U.S.C. 396 (2003)(authorizing the establishment of a nonprofit Corporation 
for Public Broadcasting to funnel federal funds to noncommercial television and 
radio stations and producers).
281
 For example, public broadcasting is continually subject to political attack for its 
performance on the statutory goal that CPB-grantees pursue “objectivity and 
balance” in their programming. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2003).  See, e.g., Ken 
Auletta, Big Bird Flies Right, THE NEW YORKER, JUNE 7, 2004, at 42 (reporting on 
political pressure exerted on PBS for allegedly left-leaning programming).  
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B. Possibilities for Reform
If media policy is to address broad market failures as well as 
narrow ones, to broaden exposure to difference, increase social 
integration, and provide meaningful non-market content alternatives, 
it can only be by taking more seriously the availability mechanism’s 
limitations.  It can only be by tackling content consumption as well as 
content availability in the digital mediascape.  Scholars are beginning 
to recognize the importance of consumer exposure, as well as media 
supply, to the achievement of media policy goals.282  Several have 
urged in general terms,283 or in more specific ones,284 that government 
should invest more in public service media content.  These proposals, 
although headed in the right direction, do not adequately address the 
implications of content abundance and attention scarcity.  Additional 
screen clutter, without more, will not achieve proactive media policy 
goals.285
The “more” that is needed is a public service media agenda 
focused on two clear goals.  First, subsidies should be targeted to 
respond to narrow market failures by supporting the production of 
content that will be under-produced even in the digital era.  These 
products were identified in Part III.286  Persistent challenges to public 
282 See, e.g., NAPOLI, supra note xx [Foundations] at 146-152 (arguing that 
“exposure diversity” or patterns of media consumption by individuals (vertical) and 
across fragmented media offerings (horizontal) ought to be taken into account in 
formulating diversity policy).  
283 See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note xx at 305-307 [Rich Media]; BAKER, supra 
note xx at 116.
284
 Some have proposed the creation of new deliberative Internet domains
SUNSTEIN, supra note xx at 170-72; ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION
205 (1999) (proposing a PublicNet domain to showcase underrepresented artists and 
activists, whose icon would appear on desktops and browsers). They have also 
proposed that government subsidize cyberspace content to encourage public debate.  
SUNSTEIN, supra note xx at 180-2.  These proposals are on top of proposals to 
revive and extend erstwhile broadcast regulations, like the Fairness Doctrine, into 
cyberspace, for example by requiring linking to contrasting perspectives.  
SUNSTEIN, supra note xx at 186-9.
285
 As Dan Hunter has noted wryly with respect to Sunstein’s proposals:  “This is 
Cass as Kevin Costner:  ‘If you build it, they will come.’  The sad truth is that they 
will not come.  They will not even know it exists.  And even if they did, the people 
about whom we should be concerned will filter it out.” Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 611, 664 (2002) (book review).  See also TRACEY, supra note xx at 
280 (making a similar point about public broadcasting whose “heady optimism 
about ordinary folk … [is a] “’field of dreams’ optimism:  build the institution as a 
vehicle for superior entertainment, quality journalism, insight and boldness, 
excellence in all that is done – construct that architecture – and they will come.”).
286 See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
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service media on the grounds that niche channels like Discovery and 
CSPAN now provide adequate commercial substitutes miss this 
point.287  As we have seen, digital networks will reduce, but not 
eliminate, narrow market failures.  There is likely to continue to be an 
underproduction of programming that is high-risk and high-cost, and 
that appeals to smaller audience segments.288
Second, public service media should look beyond the 
availability mechanism in supplementing the market.  If media 
subsidies are to advance both proactive and reactive policy agendas, 
they must boost consumption of, and critical engagement with, the 
content they support.  This may involve outreach to promote content 
using the tools of digital media, such as program guides and search 
engines.  It may involve the production of new forms of content such 
as virtual reality games or the sponsorship of peer-produced content 
and the use of all media platforms, including broadband. Most 
centrally, it requires efforts to foster meaningful exposure to content, 
of whatever type and distributed by whatever means.  
The public journalism movement shows how some segments 
of the commercial press are attempting to respond to information 
abundance and attention scarcity.  In the early 1990’s, print journalists 
began to develop a theory of journalism that challenged the 
conception of journalists as dispassionate observers.  Instead, what 
came to be called civic or public journalism vested journalists with a 
responsibility to promote active deliberation over issues of common 
287 See, e.g. John Motavalli, PBS Facing Crisis: Infighting, Low Ratings, Lack of 
Hits Put Added Pressure on Public TV, TELEVISION WEEK at 1 (Oct. 20, 2003) 
(discussing “serious challenge” to public television posed by niche cable channels).
288
 One need only compare the critical awards garnered by public television and 
commercial television documentaries to perceive that the two kinds of product 
perform different functions. From 1998-2002, public television received 40 
Peabody awards, widely considered the most prestigious award for excellence in 
television.  This is nearly twice as many as any other television programmer (HBO 
received 21 in this period) and four times more than any of the commercial 
broadcast networks (ABC received 10). Data gathered from 
http://www.peabody.uga.edu.  Between 1999 and 2003, public broadcasting was the 
only television winner of the duPont-Columbia gold baton for news excellence, 
winning for a documentary on the rise of Islamic terrorism, a documentary about 
post-apartheid South Africa, and for the Nova series’ excellence in science 
reporting.  Data gathered from http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/events/dupont/.  For an 
enlightening study of how the goals and methods of public television production 
differ from those of commercial television, see DORNFELD, supra note xx at 181 
(describing a producer’s struggle “to traverse the gap between the popular 
sensibilities historically attributed to and expected from television … and the 
demands of ‘enlightened’ educational enrichment – with its scientific authenticity 
and substantiality, verbal exposition, and extractable intellectual conclusions.”).
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concern and enhance the problem-solving capabilities of citizens.289
According to one of the public journalism movement’s leaders, the 
movement “is about forming as much as informing a public.”290  In 
what others have called an effort to increase “social capital,” those 
engaged in public journalism seek to further exposure to difference 
and consensus over the common.291  Here is the aspirational aspect of 
media policy laid bare.292  In order to satisfy these aspirations, public 
journalism has pioneered the use of digital tools and real space events 
to capture audience attention.293
Digital technologies provide new tools as well as new 
challenges for a proactive policy agenda.  In the spirit of the public 
journalism movement, policy interventions aimed at exposing viewers 
to programming with positive externalities could use the same digital 
tools that commercial media use to aggregate audiences.294  It turns 
out, for example, that consumers are drawn to the same content that 
others are consuming.295 Digital technologies exploit these 
289
 A popular explication of the public journalism philosophy is in JAMES FALLOWS, 
BREAKING THE NEWS (1996).  See generally, Lewis A. Friedland & Sandy Nichols, 
Measuring Civic Journalism’s Progress:  A Report Across a Decade of Activity (A 
Study Conducted for The Pew Center for Civic Journalism) 5-15 (2002), at
http://www.pewcenter.org/doingcj/research/index.html.  
290
 Paul McMasters, A First Amendment Perspective on Public Journalism in 
MIXED NEWS 188, 191 (Jay Black ed., 1997) (quoting Jay Rosen).  
291 See Martin Brookes, Watching Alone: Social Capital and Public Service 
Broadcasting (May 2004) published by The Work Foundation in partnership with 
the BBC, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/pdf/watching_alone.pdf.  The term 
social capital has been picked up and morphed into “civic capital” in the public 
journalism movement.  Civic capital is created when journalists do their work “in 
ways calculated to help public life go well by engaging citizens in it.”  David 
“Buzz” Merritt, Public Journalism, Independence and Civic Capital … Three Ideas 
in Complete Harmony, in MIXED NEWS 180, 182 (Jay Black ed., 1997).
292
 Although some non-commercial media entities have engaged in public 
journalism, the movement has been concentrated in commercial newspapers.
293 See, e.g., Friedland & Nichols, supra note xx at 12-14 (describing public 
journalism’s sponsorship of public deliberative events and the use of “explanatory 
framing” to draw readers into an issue in all its complexity by stressing the 
relevance and impact on community and personal lives).
294
 Scholars have recognized the power of digital tools to foster social integration in 
virtual settings or through real time networked communication.  See, e.g., SHAPIRO, 
supra note xx at 120 (“one of the wondrous qualities of  [a digital network] is the 
way it allows users to break down boundaries, erase distances, and build 
alliances.”).  See also id. at 203 (“With its potential for individual empowerment 
and unfettered citizen interaction, the Internet has been a harbinger of a society in 
which citizens will engage one another in the vital conversations of a democracy.”).  
295 See Pesach, supra note xx at 1084-85 (discussing cultural network effects and 
distinguishing them from economic network effects on the grounds that more users 
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bandwagon effects by alerting viewers to content they might share 
with others.296 Public service media might enlist these same 
technologies to promote and draw consumers to content that furthered 
media policy goals, particularly community-building content.  In 
doing so, the concept of community need not be limited to the 
geographically proximate as it has been in localism policy.297  The use 
of interactive tools and distributed digital networks to produce and 
disseminate content can produce community in ways that were not 
possible in the analog world.
C. Real World Beginnings
Some of these concepts are being implemented in the existing 
public television community.298  These approaches take media out of 
the box and put it online, in schools, libraries, museums, and the 
workplace, leveraging investments in high quality content to achieve 
really does increase value for the latter, but only the perception of value for the 
former).
296
 Personal video recorders typically recommend programming that is similar to 
what the consumer routinely views or that media companies have paid to promote, 
reinforcing personal preferences and market hierarchies.  But the same technology 
will also be able to tell viewers what others are watching, perhaps furthering at least 
the centripetal impulse.  See Peter Grant, Manage TV-Channel Clutter, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 17, 2003, at R6.  
297
 47 C.F.R. § 73.1120 (2003) (defining the location broadcast licensees are to 
serve as “a principal community (city, town or other political subdivision)). Glen 
Robinson, among others, has criticized the localism principle for its fidelity to the 
physical community as the object to media policy.  Glen O. Robinson, The 
Electronic First Amendment:  An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L. J. 899, 942-43
(1998) (“in a world where information can be pulled or pushed from every corner of 
the planet, there is something almost quaint about the idea of linking localism and 
modern information services.”).  See also Yoo, supra note xx at 1668.  For support, 
but reformulation, of the localism principle, see Andrew Calabrese, Why Localism?  
Communication Technology and the Shifting Scales of Political Community, in 
COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 251, 267 (Gregory J. Shepherd et al. ed., 2001) 
(calling for a “revised concept of, and renewed commitment to, localism” aimed at 
enhancing democratic participation in the “translocal community”).
298 See Richard Somerset-Ward, Public Television in the Digital Age:  A Community 
Partner, a Digital Perspectives Background Paper in LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN & 
NEWTON N. MINOW, A DIGITAL GIFT TO THE NATION:  THE 2001 REPORT 239 
(2001), available at http://www.digital 
promise.org/about/digital_gift/backgroundpapers/17_somerset-ward.pdf (providing 
examples of and recommendations for public television community partnerships in 
developing and disseminating video content and exploiting digital technologies).  
See also DAVID W. KLEEMAN, ONE MISSION, MANY SCREENS:  A PBS/MARKLE 
FOUNDATION STUDY ON DISTINCTIVE ROLES FOR CHILDREN’S PUBLIC SERVICE 
MEDIA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 52-68 (2002) (identifying and proposing successful 
community partnerships in the development and dissemination of children’s 
programming).
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greater impact and exploiting and enhancing new production and 
distribution capabilities.  
The examples identified below arise in a traditional public 
broadcast context and are limited by the existing constraints of the 
Public Broadcasting Act, public television funding, and political 
pressures.299  As a result, they address a relatively narrow range of 
topics and focus heavily on the broadcast medium.  However, they 
illustrate ways in which public service media might forge exposure to 
media content, in the service of proactive media policy goals, and 
develop desired content that would otherwise not be produced, in the 
service of reactive goals. 
• The production of Bill Moyers’ 2002 documentary on humane dying, 
On Our Own Terms, involved $2.5 million and two years of outreach 
work to accompany the program.  Months before the program aired, 350 
hospitals, universities, community organizations and local public 
television stations had already enrolled to participate in a 90-minute 
training videoconference on the conduct of town meetings, the staffing 
of hotlines, and the delivery of professional training.300
• Breaking the Cycle, a documentary on the working poor, provides 
another example of this multimedia, multi-institutional approach to 
video programming.  Filming over a two-year period for release in the 
fall of 2005, producers are developing a sophisticated outreach program 
in connection with the film to target families, workers, and employers, 
to offer workplace training, and to provide media resources in family 
299
 In addition to a severe shortage of funds, one of the chief impediments to more 
innovative content development and dissemination within the existing public 
service media structure is that the Public Broadcasting Act limits the expenditure of 
funds to “public telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(1)(C).  
300 See Geneva Collins, Outreach Complements Moyers’ On Our Own Terms, 
CURRENT (Oct. 30, 2000), at http://www.currrent.org/outreach/out020dying.html.  
In Iowa alone, at least 73 towns and cities, with the assistance of Iowa 
Public Television, held events related to the series.  Id.  Similarly ambitious 
efforts were undertaken in Philadelphia.  The local public television station, 
WHYY, formed Caring Community, a volunteer coalition comprised of experts 
from more than 75 partners representing non-profit organizations, academic 
institutions, government agencies, faith-based organizations and health care systems 
in the region.  Among Caring Community’s efforts was a 15-part follow on series 
called Finding Our Way:  Living with Dying in America, which WHYY and its 
partners supplemented with related resources.  Interview with William J. Marrazzo, 
President and CEO, WHYY-TV in Philadelphia, PA (July 2003).  See also
WHYY’s Caring Community Coalition, http://www.whyy.org/about/report03/wh-
caring.html. See generally, PDIA Newsletter:  PBS Series On Our Own Terms:  
Moyers on Dying Attracts High Ratings and Fosters National Dialogue (Mar. 2001), 
at http://www.soros.org/death/newsletter8/onourownterms.html.
2004] Media Policy Out of the Box 85
leadership and economic development.301  In addition, national and local 
partners, including the Children’s Defense Fund and the Urban Institute, 
have lined up to provide resources “to strengthen community and 
neighborhood services for low income workers to improve their job 
skills.”302
• Exploiting connections with schools and online resources, Lost Children 
of Rockdale County developed exposure to a 1999 documentary about 
an outbreak of syphilis among teenagers in an affluent, suburb of 
Atlanta.  The Peabody-award winning documentary, reviewed as 
“[s]hocking and explicit without sensationalizing,” probed adolescent 
disaffection, sexual promiscuity, and substance abuse.303  Because of 
outreach efforts, including an online teacher’s guide for introducing the 
program to adolescent students,304 and an interactive website with expert 
guidance on various teenage problems,305 the program had lasting 
impact. 
• In Kentucky in the spring of 2001, a public broadcasting station 
encouraged all readers in the state to consume and discuss the same 
book, Kentucky author Barbara Kingsolver’s The Bean Trees.  More 
than 130 educational institutions, bookstores, schools, businesses, media 
outlets, and civic and social service organizations participated.  
Materials about the book and promotions were distributed through book 
club electronic networks, and the public station devoted a month to the 
book, offering a profile of the author, live call-in programs, and an on-
air panel discussion.  Public radio stations simulcast or repeated the 
programming.  In the end, the book was distributed throughout 
classrooms and adult education centers, bookstores and libraries, and 
close to 10,000 readers registered to participate in online discussions.306
301
 See National Center for Outreach, Outreach Pipeline, at
http://www.nationaloutreach.org/PIPELINE/Pipeline.pdf; see also Making 
Connections Media Outreach Initiative:  Breaking the Cycle, at
http://www.aecf.org/initiatives/mc/communications/mcmoi/btc_about.htm.
302 See id.
303 See The Lost Children of Rockdale County:  Press Reaction, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/georgia/etc/press.html. The 
reviews also recognized that The Lost Children of Rockdale County is the type of 
show that would be unlikely to air on commercial television.  See id. (The program 
“makes the way NBC uses the phrase ‘must-see TV’ seem a mockery.  It is also a 
welcome reminder of the special thing that is ‘Frontline.’” (quoting Chicago 
Tribune review)). 
304 See The Lost Children of Rockland County:  Teacher’s Guide, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/lost/.  
305 See The Lost Children of Rockland County:  Interviews, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/georgia/interviews/.
306 See Digital Alliances:  Partners in Public Service, Models for Collaboration 12 
(Penn State University 2002), at
http://www.benton.org/publibrary/index.html#Television-CommunityMedia.
86 Media Policy Out of the Box                     [Vol.__:__]
• In Minnesota, public television’s efforts to leverage its own technology 
and resources to partner with local organizations resulted in distinctly 
local content and community-oriented public service.  A Minneapolis 
public station has dedicated a substantial part of its broadcast channel to 
an initiative called the Minnesota Channel Partners’ Collaborative, 
which produces, promotes, and broadcasts non-profit partners’ most 
valuable content.307  The partners help provide the content and pay 
production costs, but the station provides production assistance and 
quality control, assuring that the product is of high quality.308  The 
content is frequently used in community events, performances, and 
presentations.
• WNYE-TV, a public station owned by the New York City Department 
of Education, used just $750,000 to create School Night, a weekly 
primetime program engaging more than 3000 public school students in 
the production of programming geared to their peers.  The station 
produced 78 programs, including a quiz show combining academic 
knowledge and street smarts.309  It enlisted a prominent local 
documentary filmmaker to help more than 150 New York City public 
school kids to produce and narrate their own documentaries.  Exploiting 
other local talent, the station employed more than 3000 students in 
creating a talk show, featuring famous graduates from New York City 
high schools, including Tim Robbins, Al Sharpton, Harvey Keitel, 
astronauts, and physicists.310
These projects are merely prototypes of what might be a far 
more robust and extensive public service media.  They are bound by 
yesterday’s analog technologies and real space encounters, with 
limited use of digital technologies beyond the Internet.  Moreover, 
they are limited by the failure of media policy to set a course for 
public service media that would reduce reactive ratings pressures in 
favor of explicitly proactive media policies.  Nevertheless, from these 
307
 Through the initiative, the station has worked with the St. Paul Chamber 
Orchestra, the Mayo Clinic, the University of Minnesota, and the Minnesota 
Department of Agriculture among others.  These collaborations have resulted in a 
six-hour block of exclusively Minnesota-related programming.  Telephone 
interview with James R. Pagliarini, President & CEO Twin Cities Public Television 
(July 2, 2003).  See also About MN Channel, 
http://www.tpt.org/mnchannel/about.html.
308
 Once production of a program is completed, the station, Twin Cities Public 
Television, retains local broadcast rights (at least three broadcasts within one year 
of production) and the partner is free to use the program for other educational, 
promotional or fund-raising purposes.  Id.
309
 Statement of Ned Kandel, General Manager, WNYE TV, delivered to 
Conference on Media Diversity and Localism:  Meaning, Metrics, and the Public 
Interest, Fordham University (December 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the author).
310 Id.
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examples emerge some basic ingredients for a future public service 
media.  These include community outreach, widespread talent 
development and exploitation, synergistic partnerships with other 
non-market actors, the leveraging of content over multiple platforms, 
and, perhaps most importantly, a focus on media consumption as well 
as production.
V. Conclusion
Digital media demand a new precision in defining policy goals 
and new means for achieving them.  Theories about the democratic 
significance of media that are premised on audience exposure must 
contend with an over-exposed and discriminating audience.  If we 
take seriously the contingent quality of consumer wants – a notion at 
the heart of media policy aspirations – then it is important to theorize 
more deeply about how media policy might influence the 
consumption as well as supply of media content in the public interest.  
Subsidies for a robust public service media, as opposed to media 
regulations, are the most promising and constitutionally acceptable 
way to affect consumption patterns.
The invigoration of public service media as a more powerful 
instrument of media policy would implicate a number of existing 
communications rules.  It would require an expansion of funding to 
entities and activities beyond broadcasting.  It would require the 
reorganization of public broadcast facilities and institutions, shifting 
resources from passive distribution of video content to production and 
more active models of engagement.  Perhaps most significantly, it 
would demand a coherent and express statement of purpose for 
structuring Congressional appropriations and standards of 
accountability for public service media.  The purpose would be to 
respond to both narrow and broad market failures with content that is 
judged not only by the audience it pulls in, but by the audience to 
which it is pushed out.
